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In this comparative policy development analysis, I utilize path-dependence theory 
and presidential records to analyze President Lyndon Johnson’s success in passing 
Medicare and Medicaid and President Bill Clinton’s failure to pass national health care 
reform. Findings support four major themes from the Johnson administration: 1) 
President Johnson had a keen understanding of the importance of language in fr ming 
debate; 2) He placed control of the legislative process in the hands of a small, select 
group of seasoned political operatives and career policymaking professionals; 3) He paid 
considerable attention to the details of negotiations and the policy c nsequences; and 4) 
He had a highly developed sense of the political and legislative processes involved in 
passing major legislation. The case study of the Clinton administration reveals five major 
 viii  
themes: 1) There is a lack of evidence that President Clinton remained actively engaged 
throughout the policy development and legislative processes, instead choosing to deleate 
the process to the First Lady; 2) There was a naiveté on the part of the Clintons and many 
administration staff members with regard to the legal and political ramifications of their 
decisions; 3) The Clintons tried to make the plan fully their own, sharing little credit for 
its development with Congress; 4) Their attempts to incorporate existing corporate health 
care delivery structures with their vision for universal coverage proved unworkable; and 
5) The extended time from task force launch to bill delivery gave opponents ample time 
to marshal their opposition forces. I conclude that in developing health care legislation, 
Johnson had the advantages of: 1) a small group of key policymakers; 2) multiple, 
simultaneous legislative initiatives which diffused the attention of a more limited media; 
and, 3) national crises which promoted an environment conducive to sweeping policy 
change. I suggest that major, national health care reform will not occur until: 1) an 
economic or geopolitical crisis sets the stage for change; 2) business interests and 
progressive interests find common ground; and, 3) Americans achieve a new cultural 
understanding of universal health care as both economically just and eco omi ally 
necessary. 
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Chapter 1: 
Sick of Being Uninsured 
Imagine the scene: The United States, the oldest functioning democracy and one 
of the wealthiest nations on Earth, faces a health care crisis. Although employer-based 
coverage is the backbone of the system, tens of millions of Americans still have no access 
to health insurance, and medical costs are increasing. Despite the crisis, members of 
Congress have bowed to pressure from business and special interest group  and blocked 
almost all attempts to reform the health care system. 
 Onto the stage steps the President of the United States, a tall southerner by birth 
from a conservative state. He is a Democrat by party affiliation, and his party controls 
both houses of Congress. He is a charismatic leader, a master of political persuasion not 
above changing his positions to match the times, yet not without his insecurities. Elected 
multiple times at the state level, he wins his first national election by an ultra-slim 
margin. In his inaugural address, he would say “In a land of healing miracles, neighbors 
must not suffer and die untended” (Woolley & Peters, 2007). 
If it sounds like Bill Clinton had his hands full in 1993, he did. But the preceding 
description is of Lyndon Baines Johnson, 36th President of the United States, who would 
win his second national election, and first Presidential election, by what has often been 
termed the “liberal landslide of 1964.” Despite facing obstacles that had plagued previous 
presidents with ambitions to reform the health care system, he pressed for and achieved 
passage of the Social Security Amendments of 1965. These amendments instituted 
Medicare and Medicaid, programs that have provided health coverage for milli ns of 
aged and impoverished Americans since 1966. 
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Federal health policy found its beginnings a century ago with the passage of the 
first Workers’ Compensation laws in 1908, offering workers at least minimal protection 
in the event of work-related injuries. The drive toward national health insurance began 
soon after in 1912, led by the American Association for Labor Legislation (AALL) and 
initially supported by the National Association of Manufacturers and the American 
Medical Association (Weathers, 2004). While the AMA eventually withdrew its support 
for a national health care plan, social workers were there during the early days of the 
progressive movement (Brosco, 1994; Poen, 1979), actively worked with the AALL
(Kreader, 1988), and have remained actively interested in and supportive of an expanded 
federal health policy ever since (Hoffman, 1996; Kim, 1990; Millner, 1991). Over the 
course of the 20th century, the country also saw two major presidential efforts to ins itute 
federal health care policies. The first effort resulted in success with the passage of the 
Social Security Amendments of 1965 under President Johnson, bringing Medicare and 
Medicaid programs for the aged and poor into existence. The second effort, the attempt to 
pass a national health care plan to ensure coverage of all Americans in the early 1990s by 
President Clinton, ended in failure. This dissertation focuses on the proc sses of policy 
formulation and adoption associated with each period in an effort to illuminate the cri ical 
elements and processes necessary for successful policy change. The result of this analysis 
is to inform progressives, including social workers and their allies, of a potential way 
forward to universal health care in the United States in the 21st century.  
While Johnson and Clinton share many similarities, the differencs are equally 
noteworthy. Johnson had a veto-proof majority in Congress, and a filibuster-proof 
majority in the Senate. Clinton’s majorities were slimmer. Johnson was elected with a 
landslide majority of 61 percent of the popular vote, in part due to an expanding economy 
and his inheritance of the country’s trust in the wake of the JFK assassination (Goodwin, 
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1991; L. B. Johnson, 1971; Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and Museum, 2006). 
Johnson inherited a populace who had experienced government efficacy in the form of 
New Deal and Social Security programs, as well as relativ y recent victory in World 
War II, defeating fascism. Cold War geopolitics, brought to a fear-inducing fever pitch by 
the Cuban missile crisis, contributed to Johnson’s 1964 victory as Republican nominee 
Barry Goldwater went far right on communism and Johnson answered Goldwater’s 
tactics by showing his own resolve against communism in the wake of the Gulf of Tonkin 
(Grubin, 1991; L. B. Johnson, 1971).  
Clinton inherited an economy in deep recession, a country in the midst of a 
startling electoral realignment, and a populace with diminished faith in government’s 
effectiveness, in part due to previous presidential administrations’ failures (H. Johnson & 
Broder, 1997; D. Morris & McGann, 2004). The Watergate scandals of Richard Milhous 
Nixon had severely eroded public faith in the presidency. The public lost faith in the 
efficacy of government as the economy faltered under Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter. 
The Reagan Revolution had led to deep division in the country as Ronald Reagan 
capitalized on the culture wars to bring the Republican Party back to power. Clinton was 
elected to his first term with only 43 percent of the popular vote, though he enjoyed a 
wide margin in the Electoral College.  
Factors outside the government also differed between the administrat ons. 
Organized labor, traditionally a bastion of support for the Democratic Party, was a much 
stronger force in the 1960s than in the early 1990s. Labor leaders supported b th the 
Johnson health care efforts and the Clinton efforts, but the decline in union membership 
during and following the Reagan administration meant that unions were considerably less 
effective in the Clinton case (Hacker, 1997; H. Johnson & Broder, 1997). The media 
explosion, both in terms of cable television programming and the Internet was a factor 
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Clinton faced that Johnson did not. This meant that the media had considerably more 
power to set the political agenda, and was available as a powerful wapon in a political 
battle. That conservatives and their allies made better use of that weapon in the Clinton 
health care battle than did progressives and their allies is in it elf an important historical 
and political lesson (H. Johnson & Broder, 1997; Lakoff, 2006; Skocpol, 1996).  
Clinton took office in a period influenced by the legacy of the Johnson 
Administration and the huge government insurance programs (i.e. Medicare and 
Medicaid) along with their rapidly escalating costs that had been in place for almost 30 
years. He also inherited the countervailing legacy of the Reagan nd George H. W. Bush 
administrations, both of which successfully engineered retractions in the growth of 
federal social welfare programs. 
What difference does the Clinton failure make now? Nearly fifteen years have 
passed since the whimpering death of the Health Security Act of 1994. There have been 
four presidential elections since that time and eight congressional elections. According to 
actuaries and economists at the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), 
health care spending is projected to continue its rise, from 16.2 percent of the gross 
domestic product of the country in 2007 to 20.3 percent in 2018, with spending projected 
to be $2.4 trillion in 2008 and $4.4 trillion by 2018 (Sisko, et al., 2009). Business is 
straining under the burden of benefit costs. Economic and political forces appear to be 
poised to make change difficult in the foreseeable future, with the recession leading CMS 
actuaries to predict that “differences in growth rates between national health spending 
and GDP are expected to be the greatest in 2008 and 2009” (Sisko, et al., 2009, p. w346). 
All these reasons, further explored below, make it important to study he policy 
formulation efforts of the two Democratic administrations. 
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Today, President Barack Obama–elected on a platform that included a promise of 
major health care reform–has inherited an economic crisis of a proportion unseen since 
the 1930s. Over $1 trillion has been authorized in stimulus spending, tax cuts, and bailout 
funds for the struggling financial sector, with trillions more obligated in the form of 
guarantees from the Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (Bhide, 2009). The public trust in government is being tested, particularly in 
the wake of the first round of spending on the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) 
under Bush’s Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson. TARP represented a $350 billion outlay 
that was followed by rounds of executive bonuses of an estimated $18 billion while banks 
continued to hoard the funds rather than increase lending as intended. Meanwhil , 
Congress has authorized a $787 billion stimulus package (Meckler, 2009) for which only 
three of the 219 Republicans on Capitol Hill voted (Hitt & Weisman, 2009), a 
demonstration of the country’s deep partisan and ideological divide that does not bode 
well for passing health care legislation that has the potential to increase spending. 
Republicans, who are supposed to be fiscal conservatives and who held majorities in 
Congress from 1994 to 2006, have followed a strategic initiative based on spending in 
such a way that later the government will be unable to sustain itself. Hacker and Pierson 
(2005) call this strategic initiative “Starving the Beast – Later” (p. 103).  
During the recent presidential primary campaigns, Barack Obama espoused a plan 
that appears, at least on its face, to be considerably more compli ated than competing 
ideas (such as single-payer, among others) and involves a partnership among employers, 
private insurers, beneficiaries, and the government. He named Tom Daschle, former 
senator from South Dakota, as the Secretary-Designate of the Departm nt of Health and 
Human Services. Daschle (2008) has put forth his own proposal for dealing with the 
health-care crisis. It entails opening the Federal Employee Health Benefits Plan (FEHBP) 
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to the public and establishing a Federal Health Board, similar to the Federal Reserve 
Board, which would be at least marginally politically independent, to control health care 
spending. Daschle withdrew his name from nomination in the wake of a scandal over his 
failure to pay a portion of his income taxes in past years. 
The Obama and Daschle plans differ radically from Clinton’s failed “managed 
competition” plan of 1993. If a new reform initiative is to succeed, it will be important to 
avoid repeating the mistakes of the early 1990s.  
This study is based on four orienting questions, the theoretical basis for which are 
explored in Chapter Two. In the interest of orienting the reader’s expectations about what 
is to come, I offer the orienting questions, without explanation at this point. These 
questions are: 
1) Relying on a modified approach based on Arthur’s (1994) path-dependence 
model:  
a) what historical factors, including political, economic, and direct 
health policy components, set the stage for the respective success and 
failure of the Johnson and Clinton health care policy initiatives,  
b) were those factors natural, accidental, or planned, and  
c) in what sequence did they occur to facilitate the respective 
outcomes? 
2) To what extent did the two presidents, their staffs, and legislator  of the two 
time periods act to foment or facilitate these factors, and, in the absence of any such 
direct action, in what ways did they react to or utilize these factors in pushing for passage 
of the respective presidential health care policy initiatives? 
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3) What were the barriers to legislative passage, and what steps, if any, did 
members of the respective administrations, legislators, and policy activists such as social 
workers take – or should they have reasonably taken – to overcome these barriers? 
4) To the extent that conditions have changed since the 1990s, what can social 
workers and allied policy activist groups do to:  
a) hasten the process of health care reform by reducing political barriers;  
b) recognize opportunities to advance reform initiatives;  
c) prepare for swift action when the path to new policy change options 
opens; and  
d) utilize strengths of the social work profession (e.g., case management, 
clinical skills, advocacy skills) to ease the transition to natio l health care if and 
when that time arises? 
A WORD ABOUT THE REMAINING CHAPTERS 
Chapter Two: “American Health Care at the Breaking Point” opens with a brief 
cultural and historical examination setting the stage for a consideration of the current 
state of health care and health-care related policy in the United States. This chapter 
discusses the importance of this study and provides a statement of the problems 
confronting any new effort at reforming health care in the United States. It al o includes a 
brief review of the major literature surrounding the topic. The literature is further 
explored in subsequent chapters as a way of verifying findings from the source 
documents used in this study as well as filling gaps in the presidential records. 
Chapter Three: “The Path-Dependent Nature of Federal Health Policy” addresses 
the theoretical framework for the ensuing comparative policy development analysis of the 
two administrations. The chapter includes the methodology that I used in developing the 
comparative policy development analysis, as well as the orienting questions that have 
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driven the research and subsequent analysis. Additionally, this chapter describes the data 
sources that were examined to answer the orienting questions. 
Chapter Four: “The Road to Medicare and Medicaid” further explores the history 
of federal health policy from the Progressive Era to Lyndon Baies Johnson’s ascent to 
the oval office. It examines the sequence and timing of relevant evets prior to his 
presidency. This chapter defines the early decisions that shaped the cultural and structural 
state of the health care delivery system prior to Medicaid’s enactment. 
Chapter Five: “For Such a Time as This” is a case study of Lyndon Baines 
Johnson’s presidential administration, the legislative tempo of that era, and the factors 
that converged to open the path to a massive shift in federal health policy. It includes an 
exploration of Johnson’s reaction to the opportunity, the political barriers faced in the 
reform effort, and the methods, tools, and techniques Johnson and his administratio  
utilized to overcome those barriers.  
Chapter Six: “The Interim” looks at the period following enactment a d 
implementation of Medicare and Medicaid from the mid-1960s to Bill Clinton’s election 
in 1992. It examines the path of federal health policy and the parallel p ths of medical 
inflation and the American labor movement as well as the effects of Medicare and 
Medicaid implementation on the political environment prior to Clinton’s assumption of 
the presidency. 
Chapter Seven: “Too Much Money, Too Little Time,” is a case study of William 
Jefferson Clinton’s presidential administration, his Task Force on National Health 
Reform, and the legislative and institutional conditions that halted his health care 
initiative. In this chapter, I examine the available evidence as to the Clinton team’s 
assessment and understanding of the options available to them for reform, as well as 
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activities undertaken by the Clinton administration and its constituencies that may have 
influenced the outcome of the initiative.  
Chapter Eight: “Lessons Learned” attempts to draw comparisons between the two 
presidents and their administrations as they each sought to createa massive shift in 
federal health policy. In this chapter, I attempt to consolidate the answers from the first 
three orienting questions into a cohesive and comprehensive path-dependence analysis of 
the two periods, leading to the final chapter’s exploration of the future. 
Chapter Nine: “The Road to Somewhere” focuses on the future of national health 
care in the United States given the paths that policy, the medical-industrial complex, and 
labor conditions have taken to date. The chapter opens with an analysis of po t-1994 
implications for federal health care policy. I then attempt to apply the lessons learned to 
both current conditions and predictions about the path ahead. This chapter focuss n 
answering the last of the orienting questions, stated briefly as: How do policy allies, 
including social workers, prepare for, recognize, and facilitate fu ure health policy 
reforms in the quest for social justice and access for all? 
CONCLUSION  
As the political system of the United States heats up again towards reform of its 
health care delivery and payment system, it is important to determin  what Americans 
must be able to expect from their leaders. Presidents Johnson and Clinton provide 
contrasting case studies in almost every way imaginable—contrasti g leadership styles, 
contrasting political experience, and, without question, contrasting policy outcomes. To 
date, there has been no comprehensive comparison of these two contrasting examples. If 
the United States is ever to achieve universal health care, it will be helpful for President 
Obama or some future president to understand the processes which have istorically led 
to a successful policy outcome. While there may be many paths to achieve a successful 
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policy change, avoiding historical mistakes should help move the policy frward more 
quickly. That is the purpose of this dissertation. 
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Chapter 2: 
 American Health Care at the Breaking Point 
CULTURAL AND STRUCTURAL DIMENSIONS LEADING TO THE STATUS QUO 
The United States is the only developed nation that does not have a 
comprehensive national approach to health care delivery. Rather, our system is fractured 
into a complicated web of government and private-sector types of insura ce-based 
coverage that creates a veritable “Turkish bazaar” of health care. On the government side, 
there is Medicare, Medicaid, the State Children’s Health Insurace Program, military 
hospitals (for active duty personnel), and the Veterans’ Administration hospitals and 
clinics (for military veterans). On the private side, large employers often utilize self-
insured plans, the next largest employers typically enroll employees in experience-rated 
group health insurance policies, and the self-employed typically choose either association 
plans—for example, group plans available for members of a business association or 
credit union—or individual plans. Meanwhile, roughly 46 million people are unins red 
and rely on emergency rooms, free or low-cost community clinics, or urgent-care clinics 
as their primary point of contact with the health care system (Kaiser Commission on 
Medicaid and the Uninsured, 2006, 2007; Kaiser Family Foundation, 2009b). Many of 
the uninsured are employed by small businesses whose owners deem it unaffordable to 
offer their employees health insurance. 
HEALTH CARE TODAY   
According to the United States Census Bureau, 45.7 million people were 
uninsured in 2007, a decrease in the number of uninsured of 1.3 million from 2006. This 
decline represented a 0.5 percent drop in the uninsured rate from 15.8 percent to 15.3 
percent (DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, & Smith, 2008). As Figure 2 below ilustrates, the 
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number of people uninsured increased steadily from about 31 million in 1987 to 4
million in 2006, while the rate increased from about 13 percent in 1987 to 15.8 percent in 
2006. Whether the change in direction from 2006 to 2007 represents a new trend remains 
to be seen. A change in the way the questions were asked and the statistic  were 
calculated in 2000 (for which 1999 data was collected) resulted in an crease in the 
number and percentage of persons insured.1 The Census Bureau has not explicated the 
extent of the increase resulting from these changes in data collection. However, one can 
draw a reliable inference that the number and rate reported uninsured woul  be greater 
had the changes in data collection not occurred. The increase in perce tage insured is due 
to an increase in the number covered by government plans (Medicare, Medicaid, military 
health care, Veterans’ Administration hospitals and clinics, and the S ate Children’s 
Health Insurance Program [SCHIP]). The percentage of people cov red by private 
insurance and the percentage covered by employment-based insurance both d clined by 
0.4% each. The number covered by government health insurance increased by 1.7 million 
from 80.3 million in 2006 to 83 million in 2007, a larger number than the total decrease 
in uninsured over the same period. This represents an increase in the percentage of 
population covered by government programs of 0.8 percent from 27 percent in 2006 to 
27.8 percent in 2007 (DeNavas-Walt, et al., 2008). 
This same report points out that the number of children under 18 years of ge 
without health insurance decreased from 8.7 million in 2006 to 8.1 million in 2007, a 
number still higher than the 8 million in 2005. This represented a decreas  in the rate of 
uninsured children from 11.7 percent in 2006 to 11 percent in 2007, up slightly from the 
                                                
1 The sample for the 2000 Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC), which asked about the year 
1999,  was based on the 2000 Decennial Census data. Additionally, beginning with the 2000 Current 
Population Survey (of which ASEC is a part), those respondents who answered “no” to each question by 
coverage type are then asked to verify whether they were, in fact, not covered by any type of health 
insurance. Whether this results in more accurate reporting has not been determined as far as I know. I offer 
the footnote only to partially explain the “glitch” in Figure 1. 
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10.9 percent in 2005. Children in poverty had an uninsured rate of 17.6 percent in 2007, 
down from 19.3 percent in 2006, though children living in poverty were still “more likely 
to be uninsured than all children” (DeNavas-Walt, et al., 2008, p. 20).  
 
 
Figure 1:     Number Uninsured and Uninsured Rate: 1987 to 2007 (DeNavas-Walt,  
         Proctor, & Smith, 2008) 
Comparing these rates to historical data, the number of uninsured children in the 
United States was 8.1 million in 1987. That number reached 9.5 million in 1993 and 
peaked at around 10.7 million in 1998. The numbers then began to steadily declineto 
around 7.8 million in 2004, then slowly climbed until 2007 when they declined again. 
The decline in numbers is likely attributable to the passage of the S ate Child Health 
Insurance Program (SCHIP) as part of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. However, in 
1987, 40.4 percent of uninsured children were living in families below the fed ral 
poverty line. By 1993, this had changed to 33.5 percent of uninsured children. In 2005, of 
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the 8.1 million uninsured children, 30.1 percent lived below the federal poverty line (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2006).  
Uninsured rates for non-Hispanic Whites decreased from 10.8 percent in 2006 to 
10.4 percent in 2007, with a decrease in numbers from 21.2 million uninsured in 2006 to 
20.5 million in 2007. The number of uninsured African-Americans also decreased from 
7.6 million in 2006 to 7.4 million in 2007, still higher than the 7.1 million in 2005 
(decrease in rate from 20.5 percent to 19.5 percent), while the percentage of uninsured 
Hispanics decreased to 32.1 percent, representing 14.8 million people in 2007 (DeNavas-
Walt, Proctor, & Smith, 2007; 2008). 
Economic status is a predictor of insured status. Only 75.5 percent of people 
living in households with incomes less than $25,000 in 2007 were insured. Coverage 
rates increased to 92.2 percent of people living in households with incomes of $75,000 or 
more. This indicates that cost of coverage, as well as full-time employment status, 
significantly impacts the likelihood of being covered (DeNavas-Walt, et al., 2008). 
In 1995, the Census Bureau (Bennefield, 1995) reported that “Despite the 
existence of programs such as Medicaid and Medicare, 29.1 percent of the poor (11.1 
million) had no health insurance of any kind during 1994. This percentage [of uninsured 
poor] was about double the rate for all persons. Poor persons comprised 27.8 percent of 
all uninsured persons” (p. 1). The same report indicated that young adults ged 18-24 
were the most likely to be without coverage during all of 1994; persons of Hispanic 
origin were almost 3 times as likely as Whites to be without cverage; and part-time 
workers had the highest non-coverage rate at 19.5 percent. Notably, non-workers had the 
lowest uninsured rate at 13.4 percent, which was attributed to Medicare coverage of the 
elderly and the Medicaid program (though it should be noted that many doctors refuse to 
accept Medicaid and some, if not many, are not accepting any new Medicare patients). 
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The report also noted that “Among the poor, workers had a far higher uninsured rate than 
nonworkers [sic]” (p. 1). In 2006, 31.6 percent of people living under the poverty line had 
no coverage at any time during the year, and those living under the federal poverty line 
comprised 24.6 percent (11.5 million) of all uninsured persons. The bar charts in 
Appendix B illustrate the percentage uninsured during 2007 by race, age, household 
income, and working status (U.S. Census Bureau, 2007a, 2007b).  
Poverty continues to be a predictor of increased risk for being in a non-covered 
status. It is reasonable to expect that the number of uninsured might actually decrease in 
2008 as it did in 2007 as more people are added to the government health insurance rolls. 
This would be a natural consequence of the dramatic increase in unemployment in the 
last quarter of 2008 resulting in working poor—or at least their dependnt children—who 
were not covered becoming eligible for Medicaid and/or SCHIP coverage due to the loss 
of income. We already know that higher income households are far more likely to be 
covered than the working poor. In this light, it is appropriate to consider income 
dispersion among United States households. 
POVERTY AND PLENTY  
Over the 2006-2007 reporting period, the Census Bureau reported an increase in 
the number of people living in poverty from 36.5 million in 2006 to 37.3 million in 2007. 
The poverty rate also increased from 12.3 percent in 2006 to 12.5 percent in 2007. Over 
this same period, real median household income rose for the third consecutive year from 
$49,568 to $50,233, an increase of 1.3 percent. Notably, the number and percent of 
insured persons rose during that same period (DeNavas-Walt, et al., 2008). 
Inequality in income is traditionally measured using two methods: the shares of 
aggregate income by households, normally divided into quintiles, and the Gini index. The 
Census Bureau reported that “the changes in the shares of aggreg te household income 
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received by quintiles indicated a decrease in income inequality between 2006 and 2007” 
(DeNavas-Walt, et al., 2008, p. 8). While this may sound like good news on first blush, it 
is important to remember that the bottom quintile receives 3.4 percent of the nation’s 
total income (down from a high of 4.4 percent in the mid-1970s), while the top quintile 
receives 49.7 percent of the nation’s total income (up from a low of 42.8 percent in 
1968). Eighty percent of American households share just over half of theincome in the 
United States. Meanwhile, the top 5 percent of households rose from a low share of 15.6 
percent in 1981 to 21.2 percent of total aggregate income in 2006 (DeNavas-Walt, et al., 
2008; U.S. Census Bureau, 2007c), 
The Gini index, a ratio that expresses the inequality of distribution of a variable, 
captures income dispersion across the entire income distribution in a single measure. The 
index ranges from 0, which would indicate perfect equality (everyone receives an equal 
share of income) to 1 representing perfect inequality (all income received by one 
recipient). An increase in the Gini index for income indicates greater inequality in income 
distribution—a widening of the gap between the poor and the rich. The Gini index allows 
for comparison of inequality regardless of changes in the size of the population or of the 
economy. For 2007, the Gini index was 0.463, compared to a 2006 Gini index of 0.470 a 
decrease in inequality of 1.5 percent, notable, but still “not statistic lly different from any 
of the annual Gini indexes [sic] over the 1997 to 2005 period” (DeNavas-Walt, et al., 
2008, p. 9).  
I examined the annual Gini index from 1987 to 2007 and compared it to the 
annual reported percentage of the population that was uninsured for the same period (data 
for both variables was available only over this 21 year period). The Gini index ranged 
from .236 to .470 over the period. The percentage uninsured ranged from 12.9% to 16.3% 
(DeNavas-Walt, et al., 2008). Using SPSS (SPSS Inc., 2002), I perform d a linear 
 17 
regression analysis (N=21) using the percentage uninsured as the dependent variable and 
the Gini index as the independent variable. Results showed that the two were moderately 
correlated (p<.001) with an R-squared of .484 indicating the variance in the Gini index 
accounted for 48.4% of the variance in the percentage uninsured. 
Data from the previous section indicated that the chances of being un sured in 
the United States are significantly greater among the nation’s p or. Further, trends in the 
growth of the rate of uninsured mirror trends in income distribution. It i dicates that race 
and economic status play a role in predicting insured status. Most importantly, it shows 
that overall, since the last serious attempt to strengthen health care access in the United 
States, rates of health care coverage have decreased, not increased. 
PRICING OF HOSPITAL CARE 
In his 2007 study funded by the Kaiser Family Foundation, Anderson (2007; also 
see DeNavas-Walt, et al., 2008) found that the “rates charged to many uninsured and 
other ‘self-pay’ patients for hospital charges were often 2.5 times what most health 
insurers actually paid and more than three times the hospital’s Medicare-allowable costs” 
(p. 780). Anderson further noted that this gap had increased considerably since the mid-
1980s. This makes it extremely difficult for many self-pay (uninsured) patients to pay 
their hospital bills. Anderson did not address other medical costs, such a  doctor’s bills, 
durable medical equipment, home health care, or nursing care.  
Anderson (2007) further notes the dramatic change this represents in cost-shifting 
dynamics post-Medicare. In fact, according to Kessel (1958), it was most common in the 
medical profession in the early twentieth century to charge according to a sliding scale, 
much like the progressive income tax.  
Anderson (2007) found that hospital charges as a factor of hospital costs rose 
from a charge-to-cost ratio (total charges divided by total costs) f 1.35 in 1984 to 3.07 in 
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2004, with hospital charges per admission rising 10.7 percent on average over the same 
period. However, over this same twenty-year period, Medicare-allow ble costs rose only 
6.3 percent, very close to the increase in net hospital revenue of 6.6 percent per year. 
Anderson (2007) then turned his attention to the justifications given by hospitals 
for these widely-discriminatory pricing plans. He outlines, and debunks, six common 
justifications: (1) patient responsibility to negotiate a discount in advance, (2) charity-
care policies, (3) solvency, (4) negotiating strategy with managed care plans, (5) 
Medicare outlier payments, and (6) geographic competitors. Each warrants a brief 
explanation. 
Patient responsibility as a justification refers to hospitals’ rgument that the 
patient is responsible to negotiate a discount prior to service being rendered. Anderson 
(2007) notes that patients must know to ask in advance, be approved by the hospital, and, 
even if all of that occurs, the discount is much less than what insurers receive. I might 
add that it is also relatively difficult, if not outright impossible, for the patient to negotiate 
price in the face of a medical emergency.  
Most hospitals provide some charity care, but Anderson (2007) notes that even 
with their inflated charges, many hospitals still have difficulty meeting the requirements 
of various state laws for the amount of free care they must offer. Meanwhile, even though 
hospitals collect only 10% of charges on average from uninsured patients, many of them 
pursue aggressive collection strategies resulting in an increased role of medical care costs 
in personal bankruptcy filings. Even including the insured, as late as 2001, as many as 
half of bankruptcy filers surveyed cited medical expenses as the primary cause of their 
bankruptcy (Himmelstein, Warren, Thorne, & Woolhandler, 2005).  
Some hospitals point to solvency as a rationale for these discriminatory charging 
policies. Noting that Medicare, Medicaid and negotiated contracts with managed care 
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plans have squeezed profit margins, these hospitals justify cost-shifting to the uninsured 
to make up for lost profits. Anderson (2007) notes two problems with this justification. 
First, hospitals’ desire to earn a profit does not justify charging uninsured and self-pay 
patients more than double what hospitals charge public and private insurrs. Second, 
there is virtually no difference to hospitals in the costs of medical care for patients by 
insured status. 
Negotiating strategy with managed care plans represents the fourth justification. 
In this model, hospitals maintain that charging high rates for non-contracted managed 
care plans raises the incentives for managed care plans to contract with the hospital 
(Anderson, 2007). 
In the past, a drive to obtain higher outlier payments from Medicare caused some 
hospitals to increase charges. Outlier payments are payments outside the normal range for 
a geographic area based upon the hospital’s own actual charges to non-Medicare patients. 
This strategy, along with the negotiation strategy outlined above, tak  no notice of the 
fact that uninsured and self-pay patients are expected to pay these higher prices, resulting 
in increased collection attempts and defaults for these higher charges (Anderso , 2007). 
Finally, hospitals argue that other hospitals in their same geographic rea charge 
substantially similar rates. Anderson (2007) notes that chargemaster files, the master list 
of hospital charges usually comprising some 25,000 items and services, are confidential 
and typically not available to the public. This makes it impossible for patients to 
comparison shop for hospital services. 
It would be tempting to argue that hospitals could increase their base of business 
by charging less, on the theory that customers will not pay more for the same service 
unless they perceive the lower-priced service to be inferior, i.e., price is a marker of 
quality to the consumer. This argument applies in a market where t r  is equality, or at 
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least near-equality, of information on the part of buyer and seller. This, of course, is not 
the case with hospital pricing. Furthermore, such an argument presumes that people could 
at least shop for a cheaper hospital. Practically speaking, however, many locales do not 
have multiple hospitals from which to choose. Also, in areas that do have multiple 
hospitals, the patient’s physician may only practice at one hospital, which would dictate 
the patient’s “choice” of hospital. Finally, in cities where there a  multiple hospitals, 
many services have been divided between the competitors, especially such higher-priced 
services such as Magnetic Resonance Imaging, lithotripsy and lasertripsy for kidney 
stones, and cardiac specialty care among others. In many cases, these facilities must 
obtain a Certificate of Need from the state in order to purchase igh-cost equipment. 
These certificates are typically not offered to multiple hospitals in the same geographic 
area (except for very densely populated large cities). These factors combine (dare one say 
“conspire”) to prevent patient choice based upon price. If I am correct in these assertions, 
then pricing is no longer based strictly upon consumer demand. The deman  curve would 
be relatively flat—that is, the demand does not fluctuate (or fluctuates very little) by 
price. This applies mostly to the uninsured, those paying the so-called “rack rate” prices. 
Large buyers such as insurance companies, managed care organizations, or large self-
insured employers, can and certainly do negotiate a lower price. Individuals, as the 
system is currently configured, have little real negotiating power and even less 
knowledge of the pricing structures. If this were to change, then Herzlinger’s (2007) 
consumer-driven approach might stand a fighting chance. 
 Whatever the rationales for what hospitals charge, especially what they charge 
the uninsured, the results are devastating. Anderson (2007) notes that what it costs 
hospitals to care for the uninsured on a procedure-for-procedure basis is very close to that 
of insured patients with the bulk of any increase attributable to ex ra billing and 
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collections costs. The effects for the patient and his or her family, however, are often 
devastating. 
Anderson (2007) offers two options for reducing rates for self-pay patients: price 
transparency and maximum-rate setting. Price transparency was a priority of the Bush 
Administration, and pending legislation has caused some hospitals to begin publishing 
price data on the Internet. However, these are largely published at the diagnosis-related 
group (DRG) level and not at the price level in the chargemaster file, the price basis for 
charges to self-pay patients. DRGs began to play a role in Medicar  financing in 1984, as 
a way of paying prospectively for services based on what costs could be expected based 
on a patient’s diagnosis. This is how Medicare pays for hospital charges (Marmor, 2000). 
Self-pay patients, however, do not pay based on DRG charges prospectively. Rather, they 
pay for each service and each item according to the master li, known as the 
chargemaster. This calls the value of the published data into question. 
Setting maximum rates is the second solution Anderson (2007) proposes. He 
further breaks this into three categories of action: (1) voluntary rate setting by hospitals, 
(2) litigation, and (3) legislation. In the first of these categories, voluntary action by 
hospitals, Anderson notes that the American Hospital Association (AHA) has recently 
published voluntary guidelines which would have uninsured patients with income below 
100 percent of the federal poverty line (FPL) paying nothing, those between 100-200 
percent of FPL paying no more than the price paid by a public or private nsurer 
contracting with the hospital or 125 percent of the Medicare rate, and patients above 200 
percent of FPL priced at the hospital’s discretion. It is unclear whether these very 
recently published non-binding principles will be adopted. 
Litigation on the basis of discriminatory pricing, the second action category, has 
already begun to spring up in numerous class action suits around the country. Getting the 
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uninsured certified as a class has posed difficulties, but once class ertification is 
attained, the defendant hospitals typically settle the case. These settlemen s have typically 
given discounts to the uninsured at FPL levels higher than those recommended by the 
AHA guidelines (G. F. Anderson, 2007). 
Finally, Anderson (2007) offers the legislative remedy, in which legis ation would 
mandate price regulation if hospitals do not adopt the voluntary AHA guidelines or court 
proceedings grow onerous. He notes that the effects of rate reductions from whatever 
source, while unknown, would likely result in greater collections and fewer personal 
bankruptcies. Since most hospitals do not expect the uninsured to actually pay the 
charges, Anderson discounts any effect on access to hospital care. How ver, this neglects 
the fact that uninsured persons may be more likely to receive care if they do not feel that 
it will put them in dire financial jeopardy. He also fails to address similar practices by 
physicians and other health providers that would, in the face of such reductions in pricing 
disparity, increase the likelihood that the uninsured would acquire health c re before 
requiring hospitalization, which would further reduce the overall costs f hospitalization 
in the national health expenditures as well as to the individual patient. 
TRENDS IN EMPLOYMENT -BASED INSURANCE 
Employment based insurance has been the backbone of the health care financing 
system in the United States since World War II. In October, 1942, Congress enacted the 
Stabilization Act 56 Stat. 765, limiting wage increases by employers as part of an effort 
to control inflation during World War II. Though most Stabilization Act provisions had 
been lifted by 1946 (Campbell, 1949), the relatively brief period of wage and price 
controls had some lasting effects regarding the nexus between employment and health 
insurance. While it limited wage increases, the Act did permit the adoption of employee 
insurance plans. As a result, business and labor agreed to replace wage increases with 
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fringe benefits, including employer-provided health insurance. This nexus between 
employment and insurance was further reinforced by rulings of the IRS that gave such 
employer-provided benefits favorable tax treatment in that they were deductible to the 
employer while being non-reportable as income to the employee. Collective bargaining 
agreements began to include medical insurance on a widespread basis. From 1940 to 
1950, the percentage of insured in the United States population jumped from about 9 
percent to roughly 50 percent. In the 1950s, vision and dental benefits emerged for the 
first time. Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) had been around since at least 
1929, with the largest HMO, Kaiser Permanente, founded in the 1930s (Scofea, 1994a). 
By the 1970s, with costs rising almost exponentially, managed care—in the primary 
forms of HMOs and Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs)—began to receive 
government attention. In 1973, Congress passed the Health Maintenance Organization 
Act under the Nixon Administration in an effort to encourage formation of additional 
comprehensive prepaid medical care programs (Scofea, 1994b; Weathers, 2004). 
According to Acs and Sabelhaus (1995), between 1980 and 1990, the share of 
increased medical spending borne by employers, governments, and households rose 
proportionately to the baseline percentage of spending that each sector represented in 
1980. However, from 1990-92, government’s share increased while household out-f-
pocket spending declined (Acs & Sabelhaus, 1995). This suggests that spending increases 
are hidden in costs of other non-health goods purchased and in increases in government 
debt. According to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), out-of-
pocket payments peaked in 1993 at 18.9 percent of total health care spending, declining 
to 15.9 percent of total health care spending by 2002 (Buckley & Van Giezen, 2004). In 
2007, out-of-pocket spending grew 5.3 percent, up from 3.3 percent in 2006. CMS 
attributed the acceleration to increased out-of-pocket payments for prescription drugs, 
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nursing home services, and nondurable medical supplies (CMS Office of Public Affairs, 
2009).  
Employer-provided insurance has changed over the past fifty years. Initially 
paying on an indemnity basis (e.g., $35 per day for hospital expense) in the 1960s, the 
trend moved toward more comprehensive major medical coverage in the 1970s and 
1980s. In the early 1990s, employers began shifting more costs to employees in the form 
of premium-sharing for both employee and family coverage, and in the form of higher 
deductibles and out-of-pocket maximums (Scofea, 1994a). The percentage of costs paid 
out-of-pocket has declined, but this is more likely a factor of the comprehensive nature of 
the coverage (more services are covered) and reflects the fact that health care spending 
tends to concentrate in the top 20 percent of users when ranked by total annu  spending 
per person. According to Kaiser Family Foundation (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2009a) 
calculations, 79.8 percent of health care expenditures in 2006 were spent on the top 20 
percent of medical care consumers (those with health care spending i  excess of $4,028 
for the year). According to the same report, in 2006, the top 1 percent (those with health 
care spending in excess of $41,579 for the year) consumed 21.2 percent of all health care 
spending. From this, one can conclude that while the percentage of total spending paid 
out-of-pocket has declined, the total amount the consumer expends has increased, with 
first-dollar benefits (those paid prior to insurance picking up any costs) actually rising 
over the period.  
From the inception of the Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans, health insurance in 
the United States has been structured around a treatment model rather than a preventive 
medicine model. This could be viewed as a reflection of the moral haz rd rchetype that 
is prevalent in the American collective psyche. Moral hazard exists to the extent that the 
cost of a benefit to an individual exceeds its value as a societal b nefit (Auger & 
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Goldberg, 1974; Donaldson & Gerard, 1989; Ma & Riordan, 2002; Nyman, 2007). In the 
case of health insurance, the fear is that people will overuse the system unless they have 
some economic interest which restrains them from doing so. This play  out in the form of 
deductibles, co-payments, and co-insurance. The theory cum ideology behind this is that 
first-dollar expenses are the most expensive to cover and that raising deductibles, co-
pays, and co-insurance amounts is the best way to constrain use of th system and 
therefore constrain costs (Auger & Goldberg, 1974; Ma & Riordan, 2002). As the United 
States spends more per capita on health care than any other developed nation without 
achieving anywhere near the best health outcomes by any current measure of outcomes, 
the evidence surrounding this ideology is mixed at best (Donaldson & Gerard, 1989; 
Nyman, 2007). Compounding this is the evidence that shows that 21.2 percent of health 
care expenditures in the United States are paid for the top 1 percent of the population 
ranked by health care spending, comprising persons with average claims greater than or 
equal to $41,580. Fully 47.7 percent of claims are paid out for the top 5 percent, with 
average annual expenditure per person in excess of $14,600. By comparison, those 
spending less than $776 per year (the bottom 50 percent) account for only 3.2 percent of 
spending (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2009a). Clearly, the bulk of expenditures in the 
United States is going to large claims, a reflection of the treatment versus prevention 
model that we have come to espouse. 
This points to a conundrum. Some analysts attribute at least part of the rise in total 
national health expenditures (combined public and private expenditures) to a rising 
demand as out-of-pocket expenses have declined (Scofea, 1994a; U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2007). 
However, it should be noted that first-dollar costs (deductibles and co-pays) have not 
declined. Instead, the rise in these costs to individuals has likely contributed to the 
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concentration of expenditures into high-cost spending-per-person categories n ted above 
as consumers put off routine and preventive care. This results in increased treatment costs 
as chronic conditions go untreated until they become acute problems. Common 
approaches that employers have utilized to reduce their costs include high-deductible 
plans, bare-bones coverage, catastrophic care plans, preventive-care plans, and recent 
state-based government plans for small businesses. All of these, with the possible 
exception of the state-based plans, shift more of the cost burden onto the employee 
(Hawthorne, 2007). Furthermore, as these first-dollar cost shifts increase employee cost 
of accessing preventative care, illnesses and injuries are presumably more likely to be 
medically ignored until such time as they can no longer be ignored, ultimately resulting 
in a higher cost of treatment than might have been the case had arlier treatment been 
sought. 
The culture of health care took a bit of a turn in the 1970s when Richard Milhous 
Nixon became convinced (largely by Edgar Kaiser’s intervention) that managed care was 
the answer to reducing health care costs. Whether managed care has slowed the growth of 
costs is an ongoing debate beyond the scope of this project. It would be exceedingly 
difficult, however, to make a legitimate argument that managed care held down costs, 
when one considers that per capita spending has gone from $366 in 1970 to $7,421 in 
2007 (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2009). Adjusting for in lation, $366 in 
1970 is the equivalent of $1,934 in 2007 dollars. In other words, per capita spending 
increased over the period at 3.8 times the rate of the consumer price index. Nevertheless, 
the managed care concept has become an ingrained structural component of th  culture 
surrounding how we pay for health care in the United States; so ingrained that it was a 
major focus of Clinton’s approach called “managed competition.” 
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As I explore further in this chapter, the cultural and structural environment is 
couched in the terms of free market economics, though it is difficult to reconcile the idea 
of a market-driven system given that 45.3 percent of personal health care expenditures 
come from public sources (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2009b), and that a significant 
portion of the remaining 54.7 percent is paid for with public funds in the formof tax 
subsidies (Daschle, 2008; Kotlikoff, 2007). It is this culture-bound free market ideology 
that informs proposals to reduce health care costs such as Kotlikoff’s (2007) proposal 
favoring universal health insurance (funded through existing for-profit insurance 
companies)2 and Herzlinger’s (2007) ideas on consumer-driven health care.3 
HOW NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES RELATE TO THE AMERICAN ECONOMY  
National health expenditures as both a percentage of gross domestic product 
(GDP) and on a per capita basis have grown at an alarming rate since 1960. In 1960,  
national health expenditures were just 5.2 percent of the GDP and per ca ita spending 
was just $148 per person in the United States. Between 1980 and 1990, the share of GDP 
rose from 9.1 percent to 12.3 percent while the per capita spending increased from $1,102 
to $2,813. Over the following five years, from 1990 to 1995, the share of GDP rose to 
13.7 percent and the per capital expenditure rose from $2,813 to $3,783. The share of 
                                                
2 Kotlikoff proposes a single-payer to pay the pr miums for health insurance to the existing for-profit 
health insurance companies. His plan suffers from economic reductionism, failing to take into account 
basic insurance principles such as adverse selection which would counter his proposal. It presumes that 
companies would willingly go along with the requirem nts of the plan, a presumption that is far from 
guaranteed. For a more complete explanation of this author’s critique of the Kotlikoff plan, see: Johnso , 
D. H. (2008). Book review of Laurence J. Kotlikoff’s The health care fix: Universal insurance for all 
Americans. Michigan Journal of Public Affairs (5), pp. 1-6. 
 
3 The current sub-prime lending crisis, which has its roots in predatory lending, illustrates the flaws in 
consumer-driven health care models such as Regina Herzlinger’s. Many, if not most, consumers are 
vulnerable due to a lack of education specifically bout how they might negotiate with a complex financing 
system. In the case of mortgages, this was the banking and mortgage brokerage system. In the case of 
health care, this complex system is the negotiated (an quite secret) pricing structure that providers, 
especially hospitals, employ. Add to this the information imbalance between provider (physician) and 
consumer (patient), and there is little case to be made for a rational choice model to reduce health care
expenditures under the current system. 
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GDP remained relatively constant fluctuating only between 13.6 percent and 13.8 percent 
between 1995 and 2000, while per capita spending rose steadily over the period from 
$3,783 per person to $4,790 per person over the period (Kaiser Commission on Medicaid 
and the Uninsured, 2007; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services: Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2007). 
However, these figures began a dramatic climb in 2001, with share of GDP 
jumping from 13.8 percent the previous year to 14.5 percent and continuing to climb to a 
2005 level of 16.0 percent of GDP. Per capita spending rose from $5,148 to $6,697 over 
the same period.  In 2005, total national health expenditures in the United States were just 
short of $2 trillion (Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, 2007; U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 
2007), up from just under $1.5 trillion in 2001 (Cowan, Catlin, Smith, & Sensening, 
2004). 
Medicare and Medicaid themselves almost certainly contributed to the rapid rise 
in medical costs in the wake of implementation. Initially, costs likely increased as 
providers had eleven months between signing of the bill (July 31, 1965) and its 
implementation (July 1, 1966) to adjust their charges upward in view of the “usual, 
customary, and reasonable charge” provisions of the Social Security Amendments of 
1965. These provisions set the limits for provider payments to what was usual, 
customary, and reasonable for the same or similar services in the same geographic area. 
This had the unintended consequence of driving costs higher. Additionally, as more 
elderly and poor people had access to care which was largely (though nt completely) 
paid for by government funds, demand for medical services increased which also raised 
prices. 
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Where are expenditures going from here? No one can be certain, of course, as 
predictive models are limited. However, the National Health Expenditure forecast 
projects that by 2016, just seven years from the date of this dissertation, total national 
health expenditures will nearly double to just over $4,136,000,000,000 and per capita 
spending is projected to grow to $11,957 (U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2007). 
Private insurance plans (including employer-sponsored plans) currently cover just 
under 36 percent of total national health expenditures. This is projected to rise only 
slightly to 37 percent by 2016. Public plans (including Medicare and Medicaid) currently 
pay 45.4 percent of national health expenditures and this figure is projected to rise to 48.7 
percent by 2016. This means that public plans alone will pay out just over $2 trillion in 
2016, almost exactly what total U.S. health care expenditures were in 2005 (U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 
2007). According to the Kaiser Family Foundation, the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services project that by the year 2016, health spending will rise from its 2005 
level of 16.0 percent of GDP (a little less than one-sixth of the economy) to 19.6 percent 
of GDP, or nearly one-fifth of the total United States economy (Kaiser Commission on 
Medicaid and the Uninsured, 2007). All of this lends strong credence to President 
Clinton’s observation that we cannot solve the long-term economic problems of the 
United States without addressing the rising costs of health care in America (H. R. 
Clinton, 2003; H. Johnson & Broder, 1997). 
From this, one might reasonably question whether the problem is that o many 
Americans do not have health insurance or that the cost of health care is so high. This 
proposes a false dichotomy in that health care costs themselves can be viewed, at least in 
part, as a product of non-universal coverage. A full exploration of this relationship is 
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beyond the scope of this dissertation and better left to the health economists. However, a 
movement to universal care could facilitate a move to a prevention model of care as 
opposed to the current treatment model. To the extent that the country ca  revise its 
cultural understanding of health care provision along a more preventive model, this 
should ultimately lower costs or at least shift some of the expenditures from the high-
claim per person category to a more equitable distribution of resources. Such equity 
would like result not from a drive for social justice as much as the actual economics of 
health care provision. 
REVIEW OF THE L ITERATURE  
Now that I have provided an overview of some of the major issues in health care 
costs, it would be helpful to set the context in terms of the major contributors to the 
literature surrounding Presidents Johnson and Clinton and their respective health care 
reform initiatives. The works of authors on these administrations is further explored 
throughout the dissertation as I use their work to triangulate my own findings from the 
archival records and other sources. I mention them here to give some contextual support 
to the work ahead. 
For the purpose of this review, I arrange the literature along thematic lines. I 
begin with literature of a more biographical nature surrounding the two Presidents and 
First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton. This literature has been useful in helping me 
understand the personalities and how they potentially influenced the policy development 
and ultimate outcomes. Second, I explore the literature surrounding Medicare per se as 
both policy and program, its development, subsequent changes, and potential impact on 
post-1965 health policies. Finally, I include an analysis of the major lite ature 
surrounding the failed Clinton reform effort and literature either proposing solutions or 
predicting future reform outcomes. 
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Presidents Johnson and Clinton and First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton 
Though many people were involved at various steps in the efforts to create or 
move toward a comprehensive federal health care policy, the three major playersfrom the 
standpoint of this study are unquestionably Presidents Johnson and Clinton and First 
Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton. Though some critics might rightly point u  that personal 
memoirs are subject to extreme bias, I find that, allowing for said bias, the memoirs do 
offer some illumination as to how the actors thought about their rolesaft rwards, if not 
into their personalities and how they might have acted in the moment. To this end, I 
relied upon memoirs of the two Presidents themselves (B. Clinton, 2004; L. B. Johnson, 
1971) and First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton (H. R. Clinton, 2003). A second biography 
of Johnson that rises almost to the level of autobiography, given the ex raordinary direct 
access granted the author, is the work of Doris Kearns Goodwin (1991), who met 
President Johnson while working as an administration intern. To a lesser xtent, the 
books by Robert Caro (1982, 1990, 2002) have offered insights more into Lyndon Baines
Johnson’s pre-presidential life, including his childhood and his years as “Master of the 
Senate” (Caro, 2002). Some would characterize Goodwin’s work as a Johnson apology 
with some admitted basis for such a characterization. No one would characterize Caro’s 
work as an apology. Caro’s bias, if any, seems decidedly different f om how the 
President might have characterized himself, and to this extent provides balance to the 
perspectives provided by President Johnson directly and through Goodwin. Larence 
O’Brien was another major player in the Johnson administration, having previously 
served under President Kennedy. O’Brien ran the legislative shop for Johnson during the 
Medicare efforts (and subsequently served as Johnson’s Postmaster Gen al). His 
memoirs, though not solely devoted to Johnson by any means, provide substantive and 
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valuable commentary from someone directly involved in the legislative efforts that were 
the hallmark of the Johnson administrations. 
What emerges when examining the literature around President Johnson is a 
portrait in dualities. There is the commonly-known Johnson—irascible, intimidating, 
driven by power. These features show up clearly in virtually everything written about the 
man. The so-called “Johnson treatment”—a style of greeting involving the President 
towering over and invading the personal space of the other party while placing his hand 
on the smaller person’s shoulder—is the most oft-cited example of this facet of the 
Johnson personality. What is less publicly-recognized by far is the ingenuity, the subtlety, 
the finesse, and the political craftsmanship that characterized Lyn on Baines Johnson. 
One must look deeper than the public caricature to see this side of th President. In my 
own case, this side first began to reveal itself in some of the oral history interviews in the 
LBJ Library (Cohen & McComb, 1968; A. E. Goldschmidt & Wickenden, 1969; E. W. 
Goldschmidt, 1974; Mills, 1971, 1987a, 1987b; Wilson, 1973; Wright, 1974). Larry 
O’Brien (1985a, 1985b, 1985c, 1985d, 1985e, 1986a, 1986b, 1986c, 1986d, 1986e, 
1986f, 1986g, 1986h, 1986i, 1986j, 1986k, 1986l, 1986m, 1987a, 1987b, 1987c, 1987d, 
1987e, 1987f, 1987g, 1987h, 1987i, 1987j, 1987k, 1987l, 1987m, 1987n) provided an 
extensive set of interviews which illuminated the background not only f President 
Johnson but also of the legislative tone and tempo of the time as well as the Kennedy 
administration in which Johnson was Vice-President.  
Both Bill and Hillary Clinton have published memoirs since their White House 
years. Each of these has proven helpful in trying to understand their personalities, 
viewpoints, and operating styles. The husband and wife team of Dick Morris and Eileen 
McGann (2004) provided a counterpoint reaction to Clinton’s memoirs. Morris served for 
more than two decades as Bill Clinton’s close political adviser from his Arkansas 
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governorship days to the White House. They bill their book as a deconstruction of the 
Clinton version of the story.  The Clinton years are far fresher than the Johnson years in 
the public’s memory. Additional resources not specifically biographical in nature have, 
nonetheless, provided valuable insights into the Clintons (Hacker, 1997; Hacker & 
Pierson, 2005; H. Johnson & Broder, 1997; McCaughey, 1994a; Quadagno, 2005; 
Skocpol, 1996; Starr, 1997). 
The Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virg nia is conducting an 
ongoing project to take oral history interviews of key persons associated with the Clinton 
administration. As of the date of this dissertation, those interviews have not yet been 
released for scholarly or public use. According to the Miller Cnter’s web site, more than 
70 interviews have been conducted, including several with key players in the health care 
reform effort such as Alice Rivlin and Christopher Jennings. Releas  of the transcripts is 
not anticipated until the project is complete “several years hence” (Rector and Visitors of 
the University of Virginia, 2009). These transcripts will likely provide a richness of detail 
similar to that found in the extensive oral history collection at the Lyndon Baines Johnson 
Library and Museum.  
Similarly to the duality one finds with Johnson, there is a publicly-known version 
of Bill Clinton and a less well-known face. The charismatic, political genius who is very  
good one-on-one or speaking to a crowd is the public face. The lesser known face is one 
apparently given to bursts of rage when things are not to his liking. The First Lady 
emerges as somewhat less charismatic than her husband, but perhaps more driven to 
succeed—a harder worker. She seems to have fashioned herself after Jacqueline Kennedy 
as a mother but Eleanor Roosevelt as a first lady. Schorr (1997) reported that Mrs. 
Clinton apparently engaged in an imaginary conversation with Mrs. Roosevelt in a 
session with a New Age psychologist, a conversation that subsequently was reported in 
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the media outlets. Shortly after, in Sydney, Australia, she poked fun atherself saying that 
she had spoken with Eleanor before departing the White House and that “she sends 
greetings to you all” (Schorr, 1997, p. 6). Hillary Clinton (2003) herself reports the 
incident though the details vary slightly: she claims that a slightly different quip was 
made at a conference being hosted by the Gores in Tennessee, though the idea is the 
same. Her memoir Living History includes an entire chapter titled “Conversations with 
Eleanor.” 
Literature on Medicare 
Almost unquestionably, the author of the seminal work on Medicare and politics 
is Theodore Marmor (2000), who teaches politics and public policy at Yale University. 
Marmor’s original study was published in 1970. A second edition was published n 2000. 
Marmor’s later edition touches on the Clinton reform attempt, but primarily focuses on 
how Clinton’s Health Security Act addressed Medicare and the extent to which that effort 
may have influenced subsequent Medicare policy changes, particularly those of 1995 and 
1999. Marmor, perhaps displaying a false modesty, claims that his book is not a full 
history of Medicare. Rather, he sees it as “rang[ing] over the history of Medicare 
disputes” (p. xx). Marmor’s work is organized around three primary issues: 1) why and 
how Medicare arose as a political issue in both time and form; 2) the responses to various 
Medicare initiatives; and 3) the outcome or result of this “intense policy struggle” (p. 
xxi). 
If Marmor’s (2000) work is the seminal work, it is closely followed by the work 
of Sheri David (1985), the importance of whose book Marmor freely acknowledges. 
David, a Special Assistant Professor of History at Hofstra University, takes a more 
historical approach. As such, the work is primarily chronological in its analysis and relies 
heavily on both primary source documents as well as interviews with key actors of the 
 35 
time, notably including Wilbur Cohen, Wilbur Mills, Nelson Cruikshank, and Elizabeth 
“Wicky” Wickenden. David’s acknowledged purpose is not only to provide a rich and 
detailed historical account of the passage of Medicare and Medicaid, but to examine the 
choices and options considered as well as the compromises employed in its passage in 
order to further the understanding of these processes as future health reform debates 
move forward. Her book primarily focuses on the congressional wrangling that 
surrounded the passage of the bill. 
Marmor’s influence has been considerable in terms of the further scholarship 
surrounding Medicare. For instance, he was the dissertation advisor for Oberlander’s 
(1995) examination of the politics surrounding Medicare between 1965 and 1995. 
Relying on his interpretation of interviews with policymakers and primary source 
documents such as records of Congressional hearings and federal reports, Oberlander 
argued that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, Medicare had represented 
congressional policymaking largely independent of public opinion or the influence of 
special interest groups. Specifically, he found that the influence of such groups or of 
public opinion generally was overstated by the then-current theoretical models. 
Oberlander further argues that Medicare’s designers envisioned an xp sionary role for 
the program that would result in an eventual turn to national health insurance, a plan that 
ultimately has failed to materialize. This is evocative of some of the recent proposals for 
addressing the problem of the uninsured, specifically those proposals that envision either 
an expansion by lowering the Medicare-eligible age or those that encompass opening 
Medicare enrollment to the uninsured directly. 
Clinton Reform Effort and The Future of Health Care Reform 
Jacob Hacker (1997), another of Marmor’s students, produced what would likely 
be recognized as the seminal work on the politics surrounding the failure of the Clinton 
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initiative. Hacker’s approach is largely based in path-dependence theory (which is also 
the theoretical foundation for this dissertation and more fully explored in Chapter Three), 
holding that the failure of the Clinton initiative was inevitable. Hacker (1998) also 
compared the decision-processes surrounding development of the medical systems of the 
United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States. In this article, also b ed in path-
dependence theory, Hacker made the case that differences in the early decisions taken by 
the United States versus the other two countries had resulted in the other countries 
adopting universal health care while essentially shutting that possibility off from the 
United States. 
Sociologists have also weighed in on the health care policy issue. Most notable 
among these are Theda Skocpol of Harvard, Paul Starr of Princeton, and Jill Quadagno of 
Florida State University. Skocpol’s (1996) book on the Clinton initiative focused on a 
historical, and to a lesser extent structural, account of the conditions hat led to the 
failure. She focuses structurally on the effects of the budget and the eficits incurred as a 
result of the Reagan tax cuts. In his review of Skocpol’s book, Starr (1997), who worked 
inside the Clinton White House as an advisor following the disbanding of the President’s 
Task Force, finds himself at odds to some extent with Skocpol’s narratives. Though he 
does not completely disagree with Skocpol, he does turn completely away from her 
assertion that Clinton would have been better served by adopting a more expansive 
policy. Rather, Starr infers that he would have been more likely succe sful had he 
adopted a more incremental approach with smaller bites at the problem delivered more 
quickly. This is reminiscent of Wilbur Cohen’s “salami slicer” approach (Cohen & 
McComb, 1968). 
Starr’s (1982) seminal work on the sociology of modern medicine likely s t the 
stage for his involvement a decade later in the Clinton attempt. Starr (1995) places 
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himself in the chamber at Clinton’s address to the joint session of Congress on September 
23, 1993, and a year later when Senate Majority Leader Mitchell pronounced the bill 
dead. He called the period “one year from euphoria to defeat” (p. 20). The gist of Starr’s 
argument is that the reform failed for three reasons: its long-term and extensive nature, 
failure to reach congressional compromise, and division among the Democrats in the 
Senate and House. He called for Democrats to devise a smaller program that would more 
quickly reach implementation. To date, his call has gone unanswered. 
Quadagno (2005) provides a historical and sociological analysis of why the 
United States does not have universal health insurance. She places the issue in the context 
of a shift in the power structure inside the health care system itself. She points to an 
erosion of the cultural authority of physicians, a revolt among corporate purchasers of 
insurance benefits, and the rise of the managed care bureaucracy. Of these shifts, she says 
that the “changing composition of the antireform coalition dominated first by physicians 
and then by insurers and business groups, has obscured the persistence of stak holder 
mobilization as the primary obstacle to national health insurance. Giv n the ever shifting 
scope of these debates, it is not surprising that many Americans f nd the health care issue 
too confusing to understand or resolve” (p. 11). While Quadagno’s work expands the 
sociological perspective on the problem significantly, it begs the question of whether 
there is some economic point at which insurers and corporate interests might come to 
favor universal insurance—some Gladwell-like “tipping point” (Gladwell, 2002)—or will 
that point only give rise to another shift in the health care power structure? 
Journalists have also provided insight regarding the Clinton initiative. Most 
notably, Johnson and Broder (1997) provided an extensive history of the failed Clinton 
attempt. Extensive, if not exhaustive, their The System provides a provocative, largely 
chronological account of the Clinton reform attempt, placing it in the broader context of 
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competing political and economic interests as well as clouds of scandal—from Travelgate 
to the Vince Foster suicide—that obscured the way forward on health care. 
Political economist Sven Steinmo at the University of Colorado and Jon Watts,  
formerly a student at Yale University and the University of Colorado, provided an 
institutional perspective on reasons for the failure of national health c re (Steinmo & 
Watts, 1995). In their oft-cited article, Steinmo and Watts argue that institutional bias, 
particularly in the face of an increasingly fragmented federalist political system, prevents 
the United States from achieving comprehensive national health insurance. Their 
historical account describes congressional reforms of the 1970s, which resulted in 
changes in both rules and committee structures creating a decentralization of power in the 
Congress that made passage of the Clinton initiative virtually impossible in their view. 
They conclude with an argument that this same institutional structure is a cause or 
contributor to American anti-government attitudes. On this last point, I am not yet 
convinced that the argument might not go in the other direction, i.e., the anti-government 
attitudes of Americans become reflected in the institutions. Perhaps this is a self-
reinforcing mechanism. 
A number of books have been published since the Clinton failure that have 
proposed various solutions to the health care problem. Three of these are considered most 
influential and have certainly been influential in my own understanding of the processes, 
though I find myself largely disagreeing with two of the proposals. Kotlikoff (2007) 
proposes a single-payer health insurance system. This differs from the traditional single-
payer approach in that the federal government would pay the premiums for universal 
insurance to private for-profit insurers who would then manage the payment of benefits 
as claims. A more traditional single-payer approach would have the ben fits paid for 
directly by the government. His work is excellent in illuminatg the problem, but the 
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proposal is less than workable in its economic reductionist fashion. Kotlikoff fails to 
consider the insurance industry’s potential unwillingness to cooperate with the proposal 
as the industry would incur increased underwriting risk under his proposed plan. 
Herzlinger (2007) writes extensively about the causes behind the health care 
crisis. Her work is most valuable in its particular approach to focusing the blame. 
However, she proposes a “consumer-driven cure” for the problem which rests on free 
market principles. She believes consumers will automatically make the best choice 
(rational choice theory) based on maximizing benefit to themselves and, ultimately in 
Herzlinger’s view, maximizing benefits to the market. Herzlinger essentially ignores the 
massive imbalance of information (and, as a consequence, imbalance of power) between 
consumers and providers in the American health care marketplace. 
The third proposal comes from former Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle 
(2008). Daschle’s plan calls for establishing a politically independent Federal Health 
Board, similar to the Federal Reserve Board, which would be responsible for setting the 
annual health care budget. Daschle also proposes opening the Federal Employees Health 
Benefit Plan (FEHBP) to private employers as an alternative to other available plans and 
requiring employers to offer some form of basic coverage. Daschle’  plan is likely the 
most economically feasible, at least of the plans with which I am familiar. Where his plan 
may fall short is in its continued reliance on the current model of primarily employer-
sponsored insurance for workers and governmental or quasi-governmental pla s for those 
not covered by employer-provided insurance. 
HOW THIS WORK DIFFERS 
While many have written about health care in America, from a variety of 
scholarly perspectives—historical, political, economic, and sociological—no one to my 
knowledge has specifically compared the two recent large attempts to address this 
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problem: Medicare/Medicaid and the Clinton Health Security Act. This is what I have 
attempted to do in this dissertation. 
Equally importantly, by comparing these two efforts, which varied in outcome 
between success in 1965 and failure in 1994, I suggest some lessons on how to bring a 
solution successfully forward. With the Obama administration requesting $634 million 
for health care in the recently submitted budget, it is clear that federal health care policy 
is coming back into the spotlight now 15 years after the Clinton attemp  failed. This is the 
time to try to understand how we, as a society, can act to reconstruct the role of health 
care in modern American society. 
Finally, unlike Kotlikoff, Herzlinger, and Daschle, among many others, I do not 
espouse a particular model for providing health care coverage. Rather, I att mpt to lay the 
groundwork for reaching agreement on a model, whatever form that the solution 
eventually takes. 
SUMMARY  
Today, American health care policy is largely a product of an employ ent-based 
system that experienced its first major impetus during World War II. As coverage under 
these plans expanded, and with the advent of Medicare and Medicaid, about 85 percent of 
the population now has some form of health insurance (Kaiser Commission on Medicaid 
and the Uninsured, 2006). This leaves a current uninsured population of 15 percent or 47 
million Americans, however, composed primarily of the working poor (DeNavas-Walt, et 
al., 2007, 2008). Employer-based plans have shifted more and more of the costs of care to 
employees. Rising numbers of low-wage and part-time jobs have also contributed to the 
current rates of uninsured. Pricing policies have resulted in increased numbers of 
personal bankruptcies and lower usage rates of preventive services among the uninsured 
and underinsured. In spite of all this, total health care spending has risen d amatically and 
 41 
is projected to double by 2016. A quadrupling of the national debt and dramatic increases 
in energy costs have led to a less-than-optimal economic forecast for the United States. 
The oncoming retirements of the first baby boomers, and an increasingly aging 
population with fewer workers to support non-working and retired persons, combine with 
anticipated increases in national health care spending to create a looming and nearly-
immediate crisis condition. Perhaps these recent developments will open the path to more 
creative options. 
The clear problem for this dissertation is to determine what are the necessary 
conditions for fundamental change of the health care delivery and payment systems in the 
United States. What can the example (Johnson) and counter-example (Clinton) tell us 
about the necessary conditions to achieve true universal coverage? Chapter Three focuses 
on the theoretical foundations and methodological underpinnings of this study a well as 
the orienting questions that drove both the research and the analysis of more than 11,900 




Chapter 3: Theoretical Foundations and Methodology 
The Path-Dependent Nature of Federal Health Policy 
PATH -DEPENDENCE THEORY  
Path dependence theory’s social-science origins are in the study of economics, 
though, as with many social science theories, path dependence theory’s original roots are  
in the physical sciences and, more particularly, in the realms of biology (evolution) and 
physics. The core of the theory is the idea that early decisions have greater impact on the 
eventual outcomes than later decisions. Furthermore, this impact is reinforced by positive 
feedback mechanisms that increase the attractiveness of the path. This is consistent with 
the causes of incrementalism as espoused by Lindblom and Woodhouse (1993), who held 
that rational choice theory was constricted by factors such as lack of information, factors 
of time, and costs of decisions. This serves to narrow the options available as the 
phenomenon of interest proceeds further down the path (Pierson, 2004). 
Path dependence might best be analogized in the physical world to the climbing 
of a tree. At various points, decisions must be made about which branch to climb next. As 
the climber progresses further up the tree, the options to “jump” to another branch 
become more and more limited, and such a jump is increasingly difficult to make. Of 
course, one can always work one’s way back to the trunk and take a new rout , but the 
tendency of the climber is that whichever branch is chosen initially ends to be the branch 
(path) that is followed (Levi, 1997). An admittedly simplified illustration, as applied to 
United States health policy, appears in Figure 2 below.  
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Figure 2:     Simplified illustration of path-dependent effects on federal health policy 
As the figure shows, decisions taken early in the sequence, such as FDR’s 
decision not to include national health insurance in the Social Security Act took health 
care in a path away from universal coverage, even if this was not FDR’s intent. The rise 
of employer plans and subsequent wage-price controls during World War II, which 
opened the way for a massive increase in employer-based coverage as a result of 
negotiations with organized labor, made the path back to universal coverage even more 
difficult. 
Arthur (1994) points to four summary characteristics of positive feedback 
processes: unpredictability, inflexibility, nonergodicity, and potential path inefficiency. 
Unpredictability refers to the idea that early events, which are at least partly random, 
have large effects resulting in less predictability of the evntual end-state outcome of the 
path. Inflexibility refers to the narrowing of the path options as one proceeds further 
down the path, potentially leading to greater predictability of outcomes. It becomes 
increasingly difficult to shift to a different path over time, and decisions made earlier tend 
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to shift the path more than decisions made later. Nonergodicity implies that accidental 
events do not cancel each other out and cannot, therefore, be ignored as “noise.” Even 
small events tend to be remembered in the path-dependent process. Potential path 
inefficiency results from the first three characteristics. Over the long run, the outcome 
that becomes established may be less desirable or efficient than other alternatives might 
have proven had they been selected earlier in the process. 
To these four summary characteristics, Pierson (2004) adds the importance of 
sequencing – the idea that “history matters” (p. 18). Path dependence th refore takes into 
account the often slow-moving character of policy formation and the temporal forces that 
shape the narrowing of options and the eventual outcomes which may or m not be what 
rational actors would choose, a bit of a blow to rational choice theory.  
This is not to say that rational choice theory is without merit. Indeed, much of 
modern economic theory finds its roots in rational choice, though increasingly this has 
led to game-theoretical models—relying on thought experiments to determine the best 
moves a given player will make so as to maximize his outcome—of decision making 
(Dye, 2007). Additionally, path-dependence models tend to move away from the cross-
sectional nature of “new institutionalism” models (Hacker, 1997, 1998). Institutionalism 
generally holds that policy is the output of government institutions around which political 
activities take place. Therefore, analysis of the policy outcome, for the institutionalist, is 
rooted in the analysis of the regulating, promulgating, or legitimating institutions (Dye, 
2007). Hacker, in fact, makes an elegant rebuttal to Steinmo and Watts’ (1995) 
institutionalist view of the barriers to health care, such as constitutional design that 
encouraged factional politics to protect minority factions from majority oppression, 
Progressive Era reforms designed to limit corruption and the number of candidates for 
office thus strengthening the two-party system but creating barriers to entry for new 
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political parties, and generations of congressional reforms resulting in the need for 
supermajorities to break a Senate filibuster as an example. While Hacker does not 
discount the institutional barriers, he portrays them as also being the result of earlier 
decisions such as seniority systems and committee structures of Congress that have led to 
many available veto points for massive policy shifts. 
Path-dependence theory does allow for paths to shift and new options or wind ws 
of opportunity to open at critical junctures (Hacker, 1998; Pierson, 2003, 2004). This is 
particularly helpful in this study, as the paths of some phenomena ar closely intertwined 
with federal health policy (e.g., changes in the labor movement, cost shifting and other 
aspects of the employer-based model, medical inflation that outstrips consumer price 
inflation and wage increases, etc.). While these phenomena are guided along their own 
pathways, their paths are shaped by their dependence on other paths. As ese paths 
converge, critical junctures may occur during which one path can be abandoned for 
another, more efficient, path or modified in a new direction as options previously 
restricted open, often only briefly. 
What makes path-dependence theory particularly attractive is its longitudinal 
perspective. Much, if not most, social science is structured on reductionistic and cross-
sectional methodologies. These methods value parsimonious and statistical explanations 
of phenomena under study. Such parsimony, and particularly cross-sectional 
methodology, constricts the ability to establish causality, which requir s that the 
independent variable or variables not only co-vary with the dependent variable, but that 
they must occur before the dependent variable (Rubin & Babbie, 2005). Path-dependence 
theory permits the establishment of causal chains and potentiates the desirable predictive 
qualities of comparative historical research (Mahoney & Rueschemey r, 2003; Pierson, 
2003, 2004). 
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Path-dependence theory enhances the value of many other theoretical 
frameworks. It is entirely consistent with historical sequencing such as Neustadt and May 
(1986) espouse. It is capable of encompassing elite theory and can help to ex lain the 
constriction of elite behavior by mass political behavior and public opinin (Dye, 2007; 
Higley & Burton, 2006; Key, 1966; Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1980; Rochon & 
Mazmanian, 1993). As previously noted, it does not negate the value of institutionalism, 
but enhances it by permitting the exploration of the paths by which institutions develop, 
explaining the relative stability of older institutions, and allowing for prediction of how 
institutions might change in the future (Hacker, 1998). It is not only completely 
compatible with incrementalism, but it may help to explain why incremental change is 
prevalent. 
Path-dependence theory, as applied to federal health care policy, would predict 
that the longer things stay the same, the harder they will be to change. For example, the 
nexus between employment and insurance established in the first half of the 20th century 
was reinforced by later decisions such as favorable tax treatment of employee benefit 
plans, wage freezes during World War II, and concomitant rise in union power. The 
societal expectation is set that the employer will provide healt  care for the employee. 
But as costs have risen, many companies have chosen to employ ore people on a part-
time basis to avoid having to offer expensive employee benefits. Companies have 
increasingly shifted costs to regular or permanent employees in the form of more 
premium sharing, higher deductibles, higher co-payments, and higher out-of-pocket 
maximums. The employer-insurance nexus is straining under these changes. Whether this 
will cause a limb to break is uncertain, though the path-dependence mod l would suggest 
that a critical juncture may be hurtling towards the American system. 
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Early decisions about Medicare payment structures—decisions that were made in 
the policy formulation stage—have contributed to rising health care costs. This, too, is 
predicted by the theoretical model. The early decisions to which I refer here surrounded 
utilizing private insurance companies to administer Medicare/Medicaid payments, as well 
as the “usual, customary, and reasonable” charge structures that created initial upward 
pressure on provider pricing. As private insurers often negotiate provide  contracts on a 
basis of percentage-of-Medicare-approved charges, these early decisions have been 
reinforced.  
Investments in infrastructure such as facilities, computer systems, personnel, and 
training in the private health insurance sector also tend to reinfo ce the status quo. This is 
clearly seen in the Clinton effort as the Task Force sought to appease the private health 
insurance companies and avoid potential destabilizing effects of a single-payer type of 
plan on the economy. Such a plan would have potentially led to hundreds or even 
thousands of employees being laid-off in the health insurance sector, though presumably 
some of these employees might be subsumed into the government to process ayments. It 
would have led to downward pressure on stock prices in the financial se tor. It might 
have led to bankruptcies of insurance companies, who are among the large lenders and 
investors who fund much of the market economy. 
Taken together, these predictions might lead one to dismiss any possibility of 
major policy change toward a universal system of either coverage or care. That case has 
been made. Hacker (1997, 1998) utilizes just such an argument in his discussions of the 
failure of the Clinton health care initiative, implying that the path along which federal 
health policy had moved had so restricted future decisions as to make the passage of 
national health care reform impossible. Hacker (1998) goes a step fur her in using the 
model predictively when he says, “This reversal of fortune is perha s the strongest 
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evidence yet that the United States has followed a fundamentally different path of health 
policy development than have other nations – one that will almost certainly not culminate 
in the passage of European-style national health insurance” (p. 124, emphasis added). In 
this, Hacker may or may not be correct, particularly if one takes note of the qualifying 
phrase “European-style.” To the extent to which Hacker has ignored changes in the 
intertwined paths of employer-sponsored private health plans and significant ncreases in 
medical costs relative to the overall economy, his conclusion that the United States is 
“left facing virtually insuperable political barriers to the passage of national health 
insurance” (1998, p. 128) may be unwarranted. 
 Hacker (1998) does offer some measure of hope. He concludes that many have 
hailed the Clinton failure as the last great opportunity for healt c re reform, a point with 
which he disagrees, but only to the extent that “the right combination of interests, ideas, 
and leadership can create possibilities for policy innovation where r formers once 
thought none existed” (Hacker, 1998, p. 182). The goal of this dissertation is t  examine 
two critical points on the historical path, the processes that occurred at each of those 
points, and the lessons to be learned in preparation for the time when Hacker’s “right 
combination” comes to fruition.  
METHODS 
Comparative policy development analysis, a combination of retrospective and 
prospective approaches that focuses on the development process rather than the policies 
per se, has experienced a resurgence in the past decade. It is broadly seen in the social 
sciences as a method of addressing the less satisfactory cross-sectional models of policy 
analysis that continue to dominate the intellectual discourse. Methodologies continue to 
arise that improve the scholarly rigor of comparative policy analysis studies, provide 
useful frameworks for building such analyses, and speak to the usefulnes, if not 
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generalizability, of comparative policy development analysis (Mahoney & 
Rueschemeyer, 2003; Pierson, 2004). 
I have utilized a hermeneutic approach to case analysis as my method (Creswell, 
1998; Diesing, 1991; Lejano, 2006). I have relied on the direct documentary evidence of 
the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the Clinton Presidential Library archival 
holdings, at least to the extent that relevant holdings have been made av ilable. I have 
also examined the relevant files of Congressman Wilbur Mills from his archives held at 
Hendrix College in Conway, Arkansas. I have examined an estimated 16,000 documents, 
selecting more than 11,900 pages of documents from these three primary document 
sources to be photographed or photocopied for study outside the archival settings. 
I used the relevant literature surrounding both initiatives as well as federal health 
policy in general to formulate a basis for understanding the two presidents, First Lady 
Hillary Clinton, and the other major players involved in these efforts. I also relied on 
extensive oral histories, most unpublished, from the LBJ Oral History c llection. These 
provided insight into at least how the players contemporaneously viewed themselves and 
the other critical players in the efforts of the times. This grounding is in line with 
Lejano’s (2006) approach to validity. Lejano suggests that such interpretations must be 
grounded in the context of the time, other literature and interpretations as available, and 
the interpreter’s knowledge of the authors of such texts, documents, or artifacts.  
Prior to entering the archives, I prepared myself for the initial phases of the 
documentary research by contacting the archivists and obtaining either e-mailed copies or 
links to online copies of the extensive finding aids from each of the archiv l depositories. 
I studied these aids and marked the boxes and folders which would be most relevant to 
my study. I then met with the archivists at both presidential libraries for training in how 
to request, handle, and photograph or photocopy the documents. The presidential archives 
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require scholars to complete this training prior to utilizing the archives, and the training is 
certified by a researcher identification card issued by each respective presidential library. 
Having received the training at the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, I requested 
document boxes and began reviewing the documents. Because I lived in Aust n during 
the time I was conducting this study, the LBJ Library is convenient enough that I was 
able to do an initial triage of each box. This entailed examining each document and 
deciding whether it was of enough interest to photograph. The library p ovides a system 
for scholars to index and then photograph documents free of charge. This make storage 
easier and is considerably cheaper than photocopying. The Clinton Presidential Library 
had no such arrangement. Consequently, I created my own copy stand and tripod 
arrangement and obtained permission to use it to photograph the Clinton documents. Due 
to travel costs to Little Rock for the Clinton part of the documentary research, I did much 
less triage on the documents as I was handling them (unlike the LBJ case). For this 
reason, I have about twice as many Clinton document photos as I do of the Johnson 
documents, in spite of the fact that there are many more Johnson documents available. 
The result is that I now have full-size photographs of approximately 7,300 pages of 
documents from the Clinton Library.  I also have about 300 hard copies of Clinton 
Library documents from my first excursion there and about an equal number of scanned 
copies, for a total of about 7,900 pages. I have about 4,000 from the LBJ Library. 
Additionally, I have visited the Wilbur Mills Archives housed in the Hndrix 
College Archives in Conway, Arkansas. During my visit there, I was able to triage all the 
files relevant to the passage of Medicare and Medicaid. Judy Robinson, the Hendrix 
College archivist, very kindly copied all the documents which I selected and 
subsequently sent me the hard copies. There are about 300 pages of documents fro  the 
files of the late Congressman. 
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All of the digital documents have been processed into formats that are easily 
viewable and readable. I have developed a dual-monitor system that permits me to view 
the document on a vertical monitor while noting those documents that are of most 
importance on a database on the other monitor. I have shot pictures of many more 
documents than are directly relevant to the actual political processes. I did this for two 
reasons: 1) I hope that I may be able to utilize these documents in further research b yond 
the dissertation; and 2) with limited time and resources when traveling away from home, 
it is much quicker and less expensive to photograph entire boxes of documents in o e trip 
and triage them later. 
Bearing in mind the path-dependence model on which I had based my predictions, 
I created a database encompassing all of the documents which I had photographed or 
photocopied from the archival depositories. Included in the database were the location of 
the document, box number, folder number or identifier, date of the document, cr ator(s) 
of the document if known, recipient(s) or intended recipient(s) of the document if known, 
a temporary notation of the importance of the document, and contemporaneous notes of 
my impressions, the document topic, and any other relevant information that would assist 
me in reviewing the documents at a later date. I also included the computer directory 
where the document could be found in my storage system and the numerical photograph 
file name (or range of names, in the case of multiple page documents) so that I could 
quickly retrieve any document in the database. 
After all documents had been catalogued, I reviewed each database utilizing a 
triage system based on the ranked importance of the documents. I first read all documents 
which I had classified as “Extremely Important,” followed bythose that were “Very 
Important,” or “Somewhat Important.” I briefly reviewed those documents which had 
been classified as “Important for later use” to ensure that I w s not leaving out any of the 
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major points to be determined from the archival documents. Finally, I briefly reviewed 
those documents that I had originally ranked as “medium” or “low” in importance. As I 
reviewed documents, I expanded the notes as necessary which gave me, in essence, a 
field journal of the research (Creswell, 1998). 
Having completed my review of the documents, I compared my notes to various 
sources from the literature seeking from reports of interviews done by other scholars as 
well as their interpretations, some of them contemporaneous to the events, to assist in my 
interpretation of the documentary evidence. At times, I was able to confirm other reports. 
Occasionally, my reading of the source documents conflicted with other reports. In other 
cases, my interpretation of the documentary evidence expanded upon the earlier 
interpretations of documentary and other evidence offered by other scholar . In this way, 
I triangulated my findings against the work of known and recognized scholars (Diesing, 
1991; Lejano, 2006). 
Based upon the resulting, and considerably narrower, selection of documents, I 
utilized a case study comparison and contrast approach, as set forth by Creswell (1998), 
to reconstruct important events, conversations, and correspondence in the process. 
Utilizing the triaged documents and database, I initially read through the documents to 
get an overall sense of the case, making additional notes during this reading. Gaps in the 
record were noted and, to the extent possible, I drew tentative conclusions from the 
surrounding documentation regarding the gaps. Such an approach to gaps in the record is 
generally-accepted in historical analysis (Diesing, 1991; Neustadt & May, 1986; Pierson, 
2004). Finally, I developed naturalistic generalizations.  
Rigor in the case study tradition relies upon one or both of two strategies: member 
checking and triangulation. For this study, I utilized triangulation t  improve the 
scholarly rigor of the study. Comparison of the actual historical record to events as 
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outlined in the literature, including memoirs of the various political actors; journalistic 
reports of the relevant periods; and previously promulgated theories about the outcomes 
of the two legislative initiatives provided the required triangulation to confirm the 
naturalistic generalizations drawn from the case studies of the two periods. Additionally, 
I  utilized the criteria of cohesiveness, utility, triangulation, ad study balance put forth 
by Stake (1995). 
I developed a narrative for each of the two administrations, including description 
of the times, settings, main players, and their activities, processes utilized by the players 
to move their activities forward, and patterns of meanings. Stake and Kerr (1995) state 
that “[T]he change in respect for naturalistic case study findings has been almost 
paradigmatic…Increasingly, personally constructed knowledge is seen not only as 
credible evidence but as the product of good research” (p. 55, emphasis in original).  
Public opinion polling data from both periods are available from The Gallup 
Organization. I acquired a subscription to The Gallup Brain which gaveme access to 
polling results from 1935 forward. Unfortunately, Gallup has now discontinued this 
subscription-based product and access is no longer available. Specifically, I concentrated 
on Gallup’s “Most Important Problem” (MIP) surveys which have been co ducted 
several times annually since 1935. To the extent that data were available, I examined 
additional polls directly related to health care. Health-care specific polling data were 
available for the Clinton era but not the Johnson era. 
The Lyndon Baines Johnson Library web site has online search capabilities for 
recordings of White House telephone conversations from the Johnson admiistration. 
These recordings are largely available online through the Miller Center for Public Affairs 
at the University of Virginia. Using the LBJ Library search engine, I located 67 
conversations referencing Medicare. I listened to each of theseconversations seeking any 
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additional evidence of the paths and processes President Johnson took to pass Medicare 
and Medicaid. 
Finally, I utilized the ProQuest databases of The New York Times and The Los 
Angeles Times to acquire data on articles on pending health care initiatives for the 
respective periods in an effort to assess the degree of media attention given to the two 
initiatives. Although I have chosen to base this analysis in McCombs’ (2004) initial stage 
of agenda setting (capturing public attention), which does not require an examination of 
the valence of the coverage, I have elected to examine the relevant editorial content of the 
two newspapers to formulate some understanding as to the editorial positions taken 
during the two periods relative to the two legislative initiatives. 
Scholarly pursuits by their nature are subject to the scholar’s biases. Qualitative 
inquiry is perhaps particularly vulnerable to bias. Scholars strive o minimize bias to the 
extent possible, and one important step in doing so is to acknowledge any particular bias 
towards the subject matter (Creswell, 1998). Having said that, scholars have come 
increasingly to formally recognize the importance of personal experience as a component 
in the creation of knowledge While the AMA would eventually withdraw its support for a 
national health care plan, social workers were there during the early d ys of the 
progressive movement, actively worked with the AALL (Kreader, 1988). In respect of 
both viewpoints, I offer the following statement regarding my own biases in the matter of 
health care policy and the experiences which have brought me to my view of the 
importance of this study. 
As a social worker and a progressive, I am biased in favor of universal health 
care. Having spent more than 11 years of my pre-social work career in the insurance and 
investment industries, I am keenly aware of the inner workings of those industries. This 
knowledge has the potential to bias my perspectives. There are many ways to achieve 
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universal access to health care. Some of these ways involve utilization of current 
institutions and structures for provision of care, specifically insurance companies or 
government-backed insurance models. Others involve more direct payment and provision 
of services by the government itself. Having examined my own ideas about these means 
and methods, I find that I have no single bias as to how universal health care should be 
accomplished. Rather, I think that it could reasonably be accomplished in a number of 
ways. 
Social work as a profession espouses principles of social and economic justice, 
and strives to improve the lot of the oppressed and underrepresented members of society. 
Many, though certainly not all, social workers see the present state of health care in the 
United States as representing a certain level of economic and social injustice. I place 
myself among that group. However, because of my extensive background in the private 
sector prior to entering the study and practice of social work, I bring a business point-of-
view to the problem in addition to the social and economic justice models. Universal 
health care, in my admittedly biased view, is not only the moral thing to do; it is also the 
prudent course from a business and economic perspective. Achieving agreement on 
universal health care will not likely be accomplished solely on the s rength of the moral 
argument for economic justice. More likely, it will have to be sold on the basis of the 
economic soundness of the idea. That bias on my part is likely to inform at least the last 
chapter of the dissertation, which addresses moving the universal health care policy 
agenda forward. 
Finally, and in a larger sense, I contend that bias is a necessary ingredient for the 
valid exercise of hermeneutic interpretation of texts and artifacts. Gadamer (1960, as 
cited in Lejano, 2006) holds that such bias, so long as it does not fatally restrict other 
interpretations and meanings, is necessary to the interpretation process.  
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Diesing (1991) makes a similar case for the importance of bias and against 
scientific neutrality in the hermeneutic approach: 
 
The hermeneutic approach does not require detachment or neutrality of the 
scientist. It requires involvement, even participation in the culture of the 
author. Indeed, it denies that neutrality is possible. Interpretation is an 
active process that begins with foreknowledge and is limited to the ideas 
interpreters can think and the contextual material they can find. 
Interpreters necessarily bring their own way of thinking to the text, and 
their interpretations express their experience as well as the meanings 
implicit in the text. (p. 122) 
 
Diesing (1991) also believes that such active engagement in interpretation “contrasts 
sharply with the scientific detachment or neutrality postulated by logical empiricism” (p. 
124), and attributes disagreement between the two traditions at least partially to this 
contrast. 
Based on these ideas, I have attempted to ground my interpretations in their 
appropriate temporal and political contexts through use of the literatur  relating to both 
eras. I bring to bear my own past knowledge and experience, which arises out of more 
than 20 years of business experience, with over 11 years directly in he insurance 
business. In those capacities, I have experience in the purchase of both employer-based 
group health insurance and individual policies. I also have an insider’s understanding of 
the product structure of health insurance as well as the business and cultural ideologies 
that have shaped that structure. It is my hope that these experiences—including the extent 
that they might be seen as biases—will enlighten my interpretations of the various texts 
and presidential documents in ways that are appropriate and that do not represent fatal 
dismissal of alternative interpretations (Lejano, 2006). 
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APPLYING THE THEORETICAL MODEL TO DETERMINE THE ORIENTING QUESTIONS 
In the early 1990s, political scientists began to adapt the methods of comparative-
historical analysis primarily to study the rise of societal institutions such as the welfare 
state and national health care. The critical juncture framework of path dependence holds 
that early decisions or antecedent conditions limit the agency of political actors during 
critical junctures and thus favor particular trajectories of institutional development 
(Collier & Collier, 1991). Some scholars argue, however, for a model f industrial 
evolution in which key actors constantly renegotiate institutional configurations and 
missions (Streeck & Thelen, 2005). This is not inconsistent with punctuated equilibrium 
theory, which holds that policy shifts gradually with policy change punctuated by 
changes in institutional conditions such as party control of government, shifts in public 
opinion, or exponential growth of institutional influence (e.g. the media). Punctuated 
equilibrium theory arose from Darwinian biological theory, as adapted initially by 
Baumgartner and Jones (1993).   
Paul Pierson (2004), a political scientist, was an early adaptor of the path-
dependence model as it related to political economics and health care in particular. 
Pierson (2003; 2004) points to the need to understand temporal processes and proposes 
four types of time horizons for causal accounts. The four are divided along a matrix based 
on the time horizon of the cause versus the time horizon of the outcome (see Figure 3). 
The health policy reform phenomenon fits best in what Pierson refers to a  Type III, 
which he compares to the natural pattern of earthquakes: that is a phenomenon in which 
the time horizon of the cause (building pressure beneath the earth’s crust accompanied by 
slow movement of tectonic plates) is relatively long while the time horizon of the 
outcome (the actual quake) is relatively short. Pierson (2003, 2004) further emphasizes 
the importance of the sequence of events in a path-dependence model. Based on the path-
 58 
dependence model and Pierson’s time horizons approach, I developed the orienting 
questions for this study.  
 
Figure 3:     Time Horizons of Causal Accounts [adapted from Pierson (2004)] 
ORIENTING QUESTIONS 
Accepting the explanatory potential of the path-dependence argument (Arthur, 
1994; Hacker, 1997,  1998; Hacker & Pierson, 2005; Pierson, 2003,  2004), four orienting 
questions, based on this model, directed the comparative policy development analysis of 
the Johnson success and the Clinton failure. These questions are: 
1) Relying on a modified approach based on Arthur’s (1994) path-dependence 
model:  
a) what historical factors, including political, economic, and direct 
health policy components, set the stage for the respective success and 
failure of the Johnson and Clinton health care policy initiatives,  
b) were those factors natural, accidental, or planned, and  
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c) in what sequence did they occur to facilitate the respective 
outcomes? 
2) To what extent did the two presidents, their staffs, and legislator  of the two 
time periods act to foment or facilitate these factors, and, in the absence of any such 
direct action, in what ways did they react to or utilize these factors in pushing for passage 
of the respective presidential health care policy initiatives? 
3) What were the barriers to legislative passage, and what steps, if any, did 
members of the respective administrations, legislators, and policy activists such as social 
workers take – or should they have reasonably taken – to overcome these barriers? 
4) To the extent that conditions have changed since the 1990s, what can social 
workers and allied policy activist groups do to:  
a) hasten the process of health care reform by reducing political barriers;  
b) recognize opportunities to advance reform initiatives;  
c) prepare for swift action when the path to new policy change options 
opens; and  
d) utilize strengths of the social work profession (e.g., casemanagement, 
clinical skills, advocacy skills) to ease the transition to natio l health care if and 
when that time arises? 
PATH DEPENDENT DOMAINS TO BE EXAMINED IN FEDERAL HEALTH POLICY  
Having provided a rationale for path-dependence theory as the model of choice 
for this comparative policy development analysis, it is now necessary to delineate the 
domains I will examine in attempting to answer the four orienting questions above, as 
well as the methods by which I will examine these domains and their influence on the 
paths the United States has taken and the outcomes to date of these paths. The final 
chapter will incorporate the changes in these paths and variables post-Clinton with an 
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attempt to predict the necessary critical junctures and recommendations for capitalizing 
on them when the path reopens to a policy shift for federal health policy. 
The first three orienting questions lend themselves to examination in three 
primary domains of study: historical, institutional, and political. These three domains 
influenced outcomes in both the Johnson and Clinton administrations, and will 
undoubtedly further influence any new attempts at national health care reform.  
Historical Domain 
 Consistent with the current state of the literature (Hacker, 1997, 1 98; 
Hawthorne, 2007; Lakoff, 2004; McCombs, 2004, 2005; Steinmo & Watts, 1995), I will 
examine historical developments in American social welfare policy including: a) 
workers’ compensation insurance and Social Security; b) attempts to pass a 
comprehensive federal health policy between the passage of the Social ecurity Act of 
1935 and the Johnson initiative; c) post-Medicare developments in health care costs, 
policies, and reform attempts; and d) the rise in inequality and other factors that have 
influenced health insurance programs and coverage of the American population between 
the Johnson Administration and the Clinton Administration. This domain will rely on 
historical accounts in the extant literature interpreted as they apply to the health policy 
path, recognizing that the Clinton era opens with a path dictated not only by the sequence 
of events prior to the Johnson era, but the effects of Johnson era policies and other 
changes between the two periods. 
Institutional Domain 
The institutional domain refers to the legislative environment and the influ nce or 
leadership the two presidents exerted in response to the respective legislative 
environments of the time. The majority of this analysis rests in he thematic analysis of 
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relevant documents from the respective presidential archives. To establish the rigor of the 
analysis, I utilized triangulation with the literature concerning the two presidents and the 
respective periods, i.e., I compared the findings from the source documents to the results 
of previous studies of the phenomena of interest. I give specific attention to the following 
dimensions of the institutional domain:  
1) Legislative tempo, particularly the amount and type of legislation sent to 
Congress by the respective presidents. 
2) Positioning strategies of the respective administrations with respect to the 
media, special interest groups, and members of Congress. These strategies include 
attempts at setting public expectations, strategies for controlli g r influencing the media, 
and strategies for “marketing” the administration and its policy initiatives in the best 
possible light. 
3) Perceived level of engagement of the respective presidents in the legislative 
process. This picture will be more complete for LBJ than for Clinton given the 
considerably higher availability of direct records in the LBJ archives. However, 
correspondence files in the Clinton archives, and particularly in the Chris Jennings series, 
should give some insight into President Clinton’s involvement in the process and can be 
compared to historical accounts from members of the administration, the Clintons 
themselves, and journalists of the time. 
4) Prioritization of policies by the respective administrations, especially as 
compared to the priorities and stakes for the opposition party. Effects of the legislative 
priorities will be of particular interest in the negotiation of the outcomes. In particular, 
trade-offs between party interests (e.g., tax cuts versus expanded social programs) inform 
these analyses. 
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5) Outside factors (e.g., economic conditions, budget constraints, Vietnam war) 
that may have influenced the outcomes and how their influence was manifested. 
Political Domain 
The political domain comprises the dimensions of public opinion, media 
influence, and influence exerted by special interests. This analysis will be largely based 
in available public records and accounts from the time period including opinion polls, 
media accounts, and influences from both the public and the media as well as special 
interests as reflected in correspondence files of the respective administrations. I 
specifically examine the following areas in the political domain: 
1) Role of public opinion / public attention i  policy formation and legislative 
processes. This will be further informed by agenda-setting theory (McCombs, 2005) and 
an inquiry into the role of the media in setting the public agenda for the two periods. 
Agenda setting deals with the focus of media and public officials’ attention on the 
identified problem, according to Dye (2007). McCombs (2005) proposes a generalized 
theory of agenda setting that seeks to explain the relationships between the mass media 
and public opinion. However, he stops short of analyzing the impact of the agend  set by 
this interaction on the institutions charged with formulating and passing the required 
legislation to bring policy to action. This analysis will incorporate data from the Gallup 
Organization’s Most Important Problem Questions, which have been ask d several times 
per year over the last 70-plus years. 
2) Relationship of media attention to legislative outcomes. Based in McCombs’ 
Agenda-Setting Theory (McCombs, 2005), this analysis relies on counts of articles from 
The New York Times and The Los Angeles Times newspapers utilizing the ProQuest 
search engine available from the University of Texas at Austin Libraries web site for each 
of the respective periods, as well as the valence of the articles, i.e., for or against the 
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President’s health care agenda.. (I had initially anticipated also using the databases for 
The Washington Post as provided by ProQuest, but the database stops in 1990 making a 
comparison between the same databases unavailable.)  
3) Influence of special interest groups, including the American Medical 
Association, the health insurance industry (as represented by the Health Insurance 
Association of America), organized labor, business interests, and political action 
committees (PACs). This analysis is grounded in both McCombs (2005) methods and 
Lakoff’s (2004) work on framing the debate. 
SUMMARY  
Utilizing case-study techniques and comparative historical analysis, I developed 
case studies of the two presidents, the paths on which they found themselves as they 
attempted to shift federal health policy, and the means and methods they employed in 
their respective attempts. I have incorporated quantitative analyses into these narratives to 
the extent that they help to illuminate the path. To the extent possible, I drew preliminary 
causal inferences from the path-dependent analysis and used them to d velop predictions 
about the path ahead.  
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Chapter 4:  
The Path to Medicare and Medicaid 
EARLY ATTEMPTS AT NATIONAL HEALTH CARE THROUGH FDR 
The first attempts at a federal health policy began during the early days of the 
Progressive Movement. Of particular note was the passage of Workers’ Compensation 
laws in 1908, covering workers who were injured on the job and paving the way for 
further health insurance reforms. As Great Britain and Germany adopted national health 
care programs, pressure increased on the United States to take similar action (Hacker, 
1998). Emboldened by passage of the worker’s compensation legislation, many of the 
supporters worked together on national health reform. By 1915, the Standard Bill, esult 
of these efforts, was finalized and proposed by the American Association for Labor 
Legislation. The American Medical Association as well as the National Association of 
Manufacturers initially supported the Standard Bill. However, as interest waned in the 
Progressive Movement, fractures began appearing between various lab r constituencies 
and other groups, such as the AMA, which had shown support for some sort of national 
health care (Goldfield, 1992; Weathers, 2004). 
By the time Franklin D. Roosevelt took office as President, the country was 
embroiled in the Great Depression. Soup lines and bank failures marked the times as 
unemployment rose nationally. Leading up to this point, reformers in the late 1920s were 
already pushing for health care cost containment. Roosevelt inherited an economic 
collapse of Biblical proportions. As the economy struggled toward recovery, th  plight of 
the elderly poor and the disabled became a paramount concern. This led to th  passage of 
the Social Security Act of 1935. Roosevelt wanted to include health care in the act but 
was dissuaded by his advisors who thought it would be too difficult a sell nd would 
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jeopardize passage of the income components of the act (David, 1985; Marmor, 2000; 
Weathers, 2004). 
THE TRUMAN ATTEMPTS (1945-1953) 
In April of 1945, Harry Truman became President when FDR died in offce. 
Truman advocated a cradle-to-grave approach to national health care that also included 
an expansion of medical education and training. This plan was embodied in the Wagner-
Murray-Dingell health bill, first proposed in 1943 and supported by FDR. The Wagner-
Murray-Dingell bill, in one form or another, was introduced every year for more than a 
decade (David, 1985). The bill garnered unlikely but fervent support fromthe former 
assistant chairman of the Republican National Committee Albert Lasker and his wife 
Mary, a well-known philanthropist with high regard for medical research and a strong 
belief in the need for national health insurance. She urged her advertising-magnate 
husband Albert to throw his support behind national health insurance. The Lask rs gave 
more than financial support to the effort, lending their considerable political network to 
the task. The Laskers felt that the Republican bill offered by Sen. Robert Taft of Ohio, 
which included medical care for indigent people only, was insufficient and closer to a 
model of state-controlled medicine (Furman, 1947).  
Truman’s enthusiasm prompted reformers to move away from pursuing tate-
funded programs towards a nationally funded but state-administered program–much like 
the present Medicaid program. Truman’s goals also reflected a change in focus from the 
efficiency arguments of the Progressive Era towards one rooted in post-war prosperity. 
Simply stated, Truman felt that the United States could afford national health insurance. 
Unfortunately, he apparently underestimated the magnitude of the opposition and the plan 
failed to materialize during his presidency. Opposition from the AMA, ostensibly over a 
perceived threat of government intervention in the doctor-patient relationship, and other 
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organized interest groups did not abate in spite of Truman’s attempts. Grassroots 
supporters of national health care remained poorly organized and ineffectual. Truman 
took his surprise re-election in 1948 as a mandate and refused to compromise his vision 
of how national health insurance would work. Massive advertising campaigns nd “red-
baiting” were hallmarks of the opposition (Starr, 1982; Weathers, 2004).   
Though the election of 1948 had provided an increase of 75 Democrat seats in the 
House of Representatives, most of Truman’s domestic agenda was thwrted by “a 
coalition of anti-Truman Southern Democrats and Republicans” (Marmor, 2000, p. 8).  
Truman would not prevail. However, during this same time, the number of Americans  
with voluntary and privately-owned health insurance increased from 12 illion to about 
32 million Americans (Campion, 1984). Labor unions saw such plans as desirable 
features of compensation contracts and the trend toward the United States’ current 
employer-based system was on its way. In the latter years of his presidency, Truman 
begrudgingly floated a narrower proposal – expansion of health coverage to old-age and 
survivor beneficiaries under Social Security. Stymied again by the AMA and other 
special interest groups, Truman would not even see this more limited vision realized until 
1965 when LBJ signed Medicare into law at the Truman Presidential Libr ry with the 
former President in attendance (David, 1985; Weathers, 2004). 
THE EISENHOWER YEARS (1953-1961) 
There is little of note during the Eisenhower Administration with regards to any 
attempt at national health care. Apparently Ike focused his efforts elsewhere. This is not 
to say that Eisenhower failed to take a stand on health insurance. Indeed, he took an 
active stand – against national health insurance. According to Marmor (2000), “Even 
when the Democrats regained control of the Congress in 1954, the partisan majority did 
not comprise a favorable Medicare majority. In fact, the legislative prospects were so 
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slight that no committee hearings [on national health care] wereheld until 1958” (p. 23). 
In 1958, as the drive towards Medicare began heating up in the Congress, Eisenhower 
remarked: “If all Americans want is security, they can go to prison. They’ll have enough 
to eat, a bed, and a roof over their heads” (U.S. Congress, 1958, p. 8, as cited in David, 
1985).  
In 1957, Congressman Aime Forand (D-RI), at the urging of organized labor 
leaders, introduced a bill drafted by I.M. Falk and Wilbur Cohen. Organized labor gained 
increased strength when, in 1955, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and the 
Congress of International Organizations (CIO) joined forces. Labor’s c ncern was that 
most private insurers would not offer coverage to those aged 65 and older; pensioners 
were retiring without the medical coverage they had enjoyed while actively employed. 
Forand was initially reluctant to introduce the bill, thinking it would be an exercise in 
futility. As grassroots support quickly grew; however, he became an ver more ardent 
advocate of the legislation. Though the bill had no chance of passage or ev n of being 
reported out of the Ways and Means Committee, Forand did accomplish his goal of 
getting a written record started through hearings that he essentially forced Wilbur Mills, 
Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, to call. Mills, however, refused to 
attend the hearings and Forand was forced to chair the hearings himself. Still, some 720 
pages of record were created. Ultimately, the bill was defeated in the Ways and Means 
Committee by a 17-8 vote in 1959 (David, 1985; Marmor, 2000).  
Initially, the Forand Bill had no corresponding legislation in the Senate. However, 
acting on his own initiative, Senator Wayne Morse (D-Oregon) introduced the bill in the 
Senate in February of 1959. Later that same year, at the urging of Senate Labor 
Committee staffer William Reidy, a University of Wisconsin classmate of Wilbur Cohen, 
Chairman Lister Hill (D-AL) formed the Subcommittee on Aging. Reidy and his staff 
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colleagues wanted the committee’s youngest member, John F. Kennedy (D-MA) to chair 
the subcommittee. Ted Sorensen, Kennedy’s assistant, initially turned Reidy away when 
he proposed the idea. Why Sorenson did so is not clear. However, Myer Feldman, 
another Kennedy aide, liked the idea very much and promised to take it up with Kennedy. 
Meanwhile, Pat McNamara (D-MI) heard about the subcommittee and lobbied Chairman 
Hill for the subcommittee chairmanship, which he obtained. Kennedy was named to the 
committee, along with several others including Republican and long-term Medicare 
opponent Everett Dirksen (R-IL) (David, 1985). McNamara took the subcommittee on a 
seven-city coast-to-coast tour that started in Boston on October 13, 1959 ("INQUIRY ON 
AGED OPENS: 2 Senators Start 7-City Tour With Hearings at Boston.," 1959).  Each 
hearing was heavily attended by both public and press, and the hearings were opened to 
comments from the floor. Ultimately, the effort failed to pass the Forand Bill, but the 
record now included these important grassroots hearings and McNamara’s report to the 
full committee (David, 1985). 
Meanwhile, Kennedy had delivered his Ten-Point Program on Old Age to the 
Senate in August of 1958, written by Myer “Mike” Feldman, Ted Sorensen, and Wilbur 
Cohen. In 1959, Kennedy and Senator Philip Hart (D-MI) co-sponsored a bill similar to 
the Forand Bill but with an extended number of days of benefits. The Forand Bill (S. 
881), sponsored by Morse, was joined by the Kennedy-Hart Bill (S. 2915), which was 
sent to the Finance Committee. Both bills ultimately failed, but the Ten-Point Program 
and the Kennedy-Hart Bill established Kennedy’s interest in issues of the elderly, and in 
medical insurance for the elderly, in particular. Only jobs and housing ranked higher than 
medical insurance in the Ten-Point Program (David, 1985). 
In early 1960, hospital and nursing home care comprised more than half of the 
federal government’s $514 million in total outlays for medical payments. These payments 
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had grown out of the Social Security Amendments of 1950 which, for the first time, 
authorized so-called “vendor payments” for welfare services. In other words, the  
amendments permitted federal and state governments to make payments dir c ly to 
institutional providers, including hospitals and nursing homes, for the provision of so-
called “charity care.” These payments, however, were dependent upo  patients meeting 
local and state eligibility tests. In spite of a decade of such payments, ten states (mostly 
Southern states), had no provisions for vendor payments for medical care. This set the 
stage for Public Law 86-778, the Kerr-Mills Act of 1960, forerunner of today’s Medicaid 
(David, 1985; Marmor, 2000). The philosophy was to give grants-in-aid to the various 
states based on a complicated cost-sharing formula, and to allow the states to decide a) 
whether to participate in the plan at all and b) if it did, what specific services the state 
would cover for its medically indigent population (David, 1985; Weathers, 2004) 
Wilbur Mills initially proposed the bill during hearings in the Ways and Means 
Committee on the Forand Bill and the amendments to Social Security. The Mills plan 
required neither new infrastructure nor any new social philosophy for its implementation. 
Rather, it utilized the existing system and put the administrative burden, as well as 
substantial cost-sharing burdens, back on the states, should they choose to adopt them. 
The bill was quickly reported out by the Ways and Means Committee; th  House passed 
it on June 3, 1960 (David, 1985; Weathers, 2004). 
Senator Robert Kerr (D-OK) was looking for a way to distinguish himself from 
the Democrat nominee for President, John F. Kennedy, a Catholic who was almost 
certain to lose Oklahoma on religion alone. Kerr sought Wilbur Cohen’s counsel to draft 
a bill that was similar to the Mills bill but which would particularly benefit Oklahoma in 
the way in which costs would be shared. In the case of both bills, the federal government 
would supply between 50 percent and 80 percent of the funds. The respective bills were 
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passed and then reported out of conference quickly on August 24, 1960, as part of the 
Social Security Amendments of 1960. The House approved the conference report on 
August 26 and the Senate on August 29. President Eisenhower signed the bill into law on 
September 13, 1960 (David, 1985) 
Among progressives, the primary objection to the Kerr-Mills bill was the state-
administered means test, which was seen as demeaning to recipients and therefore likely 
to indirectly restrict access to the needed care. Essentially his test would require 
individuals to declare themselves “medical paupers” unable to pay their own medical 
bills while too well off to qualify for welfare. In spite of the demeaning means test, 
Wilbur Cohen, often described as an incrementalist, supported it as a step toward 
Medicare. Aime Forand reacted to the bill with disgust. Pat McNamara, chair of the 
Senate Subcommittee on Aging remained equally unconvinced by Cohen’s effort  on 
behalf of the Kerr-Mills Bill (David, 1985; Marmor, 2000). McNamara saw the plan as 
being unlikely to do either much harm or much good. In this he was borne out by the 
facts. While the bill’s sponsors and other supporters saw it as a wy the states could offer 
those benefits which they deemed most important for their own citizens, by the time 
Eisenhower left office, only Michigan, Oklahoma, Massachusetts, Kentucky, and West 
Virginia had passed legislation providing for at least some of the authorized benefits 
(David, 1985). By 1963, three years after its passage, 32 of the 50 states had adopted 
plans under Kerr-Mills, but five states—California, New York, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
and Pennsylvania—representing 32 percent of the population over age 65 were receiving 
nearly 90 percent of the funds available under Kerr-Mills. In spite of these results, both 
Kerr and Mills advocated on behalf of the efficacy of the bill (Marmor, 2000; Weathers, 
2004). 
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The net effect of Kerr-Mills may well have been to delay Medicare by another 
five years. Cohen would be proven right in the end, at least with respect to the bill’s 
being a step toward the eventual passage of Medicare, as the principles behind Kerr-
Mills, i.e. means-tested state-administered plans for the poor, wuld become the 
foundation for Medicaid under the Social Security Amendments of 1965. 
MEDICARE IN KENNEDY’S NEW FRONTIER  
In 1961, John F. Kennedy assumed the Oval Office, having defeated 
Eisenhower’s Vice-President Richard Nixon by the slimmest majority to date in the 
history of U.S. presidential elections. This did not prevent Kennedy from pursuing an 
ambitious agenda, which would include tax, trade, housing, and foreign aid bills among 
its high-priority initiatives. If they were to be passed, all would need to be reported out of 
Mills’ Ways and Means Committee (Marmor, 2000).  On January 30, 1961, Kennedy 
delivered his first State of the Union address to Congress. In the message, he addressed 
the recession under which the economy was laboring at the time. He spoke about foreign 
policy and domestic problems at home. Regarding medical care for the elderly, he said: 
Medical research has achieved new wonders – but these wonders are too often 
beyond the reach of too many people, owing to a lack of income (particularly 
among the aged), a lack of hospital beds, a lack of nursing homes and a lack of 
doctors and dentists. Measures to provide health care for the aged under Social 
Security, and to increase the supply of both facilities and personnel, must be 
undertaken this year. ("Transcript of the President's First Report to Congress on 
the State of the Union," 1961) 
 
On February 9, Kennedy sent his message “Health and Hospital Care” to 
Congress, the first special presidential message to Congress in history devoted entirely to 
the need for a health care program. In it, he particularly noted that the annual medical bill 
of persons over age 65 is likely to be twice that of the younger populations while the 
income of the elderly is only half that of the younger population (David, 1985). 
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The Kennedy Administration’s emphasis meant that Wilbur Mills would be 
confronting Medicare legislation less than a year after he had successfully sponsored 
Kerr-Mills, an attempt to prevent direct federal intervention in medical care in favor of a 
means-tested, state-controlled system. Had Mills been persuaded of Medicare’s value, his 
influence with the Ways and Means Committee, which he had chaired since 1957, was 
such that he likely would have been able to persuade the committee to r port the bill 
favorably (Marmor, 2000). However, Kennedy found himself in the unenviable position 
of having some very high-priority legislation other than Medicare before Mills’ 
committee, in particular his tax and trade legislation. This prevent d him from being able, 
in 1961, to press Mills to report out the administration’s King-Anderson health care bill 
(forerunner of the eventual Medicare Part A) to provide payments for hospital services to 
the elderly (Marmor, 2000; Weathers, 2004). On August 5, 1961, after nine days of 
House Ways and Means Committee hearings, generating 1,850 pages of testimony, the 
balance of committee votes remained against King-Anderson by a heavy margin. As 
King and the other Democratic leadership wished to avoid a negative vote on the record, 
the bill was not brought forward (David, 1985). As will be explored later, th  parallels to 
the legislative situation in which Bill Clinton would find himself in 1993 are remarkable. 
In early 1962, Kennedy issued a second message on health care to the Congr ss. 
Republicans, concerned that Medicare could become a critical issue in th November, 
1962 mid-term elections, offered three proposals. Frank Bow (R-OH) introduced 
HR10755 providing for a yearly income tax credit of $125 to be used for purchasing a 
private policy. John Lindsay (R-NY) sponsored HR11253, which provided identical 
benefits to the King-Anderson bill, but added an optional cash increase to Social Security 
checks in lieu of benefits for those over age 65 who did not want the gov rnment’s 
Medicare plan. The third bill, S2664, sponsored by Senator Jacob Javits (R-NY), 
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espoused a Social Security approach to financing with two plan options: a short-term, no-
deductible policy or a simple cash payment so retirees could purchase a private pay 
policy on their own (David, 1985). 
While Wilbur Cohen, HEW Secretary Abe Ribicoff, and others were working to 
develop a compromise bill, Under Secretary of HEW Ivan Nestingen, at the President’s 
request, was working with some labor leaders and others on a grass-roots campaign to 
bring pressure to bear on the Congress. This effort was to culminate in n address by 
Kennedy before about 20,000 senior citizens and a television audience including all three 
major networks at Madison Square Garden on May 20, 1962. This rally was to be 
accompanied by 32 other rallies across the country scheduled for the same week with 
speakers ranging from Vice President Johnson to a number of Cabinet Secr taries and 
Wilbur Cohen. Kennedy’s off-the-cuff remarks played well with the audience in the 
Garden, but fell flat on the television audience. The AMA responded with a counter-
attack televised from the same podium in a completely empty Madison Square Garden. It 
was generally agreed among pro-Medicare supporters that the AMA had delivered the 
more effective speech to the public. Most, if not all, of the 32 other rallies were cancelled 
(David, 1985). 
In the 1962 elections, Wilbur Mills faced his strongest opposition yet, largely the 
result of redistricting based on the 1960 Census. Additionally, he was under pressure 
from other House members not to report out a Medicare bill before the lections, which 
would force them to take a public stand in voting for or against the legislation. Mills sent 
word to the Kennedy Administration through Speaker of the House John McCormack 
urging the attachment of King-Anderson as a floor amendment to the welfare bill H.R. 
10606, which the House was about to send to the Senate, circumventing the necessity of 
reporting the bill out of the Ways and Means Committee. The President did not look 
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favorably on this idea as it entailed the risk of a defeat if they w re unable to secure 
enough floor votes to pass the measure (David, 1985). 
In the Senate, Clinton Anderson was now working on a compromise amendment 
with Javits. With the help of Dirksen and Russell Long of Louisiana, Kerr managed to 
win a vote to table the amendment. Bobby Baker, who had been Lyndon Johnson’s 
assistant and had continued as assistant to Majority Leader Mansfield after Johnson’s 
election to the Vice-Presidency, was also instrumental in the defeat. According to David 
(1985), Baker’s loyalty to Robert Kerr overshadowed his loyalty to his new boss 
Mansfield. To keep the White House calm, Baker managed to let Mansfield and O’Brien 
believe that the vote on the Javits-Anderson amendment would result in a tie, which the 
Vice-President could then break in favor of the amendment. Meanwhile, in a series of 
Machiavellian moves, Baker and Kerr were working to defeat the amend nt, an effort 
that paid off on July 17 when the Senate voted to table the amendment by a vote of 52-
48. David (1985) notes that the day after the defeat, “Bobby Baker took out a large 
personal loan in an Oklahoma bank owned in part by Robert Kerr” (p. 83). This 
effectively ended the 1962 attempt. 
The AMA continued its full-court press against so-called “socialized medicine,” 
spending about $2 million a year to ensure that Medicare would be defeated. Medicare 
advocates saw 1963 as a year to regroup and push for a bill in 1964. Meanwhil , public 
support for Medicare was waning. Gallup polls taken in the fall of 1962 and October of 
1963 showed public attention focused more on foreign affairs such as Cuba and Berli , 
not on Medicare (David, 1985). In the August Gallup Poll #662 (1962), only 45 out of 
3,343 respondents named “Social Security, social services, welfare, old age, etc.” as the 
Most Important Problem facing the country. By September of 1963  none of the 3,230 
respondents reported these issues as the “most important problem” (The Gallup 
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Organization, 1963). In that poll, the overwhelming attention was on race relations and 
civil rights with 51.52% of respondents listing this as the most important problem facing 
the country. According to David (1985), a 1961 Gallup poll of doctors indicated that 81 
percent opposed Medicare. 
In February of 1963, Kennedy delivered a message to Congress on improving the 
nation’s health, in which he stated “It is a tragic irony that medical science has kept 
millions of retired men and women alive to face illnesses they cannot afford” (Kennedy, 
1963-1966, p. 141). Kennedy supported Forand’s bill, but, history, in the form of an 
assassin, would intervene.  
According to Wilbur Cohen’s handwritten notes, on the morning of November 22, 
1963, he was working with Henry Hall Wilson, White House Liaison to the House of 
Representatives, on a memorandum detailing a compromise to which both Wilbur Mills 
and Kennedy could agree. Wilson had a luncheon meeting and Cohen agreed to have the 
memorandum typed up over the lunch hour. Cohen wrote: “An hour or so later I hea d a 
great deal of excitement in the hallway and when I went to discover the reason for it I 
learned President Kennedy had been assassinated. The memo was waiting for Wilson’s 
return but he never came back to my office” (Cohen, n.d.). 
Larry O’Brien (1974), Special Assistant to President Kennedy for Congressional 
Relations and Personnel, essentially corroborates Cohen’s notes. He recalls that on 
Johnson’s second night as President (November 23, 1963), Wilson told him of “an 
apparent breakthrough he’d made with Mills” (p. 186) on the morning of the 
assassination. O’Brien thought the matter of such importance that he directed Wilson to 
send a copy of the bill to the new president that same evening. 
The assassination of John F. Kennedy brought Lyndon Baines Johnson to the 
presidency. Johnson leveraged the legacy of a very popular young President, who now 
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held martyr status, to create the liberal landslide of 1964. The Johnson administration 
deluged Congress with legislative proposals. The Great Society was off nd running. 
Passage of civil rights legislation, voting rights legislation, a d, in 1965, Medicare and 
Medicaid would be hallmarks of a fruitful domestic policy–all of it occurring in the 
shadow of a foreign policy nightmare–the war in Vietnam (David, 1985; Marmor, 2000; 
O'Brien, 1974; Weathers, 2004). 
SUMMARIZING THE PATH ’S DECISION POINTS UP TO LBJ 
Initial efforts at a national health care program in the Progressiv  Era essentially 
ended with Woodrow Wilson’s election in the early twentieth century (Goldfield, 1992). 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt had the option, and the apparent intention, of including 
national health care in the Social Security Act of 1935. Fearing that the entire Social 
Security Bill would be defeated if he overreached, and on the advice of his close advisors 
and the Council on Economic Security, Roosevelt elected not to tackle national health 
care. Had he done so uccessfully, the path would almost certainly have taken a decidedly 
different turn, eliminating the need for the employer-based system that followed and was 
bolstered by wage-price controls during World War II (Cohen & McComb, 1968; David, 
1985; Marmor, 2000; Weathers, 2004). 
President Truman took office on the death of FDR in 1945. In 1948, he was 
elected in his own right, a surprising result to many. He proposed a national health care 
system, flying in the face of stiff opposition. His efforts, though nsuccessful, laid the 
stage for future developments some 15 years later. 
The rise of union power during the latter part of the depression, combined w th 
wage-price controls in World War II, led organized labor to seek benefits for members, 
including health care, in lieu of the frozen wage increases. A Treasu y Department 
decision that such benefits would be deductible to employers while not being reportable 
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as taxable income to the employees further reinforced the attractiveness of these 
employer-sponsored plans (Hacker, 1998). The unintended consequence of these polici s, 
however, was to push the country farther away from a national system of health care. 
This also had the net effect of increasing the cost of care over tim  as labor pushed for 
increasing levels of benefits for its membership. Corporations utilized health and 
retirement plans as competitive strategies for recruiting as well. This conditioned 
American workers to expect comprehensive health care coverage as a p rt of their job 
compensation package, rather than from the government. 
Very few corporations could afford to cover retirees as part of their health plans. 
Those that did were primarily the largest employers that operated under collective 
bargaining agreements, such as the automobile manufacturers. As most of the workforce 
was still not covered by union membership, many retired Americans found themselves 
without insurance. Numerous attempts, as outlined previously, were made to dress this 
situation over the years from 1945 to 1963. Two major bills played roles in the path 
during this period. The first was the Social Security Amendments of 1950 (P.L. 734), 
which permitted the government to pay vendors directly for services rendered, primarily 
for the medically indigent. This arrangement set the stage for the passage ten years later 
of the Social Security Amendments of 1960 (P.L. 86-778) which included the Kerr-Mills 
amendment providing states with block grants-in-aid which states had to match with their 
own funds. These funds were then to be used to provide benefits to the medically indigent 
using a state-level means test; the states also determined the benefits that would be 
available to those who met the state’s definition of medically indigent (David, 1985; 
Marmor, 2000). None of the proposals floated in the Congress over this period, whether 
initiated by the respective presidential administrations or by members of the House or 
Senate themselves, resembled anything remotely like comprehensive nat onal health 
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insurance coverage. All were incremental approaches to covering “more,” but never “all” 
Americans. This was the path inherited by (and, in at least someresp cts, influenced by) 
Lyndon Baines Johnson who unexpectedly became president on November 22, 1963. 
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Chapter 5:  
For Such a Time as This: 
Case Study of Lyndon Baines Johnson’s Administration and the 
Successful Passage of the Social Security Amendments of 1965 
THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION – THE GREAT SOCIETY  
In this section attention turns from the historical literature (i. ., secondary 
accounts) to original source documents, primarily from the LBJ Library. Observations 
and interpretations of original presidential and other archival documents are made in an 
effort to answer the first three orienting questions with respect to the Johnson 
Administration’s eventual success at passing Medicare and Medicaid in 1965.  
After giving at least cursory examination to an estimated 8,000 documents related 
to Medicare and Medicaid in the LBJ Library files, and more thoroughly examining 
approximately 4,000 pages of documents, several themes emerge. I will elaborate on 
these themes prior to the chronological case study details. In short, they are: 
 President Johnson’s keen understanding of the importance of words in 
framing the debate; 
 Johnson’s tendency to maintain control in the hands of a small, select 
group of seasoned political operatives and career policymaking 
professionals; 
 Johnson’s attention to the details of negotiations and policy consequences; 
and 
 Johnson’s highly developed sense of the political and legislative proc sses 
including the personal and local nature of politics, the importance of 
sharing the credit, and the importance of making each person feel as if his 
contribution was critical to the success of the effort. 
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First is Johnson’s apparent understanding of the importance of words and how a 
debate is framed. For example, Johnson consistently stood against the idea of “socialized 
medicine,” and in favor of “patient choice of physician.” In a letter to a Dallas constituent 
in 1950, then-Senator Johnson expressed his “complete opposition to socialized 
medicine,” which he had held “ever since his election to Congress thirteen years ago” (L. 
B. Johnson, 1950). He also understood, and apparently subscribed to, the idea that 
entitlement programs posed a potential moral hazard. In a phone conversation with 
Speaker of the House McCormack, Majority Leader Carl Albert, and Wilbur Cohen on 
March 23, 1965, Johnson asked Cohen for the particulars of the “[part B] over and above 
the King-Anderson, the supplementary you stole from Byrnes.” This is the part of 
Medicare that pays for physician services. The moral hazard exists on at least two levels: 
what the physicians can charge the government and what the individual patient will 
receive in benefits. For some reason, Johnson first asked about the physician charges. The 
President asked whether the physician “charges what he wants to [under the program].” 
Cohen explained that the Secretary of HEW would contract with “someone like Blue 
Shield” to determine what the “usual, customary and reasonable charges” would be for 
any given service in a given location. This satisfied the President who then asked how the 
patient comes out financially. When Cohen explained the fifty dollar deductible and 
twenty percent co-payment requirement, Johnson responded “Well, that takes care of the 
hypochondriacs,” clearly a part of how American society has come t  construct health 
care provision ("Recording of Telephone Conversation between Lyndon B. Johnson, 
John McCormack, Wilbur Mills, Wilbur Cohen, and Carl Albert, March 23, 1965, 4:54
PM, Citation #7141," 1965). 
The second thing one observes in the LBJ files related to Medicar  and Medicaid 
is the tight group of advisers and players in the events, particularly in the executive 
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branch. In addition to the President, probably the individual in his administration whose 
name comes up most frequently is Wilbur Cohen. Other important and frequent names 
include Larry O’Brien, Mike Manatos, Myer “Mike” Feldman, and Henry Hall Wilson, 
all congressional liaison and political advisers to the President, and to a lesser extent Jack 
Valenti, the President’s Chief of Staff, and Bill Moyers, Special Assistant to the 
President. Notably, all were men. Among the legislators whose names re prominent in 
the files, the first is Wilbur Mills, Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee. 
Other legislative names that figure prominently in the documents are Congressional 
leaders John McCormack and Carl Albert, as well as Senators Clinton Anderson, Russell 
Long, Mike Mansfield, Abraham Ribicoff, and Jacob Javits. (Ribicoff, it should be noted, 
had served as Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare under President Kennedy prior 
to being elected to the Senate in 1962.) 
A search of the telephone conversations database using the keyword “Medicare” 
reveals a total of 67 conversations on the topic, with 66 of these occurring sometime 
between November 22, 1963 and the time the bill was signed on July 31, 1965. Table 1 
below illustrates the number of such conversations LBJ had with each of these persons. It 
should be noted that many of these conversations included other parties than the primary 
speaker on the call, but in most cases, these are people who have alre dy been mentioned 
or appear on the list as a primary speaker. Only thirty names appear on the list as 
“primary speaker,” and fifteen of them received only one such call. By far, the most calls 
(14) were between LBJ and Larry O’Brien who ran congressional rel tions for the 
President. Again, as previously noted, the recipients of these calls were all men. Women 
clearly did not play a large public role in the Johnson White House, at l ast not as far as 








Number of calls 
Larry O’Brien 14 
 
Carl Albert 5 
 
George Smathers 4 
 





Wilbur Mil ls, Mike Mansfield, Clinton 
Anderson, Hale Boggs, Russell Long, Albert 




Robert Byrd, Arthur “Tex” Goldschmidt, B. 
Everett Jordan, Alex Rose, Lee White, Carl 
Hayden, Earle Clements, Tom Hughes, 
Anthony Celebrezze, Frank “Topper” 
Thompson, George Meany, John 
McCormack, Edward Kennedy, Benjamin 
Spock, and Henry Hall Wilson 
1 
   
The third “theme” that stands out when reviewing the documents is the 
extraordinary command of detail that the President exhibited. Johnson ot only 
understood the “big picture,” but sought out and understood the finer points and nuances 
of both the legislation and the political environment. He is widely credited if not 
renowned for his political astuteness and stamina. The previously referenced phone call 
in which he asked Wilbur Cohen about the specifics of the bill being reported out of the 
committee included even his checking to be certain what was meant by “physician 
services” in the bill ("Recording of Telephone Conversation between Lyndon B. Johnson, 
John McCormack, Wilbur Mills, Wilbur Cohen, and Carl Albert, March 23, 1965, 4:54
PM, Citation #7141," 1965). In another example of his attention to detail, Johnson 
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responded with a handwritten note to a memo from Jack Valenti (who would later 
become President of the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences) on April 22, 
1965. Valenti was passing along information from HEW Secretary Anthony Celebrezze. 
Celebrezze was concerned about press stirrings that Medicare would produce a drag on 
the economy (by then the Medicare bill had been reported out of the House Ways and 
Means Committee). LBJ wrote, “J – Please ask Ackley and Fowler to ask their friends to 
pipe down – L.” Presumably, “Ackley and Fowler” were H. Gardner Ackley, Chairman 
of the Council of Economic Advisors, and Henry H. Fowler, Secretary of the Treasury. 
There is no mention of “Ackley and Fowler” in the memorandum from Valenti, but LBJ 
knew who was stirring up the pot and who could get them to “pipe down” (Valenti, 
1965a).  
The fourth “theme” in the documentation is the sense of the political and 
legislative process that Johnson had developed so keenly over the almost 30 years he had 
spent in Washington. Restructuring the House Ways and Means Committee w h the 
cooperation of Speaker McCormack in the wake of the 1964 landslide election (David, 
1985; L. B. Johnson, 1971; Marmor, 2000) is a prime example. Johnson clearly both 
understood and enjoyed the legislative/political process. When called by Speaker 
McCormack, House Majority Leader Albert, Ways and Means Committee Chairman 
Mills, and Undersecretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Wilbur Cohen on March 23, 
1965, to be told that the bill was to be reported out of the Ways and Means Committee, 
Johnson can be heard to say: “For God’s sakes, don’t let dead cats stand on your porch. 
Mr. Rayburn [former Speaker Sam Rayburn] used to say that they stunk and they stunk 
and they stunk. When you get one [bill] out of that committee, you call that son of a bitch 
up before they can get their letters written” ("Recording of Telephone Conversation 
between Lyndon B. Johnson, John McCormack, Wilbur Mills, Wilbur Cohen, and Carl 
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Albert, March 23, 1965, 4:54 PM, Citation #7141," 1965). Presumably the ‘they” he is 
referring to are the opponents of the legislation, including the American Medical 
Association in particular. 
Johnson understood the personal nature of politics as well as the egos of the 
political players. Examples abound, but one related to health care legislation is his 
handling of several phone calls on September 24, 1964. The conference committee to 
resolve the Social Security amendments legislation between House and Senate had been 
meeting and had broken up badly earlier in the afternoon. This bill included the King-
Anderson bill, which would later become Medicare Part A (hospital/surgical coverage). 
In the first two calls relevant to the meeting, Johnson plays the ego card. The first call, at 
5:20 p.m. is to Senator George Smathers (D-FL). Smathers was of the impression that the 
conference report was “coming along,” but the President informed him he had heard 
otherwise. Smathers asked whether the President wants him to look into it and getback to 
him. The President replied in the affirmative “but don’t tell them I called, cause they’ll 
get jealous” ("Recording of Telephone Conversation between George Smathers and 
Lyndon Baines Johnson, September 24, 1964, 5:20 PM, Citation #5673," 1964).  
Less than ten minutes after hanging up with Smathers, Johnson was on the phone 
with Senator Russell Long (D-LA). The President asked Long for a report on the 
conference committee and Long delivered a much more pessimistic (and, apparently 
accurate) report. The discussion proceeded about the positions of Wilbur Mls and Harry 
Byrd (a strong opponent of the legislation), as well as Long’s recommended 
parliamentary tactics for a vote in the House on Medicare with the view to forcing 
Congressmen on the record with their votes. Putting his fellow members on ecord as 
favoring or opposing Medicare is clearly an area where Mills wa getting pressure to 
avoid bringing the matter to the floor for a vote, pressure which Mills was only too happy 
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to oblige. Near the end of the conversation, again, the President is heard to say to Long 
that he will “talk to Clint [Anderson] about it, but you forget I called so they won’t get 
jealous about it” ("Recording of Telephone Conversation between Russell Long and 
Lyndon Baines Johnson, September 24, 1964, 5:30 PM, Citation #5677," 1964). The 
implication, in both instances, is that the recipient of the instruction is in some sort of 
special position or relationship with the President which would make oth r members 
jealous. Before the evening was gone, he also spoke with Rep. Hale Boggs (D-LA) and 
Senator Anderson (D-NM). He understood that maintaining contact was part of 
maintaining relationships, and no one was more astute at the relational nature of politics 
than Johnson. 
THE 1964 EFFORT 
Lyndon Baines Johnson was sworn in as the 36th President of the United States 
aboard Air Force One at Love Field in Dallas shortly after th  assassination of John F. 
Kennedy. Along with the many perquisites and burdens of the Oval Office, Johnson 
inherited the legislative agenda of the martyred President. Ever on  to capitalize on 
whatever advantage he could find, Johnson held up the Kennedy legacy as his tru t and 
vowed to enact the legislative agenda of Jack Kennedy (L. B. Johnson, 1971; Kearns, 
1976; O'Brien, 1974).  
On January 8, 1964, just seven weeks after the assassination, Johnson delivered 
his first State of the Union Address to a Joint Session of Congress. In the brief address, 
he called on the Congress to work together to enact bold initiatives in education, housing, 
poverty, hospital (but not full medical) care for the aged, hospital construction, tax 
cutting legislation and a host of other initiatives. He declared his faith that it could be 
“done by this summer” (Office of the White House Press Secretary, 1964). Johnson 
(1971) would later recall feeling that his administration had a very short window in which 
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to act, particularly given that the next presidential election was less than a year away 
when he took office. 
Just eight days after the State of the Union address, Sen. Jacob Javits (D-NY) 
introduced the Health Care Insurance Act of 1964 in the Senate. The first prong of Javits’ 
two-pronged approach, based on the report of the Flemming Commission,4 would have 
provided “45 days of hospital care for all persons 65 years of age or over without 
deductible or option, up to 180 days of skilled nursing care, and up to 200 days of home 
care following treatment in a hospital” (Javits, 1964a, p. 1). This would be provided by 
an increase in the Social Security tax of one-quarter of one percnt of payroll each on 
employers and employees. The second prong would provide a national privateinsurance 
program covering physician and non-institutional care to be offered on a n -profit, tax-
free, optional basis with private insurers allowed to volunteer to offer the plans. There 
was no assurance that private companies would participate. Given the optional nature of 
the coverage, it was unlikely that insurers would be willing to offer such a plan due to the 
risk of adverse selection, i.e., only those who could not otherwise either qualify for or 
afford other coverage would be prone to enroll in the government-approved basic plan 
(Javits, 1964). Javits outlined his bill (S. 2431) in a one-page memorandum to the 
President (Javits, 1964b). 
On the same day, Larry O’Brien (1964b) sent a memorandum to the President 
outlining his recent conversations with Wilbur Mills. O’Brien stated that Mills had not 
committed to either sponsor or support a Medicare bill, which O’Brien saw as critical in 
both cases. In the first of several bullet points outlining O’Brien’s understanding of the 
                                                
4 The Flemming Commission was the popular name for the National Committee on Health Care for the 
Aged, chaired by Arthur S. Flemming, then-president of the University of Oregon. Flemming had 
previously served as Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare under President Eisenhower. The 12-
member commission formed in 1962, at least partially at the urging of Senator Javits, was to provide an 
independent review of the issues surrounding health c re for the elderly. 
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“principal respects in which [Mills] would alter King-Anderson,” a critical piece in the 
path-dependent journey is outlined. Here O’Brien relays to the President that Mills favors 
the use of the Blue Cross plans—founded and owned by the hospitals themselves—to 
administer the hospital insurance program, as opposed to letting commercial insurance 
companies have part of the administrative piece.5 O’Brien sees this as “entirely 
agreeable,” fully supportable by labor, and of such importance to Millsthat meetings 
were being held the same day as the O’Brien memo to begin negotiations with Blue 
Cross toward administering the hospital program (O'Brien, 1964b). Blue Cross had been 
started by hospitals themselves (who continued to own the plans) in reponse to the Great 
Depression. Blue Cross was an effort to see that hospitals continued o r ceive some sort 
of payment even during the economic crisis. (Blue Shield, which is not mentioned in the 
O’Brien memo, was the physician-owned counterpart to Blue Cross.)  
In a subsequent memo dated May 11, 1964, and outlining the discussions in 
Executive Session of the Ways and Means Committee, O’Brien (1964c) stated that Mills 
was then insisting that private insurers in addition to Blue Cross be permitted to bid on 
contracts, on a low-bid basis, for administration of the hospital benefits under King-
Anderson. This represents an about face from Mills’ January position as outlined to the 
President by O’Brien (1964a), but only to the extent that it would have permitted a 
broader number of private for-profit insurers to bid on the administrative contracts. 
Why is this a critical point in the path-dependent nature of federal he lth care 
policy? Think ahead to today’s Medicare Part C Advantage plans—private insurers offer 
coverage to the elderly and the federal government pays the premiums. With Part C 
plans, enrollees have the right to choose an approved plan administrator to pay he 
benefits rather than have them paid directly by the government to the provider (regular 
                                                
5 Asking the hospital-owned insurance plan to administer the government-proposed hospital coverage 
seems to pose a significant conflict of interest problem. 
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Medicare). These plans sometimes offer features and benefits that may differ from the 
regular Medicare benefits, and these are sometimes attractive to seniors based on their 
individual perceived needs for certain benefits. The Medicare Part D Prescription Drug 
plans are also administered by private insurers. This differs from Medicaid, in which 
states pay physicians either directly or through some managed cr  system. This idea of 
providing government benefits through private for-profit insurance companies has its 
roots in the philosophies of Wilbur Mills as outlined in the O’Brien (1964) memorandum.  
Larry O’Brien was a holdover from the Kennedy administration. He had been a 
key operative in all of Kennedy’s campaigns. He was an astute poli ician and very detail-
oriented. Evidence of this can be found in another memo (O'Brien, 1963) to the President 
on December 5, 1963, only days after Kennedy’s funeral. In this memo, O’Brien 
expressed his concern that if HEW Secretary Celebrezze spoke to the press about matters 
of importance to HEW after his meeting with the President and failed to mention 
Medicare, it could harm efforts on Capitol Hill. O’Brien does not elaborate as to why this 
would be harmful. One could surmise that it would signal a lack of full support for 
Medicare from at least some corners of the administration. 
In July, Wilbur Cohen was busy providing cost estimates to his boss HEW 
Secretary Celebrezze over the various proposals for amending Social e urity in both 
House and Senate. These proposals included increases in cash benefits, adoption of the 
King-Anderson hospital coverages, and changes required in the Social Security payroll 
tax rates (Cohen, 1964a). 
Later that same month, Sen. Ribicoff sent a letter to the President expressing 
concern that passage of the five percent increase in benefits being proposed by Mills, and 
against which legislators would be reluctant to vote, would result in an increase in the 
payroll tax beyond the point at which Medicare could be added later. Ribicoff proposed 
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the “Free Choice Health Plan,” which would give pensioners the option a  age 65 of 
taking the increased cash benefit or hospital insurance instead (Ribicoff, 1964b). We 
know that the President saw Ribicoff’s letter: A handwritten note transmitting the 
Ribicoff letter from Jack Valenti, his Chief of Staff, to the President contains a notation 
in the President’s hand telling Valenti to pass the letter to Larry O’Brien (Valenti, 1964). 
This proposal received considerable attention. On August 11, Ribicoff sent a l tter and an 
outline of his “Free Choice Health Plan” proposal to Clinton Anderson, suggesting that it 
be held in reserve as a backup plan in the event that the original Kig-Anderson 
legislation did not pass (Ribicoff, 1964a). Clearly, Ribicoff was very concerned that 
Mills’ move to increase Social Security cash benefits was going to preclude adding 
medical care at a later date. On the same day, he sent a copy to the President.  
On August 14, Larry O’Brien and his deputy Mike Manatos met with Senators 
Mike Mansfield (D-MT), Hubert Humphrey (D-MN), Clinton Anderson (D-NM), and 
Abe Ribicoff (D-CT) to discuss whether King-Anderson could, or even should, be passed 
and whether the Ribicoff plan should be offered in its place (Manatos, 1964a). According 
to Manatos’ memorandum summarizing the meeting, the general consensus was that 
passage of the cash benefit increase alone would effectively shut out any future attempt to 
add medical care for the aged through the Social Security system. The attendees further 
agreed that the Ribicoff plan was the only option, despite repeated and emphatic 
statements by O’Brien that King-Anderson had the “four-square” support of the 
Administration. Anderson, with the concurrence of the others, felt that Ribicoff “[made] 
political sense and offers an attractive campaign issue – it’s voluntary, it is elective and it 
is attractive.” The four senators also agreed that only the President would have a chance 
of persuading Wilbur Mills to accept Senate action. Finally, the group agreed that if Mills 
failed to concur, they should let the entire package die as passage of th  cash benefit, 
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again, would shut out any future attempt at medical care legislation. On this last point, 
O’Brien recalled that Anderson expressed that sentiment, but that i had not received the 
concurrence of the entire group, and he reported it as such in his memo to the President 
transmitting the Manatos memo (O'Brien, 1964a). 
In early August 1964, a meeting was scheduled at the White House betw en 
members of the National Medical Association, a group of “Negro physicians,” and the 
President. Horace Busby’s (1964) memo to the President stated the following: “This 
organization of Negro physicians is strongly in support of the Administrat on’s hospital 
care for the aged proposals. Lee White, Louie Martin, et al, urge that Medicare – not 
Civil Rights – be the focus of conversation and discussion” [Emphasis in original]. Busby 
then went on to outline talking points for the President’s consideration. I is not clear 
from the records whether the President followed Busby’s advice for the meeting. The 
memo does, however, illustrate the sense of importance – perhaps even urgency – that the 
effort had taken on.  
The White House Central Files pertinent to Medicare are filled with letters and 
telegrams from around the nation both supporting and denouncing the program. As one 
might expect, most of the letters from elderly persons supported at least some form of 
medical care for the aged. Most letters from physicians and their societies denounced the 
program, though a large number espoused the idea of a limited program for the “few” 
elderly who could not afford to cover their own medical expenses. On January 22, UPI 
reported on the testimony of Joe Belden, a Dallas public opinion pollster appearing 
before a committee (it is not clear which one) “at the request of the Texas Medical 
Association.” Belden claimed to have polled 1,666 Texans, “most of them 65 or older.” 
Belden stated his three primary conclusions that detracted from the need for medical 
insurance for the aged:  
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 Income alone is not a realistic measurement of the aged’s financial condition. 
 Almost half of all aged Texans (46 percent) appear to have health insurance, 
sufficient savings, or sufficient income, singly or in combination, to take care 
of medical needs. 
 In addition to that half, 18 percent more said their children can help them with 
medical expenses (United Press International, 1964). 
This and similar sentiments are echoed widely throughout the letters from 
physicians and their leaders. Some elderly individuals also took time to write the 
President to express the same sentiments. 
In the case of public positions as polarized as those of the AMA (organizationally 
opposed) and the elderly (generally favorable), it is useful to consider counterexamples. 
First, with respect to elderly persons, one letter stands out as a counterexample. A self-
described widow whose ancestors had come to America in 1637, Vinnie Clark (Mrs. 
Nicholas) Molitor (1964), wrote to the President on letterhead from The Park Manor 
Hotel in San Diego on January 8, 1964. Mrs. Molitor stated that she had no descen ants 
and was opposed to Medicare, favoring instead the idea that local communities had the 
capacity and should be permitted to care for their own elderly poor.  
On the physician side of the ledger, perhaps the most notable counterexampl  
comes from Dr. Caldwell B. Esselstyn (1963) of Claverack, N.Y., writing as chairman of 
the Physicians Committee for Health Care for the Aged Through Social Security. The 
letter recalls a meeting of the group with then Vice-President Johnson and President 
Kennedy in March of 1962 and pledges continued support “as doctors of the conc pt of 
hospital insurance for the aged through social security [sic].” Perhaps as notable as the 
letter is the roster on the side of the letterhead, presumably of committee members. 
Among the 31 physicians listed, only one is from the deep South, a member from 
Nashville, Tennessee. David (1985), reporting on an interview she had with Wilbur 
Cohen, describes Esselstyn as “physician to Lou Gehrig and Eleanor Roosevelt, whose 
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Rip Van Winkle Clinic in New York was forced to close by the AM because of 
Esselstyn’s ‘independent politics’” (p. 58). 
On September 2, 1964, by a vote of 49-44, the Senate passed its bill attaching he 
Gore amendment (King-Anderson) to the House version (O'Brien, 1964d). The bill would 
now move to the conference committee. By this point, the President was locked in 
election battle for the presidency with Barry Goldwater, the Republican nominee, who 
voted against health care. In a rare glimpse into the political soul of Special Assistant to 
the President Bill Moyers, a memo from Moyers to the President on the same day 
reported that he had called Ken O’Donnell and Wayne Philips at the Committee to Re-
Elect the President to suggest that they “’pull out all the stops’ among organizations of 
older Americans…over Goldwater’s vote against the health care plan.” Moyers went on 
to say that he did not think the President should take on Goldwater himself over the vote 
but that “this is a great opportunity for us to beat him to death among these older people 
if we just play it right” (Moyers, 1964b). 
Friends of the administration were working the grassroots side to build support for 
the Gore-Anderson amended bill. Nelson Cruikshank, Director of the Social Security 
Department of the AFL-CIO, joined forces with social welfare consultant and LBJ friend 
Elizabeth “Wicky” Wickenden to send a telegram to approximately 50 national social 
welfare, religious, and professional organizations urging them to call, write, and send 
telegrams to their congressmen and senators to press for passage of “social security 
hospital insurance before congress adjourns” (Cruikshank, 1964). 
Marmor (2000) provides a concise and cogent explanation of the 1964 effort.
What is striking in his account is how near King-Anderson came to passage. In fact, it 
was attached as an amendment to the Senate version of the Social Security Bill that had 
already passed the House. It had failed to be reported out as part of the House bill largely 
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due to the fact that, in spite of increasing numbers of pro-Medicare congressmen on the 
committee, the bill still lacked majority support on Ways and Means. By passing it 
through the Senate, the issue would have to be addressed in the conference committee. 
President Johnson, as both a former Congressman and former Majority Leader of the 
Senate, knew all too well the ways that bills could change in conferenc . Wilbur Mills 
was determined that Medicare would not pass in conference, which would have placed it 
beyond the control of his Committee on Ways and Means. 
Previously, I outlined phone calls between the President and Sens. Smathers (D-
FL) and Long (D-LA) regarding the breakdown of the conference committee over the 
King-Anderson bill on September 24, 1964. On that same date, shortly after h nging up 
with Russell Long, the President spoke with Rep. Hale Boggs (D-LA), who represented 
the House in the conference committee. Boggs essentially confirmed Long’s account of 
the meeting, giving a pessimistic outlook and focusing on Wilbur Mills’ parliamentary 
moves. Boggs recommended that if Medicare is not included, no bill should be passed at 
all, since he felt that giving the increase in cash benefits without the King-Anderson 
Medicare provisions would mean that they would never get Medicare ("R cording of 
Telephone Conversation between Hale Boggs and Lyndon Baines Johnson, September 
24, 1964, 5:53 PM, Citation #5682," 1964).  
Later that same evening, Johnson called Senator Clinton Anderson (D-NM), co-
sponsor of the King-Anderson bill. Anderson characterized the day’s conference 
committee meeting as “an awful bad day.” He complained that “Wilbur [Mills] just didn’t 
stand up to what he talked about at all.” Johnson told Anderson a somewhat crude story 
to illustrate how he felt that “it just isn’t my day.” In doing so, he aligned himself with 
Anderson’s feelings. The President congratulated Anderson on getting the foreign aid bill 
agreed to in the committee. When the President asked how he thought they should 
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proceed, Anderson responded that they should do nothing since the bill would not pass 
with the Medicare provisions. He essentially espoused letting it drop in favor of “do[ing] 
it better next time around” ("Recording of Telephone Conversation between Clinton 
Anderson and Lyndon Baines Johnson, September 24, 1964, 8:50 PM, Citation #5688," 
1964). Just over a week later, on October 1, the conference committee adjourned without 
reaching any agreement. Medicare was apparently the only part of the bill considered (as 
opposed to the entire bill which included an increase in cash benefits). Senators Long, 
Smathers, Anderson, and Gore voted in favor of the Senate bill. Senator Byrd abstained 
explaining that he felt obligated to support the Senate’s position as a Senate conferee, but 
he personally opposed Medicare. Senators Williams and Carlson voted against the bill. 
Among conference representatives from the House, only Representatives Boggs and King 
voted to support the Senate bill. Voting against Medicare were Representatives Mills, 
Curtis, and Byrnes (Manatos, 1964c). 
On October 4, 1964, the conference announced that it was deadlocked over the 
issues of both increased cash benefits for Social Security recipients and health care. Mills 
had succeeded in blocking the bill, relieving many congressmen who felt caught facing a 
choice between the elderly and the AMA. Mills had secured the block by promising 
conferees that he would bring Medicare up as the first order of business in 1965. This 
ended the 1964 effort (David, 1985; Marmor, 2000; Weathers, 2004). A timeline 
reviewing the major events of the 1964 effort appears in Figure 4 below.  
Even after the bill was lost in 1964, efforts to persuade the public did not slow for 
even days. No more than four days after the failure of the conferenc  committee to reach 
agreement, Bill Moyers (1964a) responded to a letter from Dr. Don W. Boston (1964) of 
Fort Worth. Boston’s letter of September 12 recalled his meeting Moyers as a patient in 
his office some years prior. Relying quite heavily on scriptural references, he states his 
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explicit wish early in the letter that “through your intercession and counsel, President 
Johnson will be influenced to make decisions in accord with established Scriptural 
principles.” Apparently the main principle to which Dr. Boston refe s is “the fact that 
God in the long ago established that a man must work or he would not eat.” Moyers’ 
response is eloquent in his assurance of the President’s full confidence in the free 
enterprise system and his view, shared by Moyers, that the free nt rprise system is not 
incompatible with “the participation of the Federal Government in programs designed to 
meet urgent national social and economical [sic] programs.” Obviously, the 1964 failure 
did not slow the battle for Medicare.  
If we accept the path-dependent nature of policy decisions, we can all be thankful 
that the Senate bill with the King-Anderson amendments did not pass in 1964. We can be 
equally, if not more thankful, that the Ribicoff proposal did not pass. Had either passed, 
Medicare would likely look much different today, if it even existed at all. King-Anderson 
addressed hospital costs for the aged only, with no provision for payment of non-
institutional costs such as physician’s fees. While it is true that this would not necessarily 
have precluded later passage of the optional Part B medical coverage, it would have 
meant another battle. Given that Congress had considered proposals for hospital-only 
coverage in one form or another since at least 1948, it is conceivable th t it could have 




Figure 4:     Timeline of 1964 Effort 
The Ribicoff Health Choice Plan would have made any coverage optional—at ge 
65 pensioners could choose between a five percent Social Security cash benefit increase 
or optional hospital insurance. Seniors would not be permitted, however, to change their 
mind later. It is entirely likely that, had the Ribicoff plan passed, those who had coverage 
with their former employers or unions would have elected the higher cash benefit. As 
costs increased and employers sought to rid themselves of pensioner health benefits, 
these elders might have found themselves without coverage. Additionally, those who 
Nov. 22, 1963 – Johnson 
takes office following JFK 
assassination 
Jan. 8 – LBJ First State of the Union Address 
– health care for the aged a top priority 
Jan. 16 – Javits introduces S. 2431 offering 45 days of hospital care, 180 days 
of skilled nursing care, 200 days of home care post-h pital, and an optional 
national private plan to cover physician and non-institutional benefits. 
May 11 – O’Brien Memo to LBJ re: Mills insisting on private 
insurers rights to bid on administrative contracts 
July 20 – Ribicoff proposes optional plan for physician 
charges to be covered in memo to LBJ 
Aug. 14 – Meeting to discuss withdrawing King-Anderson  
(hospital only plan) and replacing with Ribicoff plan 
Aug. 6 – House Passes HR11865 (King-Anderson) and sends to Senate 
Sep. 2- Senate passes bill with Gore Amendment 
(King-Anderson hospital coverage) 
Sep. 24 – Conference committee breaks down over 
King-Anderson bill 
Oct. 4 – Conference committee announces deadlock. 
Mills has blocked passage relieving Congressmen of 
choosing between elderly and AMA. 
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enjoyed good health and could afford private-pay plans might also have opted out of the 
pool, resulting in a risk pool that subjected the plans to a much higher cost risk than 
blanket coverage would incur (i.e., adverse selection bias). In any eve t, the plans would 
have further fractured the coverage picture for the elderly rather than unifying it, as was 
the final result with the passage of the Social Security Amendments of 1965 that brought 
Medicare and Medicaid into existence. 
PASSING MEDICARE AND MEDICAID – 1965 
On November 3, 1964, Lyndon Baines Johnson was re-elected President of the 
United States by the largest margin in history. Johnson watched the election returns with 
family and friends at the Driskill Hotel in Austin, Texas. He saw the landslide results as 
“a mandate for action, and [he] meant to use it that way” (L. B. Johnson, 1971, p. 110). 
On November 12, The New York Times (Hunter, 1964) reported on its front page 
that House Ways and Means Committee Chair Mills had said in a telephone interview 
from Arkansas that he was “ready to bring the long-stalled [health care for the aged] 
measure up in committee immediately after Congress convened in January if President 
Johnson asked him to” (p. 1). As a matter of law, legislation cannot be carri d over from 
one Congress to another, which meant that a new bill would have to be introduced. Given 
the administration’s strong position in the wake of the landslide election, it was unlikely 
that the new bill would contain as much compromise as the previous one (David, 1985). 
In fact, on November 25, 1964, HEW Secretary Celebrezze sent a memo to the President 
attaching Wilbur Cohen’s summary of the redrafted bill. While the bill closely resembled 
the bill passed by the Senate earlier that year, including the Gor -Anderson amendments 
(which incorporated the King-Anderson hospital coverage as passed in the House), it also 
deleted seven controversial provisions that the Senate had added (including two 
amendments by Russell Long and one by the new Vice-President-Elect Hubert 
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Humphrey) and added some of the House-passed measures, including the cash benefit 
increases (Celebrezze, 1964). 
The administration also did not waste any time counting votes. On December 8, 
Mike Manatos (1964b) sent a memo to Larry O’Brien indicating that t ey had lost two 
supporters of the Gore Amendment in the last election but picked up five. W th the three 
who had missed the vote the last time, the projected new vote would be 55 to 45.
Furthermore, Manatos speculated that persuading Senator Richard Russell would mean 
an even healthier margin of victory in the Senate. O’Brien forwarded the memo to the 
President the next day.  
Work on the new bill was proceeding rapidly under Wilbur Cohen’s direction. 
Outside interests continued to make their case for various changes they wanted in the bill. 
One in particular involved the Mayo Clinic. At the President’s request, Cohen met with 
two representatives of the Mayo Clinic on December 23, 1964. These representatives 
sought a revision of the bill that would permit coverage for hospital inpatient and 
outpatient diagnostic services at the clinic, a revision Cohen felt was minor. In his 
memorandum to the President of the meeting, Cohen indicated they would incl e the 
necessary changes in the revised bill “which Senator Anderson and Congressman Cecil 
King wish to introduce in Congress on January 5” (Cohen, 1964b). 
Senator Anderson had made an early request to Majority Leader Mik  Mansfield 
to reserve the designation “S.1” (Senate Bill 1) for the Medicare bill. Congressman King 
also requested the “HR1” (House of Representatives Bill 1) designation for the bill in the 
House of Representatives (David, 1985; Marmor, 2000). The bills were introduced on 
January 6, 1965 ("MEDICARE MEASURE OFFERED IN SENATE," 1965). The 
President had made health care a priority in his State of the Union message on January 4 
("Transcript of the President's Message to Congress on the State of th  Union," 1965). 
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Three days later, he delivered his Special Message to Congress on Health ("Johnson's 
Special Message to Congress Outlining Broad National Health Program," 1965).
By the end of January, Mills had started hearings in executive session on HR1. 
The fact that these hearings were held in executive session, and therefore excluded the 
press, is important. Wilbur Cohen was involved in most, if not all, of the sessions and 
reported back frequently. A memo from Cohen to Secretary Celebrezze on January 28 
outlines two days of questions he and members of the HEW staff had received from 
committee members. He outlined his suspicions as to changes that Mills would want in 
the legislation, including a slightly higher tax rate than the administration proposed (1 
percent versus 0.9%). At that point, Mills was skeptical of the idea of blanketing-in the 
present aged and paying those benefits out of general revenues, but Cohen felt Mills 
could be persuaded (Cohen, 1965b). 
 
 
Figure 5:     Timeline for November 3, 1964 to February 1, 1965 
Nov. 3, 1964 – LBJ defeats Goldwater for Presidency. 
Nov. 12 – Chairman Mills announces he is ready to introduce 
the Medicare bill again in January if the President wishes. 
Dec. 8 – Manatos memo to O’Brien with new 
projected vote count in Senate. 
Jan. 6, 1965 – Sen. Anderson introduces S. 1 in the Senate. 
Rep. King introduces H.R. 1 in the House of 
Representatives. 
Jan. 1965 – Rep. Byrnes introduces “Bettercare” Republican 
alternative (H.R. 4351). AMA proposes “Eldercare,” sponsored by 
Reps. Herlong and Curtis (H.R. 3737). 
Ca. Jan. 26 – Congressman Mills begins hearings on H.R. 1 in House 
Ways and Means Committee. Wilbur Cohen closely involved on 
behalf of the administration. 
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Competing Bills Offered by Republicans and the AMA 
Congressman John W. Byrnes (R-WI) sponsored a bill that came to be known as 
“Bettercare.” This voluntary plan included far more comprehensive ben fits, including 
prescription drugs and fees for physician services, which the King-Anderson bill omitted. 
Premiums would be paid by those seniors who opted for the coverage; the federal 
government would subsidize premiums out of general revenues according to the senior’s 
income level (David, 1985). In a memo to the President on January 29, 1965, Cohen 
outlined the major aspects of the Byrnes proposal, including several major problems. 
First, a substantial portion of the cost would be paid out of general revenu s; second, 
many seniors of lower income or less stable cognition would not take the coverage; and 
third, it would pay charges and not costs (charges are higher than costs) as the King-
Anderson bill provided. This last item would be considerably more expensive and subject 
the government to over-charging.  
The Byrnes plan would have offered a comprehensive federal health plan to 
seniors where the King-Anderson plan offered a blend of federal assistance and private 
insurance. Perhaps most revealing is the last point in Cohen’s memo. Cohen, an admitted 
incrementalist, frequently worked to pass an inferior bill on the notio  that getting the 
principle in place would make it easier to get what one really wanted later. He accepted 
the moniker that one publication had given him of “salami slicer,” that is one who took 
increasing numbers of very thin slices of salami ending eventually with the perfect 
sandwich (Cohen & McComb, 1968).6 In his memo to the President, he makes the point 
that “if the principle utilized of the government subsidizing payments for health insurance 
protection made by individuals is extended to the entire population, the cost to the 
                                                
6 The Harper Dictionary of Modern Thought credits the coinage of the term “salami slicer” to S alinist 
Matyas Rakosi in describing the manner in which the Hungarian Communist Party of the late 1940s dealt 
with their opposition (Bullock & Stallybrass, 1977). 
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general budget would be substantially greater” (emphasis in original) (Cohen, 1965m). 
Seemingly, Cohen’s view of the eventual perfect sandwich would have included 
government subsidy of health insurance for the entire population, but he apparently felt 
this was beyond reach at the time. In his memoirs, Johnson himself wrote that this was 
the more desirable eventuality (L. B. Johnson, 1971). 
Although Byrnes’ “Bettercare” bill would eventually be incorporated into the 
Medicare bill, subsidizing premiums would not be as transparent (or need based) as 
Byrnes proposed. Seniors would be required to pay a premium for the Medicare Part B, 
subsidized out of general revenues, but these premiums would not vary by the income 
level of the senior and there would be no means-test required for the coverage. While one 
can understand that Mills’ and Cohen’s solution was better for senior, the principle of 
subsidized premiums for the entire population was lost. The Byrnes plan might have 
provided a different path for later attempts at universal coverage. 
It is ironic that, in the end, those most opposed to Medicare, including the 
powerful American Medical Association, shaped the more comprehensive ature of the 
final bill. The AMA criticized the administration’s bill for being incomplete in its 
coverage (David, 1985), and recommended yet a third bill called “Eldercare,” sponsored 
in the House by A. Sydney Herlong, Jr. (D-FL) and in the Senate by Leverett Saltonstall 
(R-MA). The AMA touted “Eldercare” as providing 100 percent coverage, but close 
examination revealed it provided significantly less than that. In fact, Eldercare was an 
expansion of Kerr-Mills, providing benefits contingent on each state adopting the 
program and providing matching funds. Twenty states had not adopted Kerr-Mills 
programs, presumably because of the matching funds required of them. Elders in those 
states would continue to be denied coverage unless their state legislature had a change of 
heart. Additionally, as with Kerr-Mills, the elderly would be subjected to the humiliation 
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of a welfare department means test in order to qualify for the stat -sponsored benefits. 
Did Kerr-Mills technically allow states to cover all health services? It did, as would 
Eldercare had it passed. But in reality, very few seniors comparatively speaking would 
have been covered because most states would not offer comprehensive coverage and the 
others might stick with their decision not to participate at all (David, 1985; Marmor, 
2000). 
Cohen was excellent at keeping his bosses informed of what was going on. In a 
February 3, 1965 memo to Celebrezze, Cohen discussed the groups that had appeared 
before the Ways and Means Committee in executive session, including the Blue Cross 
Association, American Hospital Association, Kaiser Health Plan, Group Health 
Association, and state welfare officials. He outlined a number of pr blems that were 
coming to light. One such problem was raised by Edgar Kaiser and his Permanente plan. 
Kaiser wanted an amendment to the bill which would subsidize comprehensive group 
practice plans such as the Kaiser Permanente plan. Cohen’s objection was that the 
amendment is based on the idea that certain plans should be subsidized from the 
resources of contributors covered under other plans. This would have interf red with the 
national pooling principle that formed the actuarial basis for the system. In other words, if 
plans with better risk selection were extended these subsidies, then only the poorer risks 
would remain in the national pool. Cohen felt that this adverse selection would 
undermine the plan’s actuarial soundness (Cohen, 1965a). When Kaiser saw that the 
administration was not going to support his amendment, he asked for a meeting with the 
President. Instead, he was offered a meeting with Celebrezze and Cohen. The day after 
that February 17, 1965 meeting, Special Assistant to the President Douglass Cater 
reported to the President that Kaiser was still “very unhappy.” Cater warned the President 
that Kaiser might bring it up during a meeting at the White House later that day (Cater, 
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1965). Kaiser’s desired amendment ultimately failed, but it was not the last time Edgar 
Kaiser would try to influence national health policy. He would be considerably more 
successful not quite a decade later with Richard Nixon. 
Up to this point, the administration had supported the King-Anderson bill, which 
would have covered hospital care but not physician services. The AMA had proposed 
“Eldercare” which would have offered comprehensive benefits, but only throug  the 
states in a funding extension of the Kerr-Mills Act, which required participants to pass a 
state-sponsored means test. As also noted, twenty states had yet to adop  Kerr-Mills due 
to the matching funds requirement. Finally, the Republican-sponsored Byrnes bill, known 
as “Bettercare,”  would have provided for a private insurance pool to cover physician fees 
on a non-profit basis, with premiums heavily subsidized by the federal government from 
general revenues. However, no insurers had expressed an interest in b ing part of the 
pool. And, then, Wilbur Mills spoke to Wilbur Cohen. 
Absorbing the Competing Proposals – The Three Layer Cake 
On March 2, a critical shift in the path occurred. That evening, i a two-page 
memorandum to the President, Cohen recounted that at about 3 p.m. that afternoon, after 
the Ways and Means Committee had completed its review of all the major pending health 
bills, “Mr. Mills turned to me and requested that we develop the details overnight of a 
proposal that will put together in one bill features of all three of the major bills pending 
before the Committee…” (Cohen, 1965p, p. 1). He went on to outline the three 
components, which were the major provisions of the administration’s King-Anderson bill 
(Medicare Part A), a voluntary supplemental program of health benefits subsidized in 
part from general revenues and partly from premiums paid by those desiring the coverage 
(Medicare Part B), and an expanded Kerr-Mills program for the poor (Medicaid). 
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Cohen recognized the genius of Mills’ plan. As he recounted it in the March 2 
memo, the Byrnes bill would have required about $2 billion in general revenues to pay 
for the subsidies. Mills thought this figure ought to be between $400 million and $500 
million a year. The difference is that the Byrnes plan did not requi  additional payroll 
taxes, instead paying for the benefits entirely from general r venues. More importantly, 
both Wilburs had become concerned that the Byrnes-introduced Republican plan would 
be used to attack the Administration’s plan both in Congress and in the 1966 elections on 
the basis that the Republican plan included coverage for the major portion of he cost of 
physician fees, drugs, private duty nursing, and care in mental institutions, which the 
original Democratic plan did not (Cohen, 1965p).  
Mills has been widely credited with figuring out that combining the t r e bills 
into one plan would make it very difficult for opponents of the King-Anderson bill to 
vote against the new bill (David, 1985; Marmor, 2000; Weathers, 2004). In this, and 
contemporaneous to the events, Wilbur Cohen concurred. “I feel reasonably sure that 
now after these several weeks of Committee sessions Mills now [sic] feels he has 
developed a combined package approach which is unassailable politically from any 
serious Republican attack” (Cohen, 1965p, p. 2). Cohen told the President that he and his 
staff would be working with Mills and the Ways and Means Committee th  next day on 
this proposal. 
Apparently, Cohen submitted his memo for the President through Larry O’Brien. 
Later the same day, O’Brien forwarded Cohen’s memo and cover page to th President 
and attached a memo of his own indicating the “extreme importan[ce]” of the Cohen 
memo. O’Brien stated that he had spoken with Mills and that it was apparent that Mills 
was “definitely moving in this direction” (O'Brien, 1965b). 
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Cohen was true to his word about working out the details of the Mills-proposed 
plan, later to be referred to as the “three-layer cake,” (SeeFigure 6). Medicare Part A 
(hospital coverage) was essentially the administration’s initial proposal for hospital-only 
coverage. Medicare Part B, which covered physicians services, incorporated many of the 
features of the Republican-sponsored “Bettercare” bill introduced by Congressman 
Byrnes. Medicaid, the state-delivered, means-tested, and federally subsidized plan to 
cover the medically indigent, incorporated much of the philosophy of the AMA-endorsed 
“Eldercare” bill’s approach. The next day, March 3, 1965, Kermit Gordon, Director of 
the Executive Office of the President Bureau of the Budget, sent a memo to the President 
returning the Cohen memo, which the President had handed him the night before. Gordon 
indicates in that memo that “As a service to Wilbur Mills, Cohen and his colleagues 
worked out last night the details of a plan embodying the Mills approach” (Gordon, 
1965). Clearly the President had taken the Cohen memo, and accompanying cover memo 
from O’Brien, very seriously. Cohen, according to the Gordon (1965) memo, sent the 
detailed plan as worked out by HEW on March 3, 1965, directly to Gordon for his 
assessment of its effect on the budget. 
As far as Cohen was concerned, Mills’ request to combine provisions of the three 
major bills had been a surprise. It is possible that the idea had come to Mills suddenly. As 
late as February 25, Cohen had submitted a memo to the President outliing the 
objections to the AMA’s Eldercare bill, and stating that the bill had not even been taken 
up in executive session by the Ways and Means Committee (Cohen, 1965l). On March 1, 
1965, the day before Mills’ conversation with Cohen, Bill Moyers returnd the February 
25 memo to Cohen with a note that the President had seen it and apprecited Cohen’s 
sending it (Moyers, 1965b). 
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The White House apparently sensed the viability, if not the urgency, of the 
moment—the policy window had been flung wide open. Mills’ conversation with Cohen 
occurred late on the afternoon of Tuesday, March 2 (Cohen, 1965p). By the next day, 
Cohen had worked out details of the plan and sent a copy to Kermit Gordon at the Bureau 
of the Budget (Gordon, 1965). Larry O’Brien had also spoken with Mills on March 2 
(O'Brien, 1965b). In a memo reporting his Saturday, March 6 conversation with Mills, 
O’Brien told the President that Mills intended to complete the Committee work on it in 
the coming week and to have it ready to report out of Committee the week of March 15 
(O'Brien, 1965c). 
 
Figure 6:     Wilbur Mills’ “Three-Layer Cake”  
Senator Ribicoff’s Letter 
On the Senate side, Abe Ribicoff was also recognizing that the King-Anderson 
form of Medicare was going to “disillusion millions of the nation’s elderly” by not 
covering physician services (Ribicoff, 1965). Ribicoff sent his letter to the President on 
HR. 1 – King-Anderson 
bill (LBJ administration’s 
version) 
H.R. 3737 – Byrnes 
Republican alternative – 
“Bettercare” 
H.R. 4351 – AMA 
“Eldercare” bill sponsored 
by Herlong and Curtis 
Three Competing Bills 
Medicare Part A – Hospital Coverage 
Medicare Part B – Physician Services 
Medicaid for Medically Indigent 
The Three Layer Cake 
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March 3, the day after Mills’ conversation with Cohen. It is not clear that Mills and 
Ribicoff had any direct communication on the matter. Ribicoff felt that many elderly 
believed that all of their medical bills would be covered instead of hospital charges only 
(and those only up to the prescribed limits of the bill). Ribicoff further expressed his 
concern that the effects of that disillusionment would reverberate in he 1966 elections 
when Republicans, who were pressing for a more complete plan (albeit one that would 
cover a relatively small number of people), would use Medicare to beat the Democrats. 
That same day, Jack Valenti sent Ribicoff’s letter to Wilbur Cohen and requested 
a memorandum from Cohen responding to Ribicoff’s concerns. He wanted the President 
to see both Ribicoff’s letter and Cohen’s response (Valenti, 1965d). Cohen had spent the 
day with the Ways and Means Committee reviewing Mills’ “three-layer cake” plan. On 
March 4, Cohen (1965d) sent a response to Valenti regarding Ribicoff’s letter. The memo 
was transmitted to Mike Manatos at 11:40 on Friday, March 5, presumably so he would 
be aware of what was transpiring in the House in case it came up with Ribicoff. Manatos 
was the Senate liaison for the Administration, reporting directly to Larry O’Brien. In his 
memo, Cohen outlined the new Mills plan, concurring with Ribicoff that e original 
King-Anderson bill would have greatly disillusioned the elderly. Cohen’s memo provides 
an extraordinary political analysis of how the Mills plan would be received: 
 
I think the AMA and the private insurance companies will likely be very much 
opposed to the bill, particularly this supplementary voluntary insurance system, 
which includes payments for physician’s services. Nevertheless, I think 
practically all of the Republicans on the Ways and Means Committee will vote for 
the proposal, as well as most of the Republicans when the bill comes to the floor. 
However, the President may well be besieged by demands by the private 
insurance companies for dropping the new feature which Mills is adding. 
Politically, however, I think the Democrats on the Ways and Means Committee 
believe that the proposal now takes them off the hook from the very kind of 
criticism which Ribicoff points out would arise because of the limitations of the 
original King-Anderson bill. (p. 2) 
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This is remarkable in that the bill included most of the major prvisions of the 
AMA’s bill. What Cohen does not say in his memo is that the AMA’s objection to the 
bill would come not because they did not approve of the benefits, but because their own 
version was tied to the Kerr-Mills financing arrangement which relied on state matching 
funds and a state-determined means test for seniors. Mills seized the idea, but eliminated 
the state-level requirements, making the benefits available to any ne receiving Medicare 
Part A. In essence, he was beating the AMA (and the Republicans) at their own game. 
Valenti did indeed share the Ribicoff letter and Cohen’s memo reacting to it with 
the President on March 6 (Valenti, 1965c). Johnson scrawled a note on Valenti’s cover 
slip indicating that Valenti should “Ans[wer] Abe along the lines suggested by Wilbur.” 
Apparently, Valenti asked Cohen to draft a response to the Ribicoff letter to be sent out 
over the President’s signature, which Cohen provided to Valenti on March 8 (Cohen, 
1965e). In the memo, Cohen told Valenti that Ribicoff had spoken with him over the 
intervening weekend, and that Cohen had the impression that Ribicoff might want to 
“improve” the bill when it got to the Senate Finance Committee. Cohen had added a 
sentence in the draft to try to encourage Ribicoff to speak with someone in the 
Administration before offering amendments to improve the bill. 
The Ribicoff letter and the attendant responses surrounding it illustrate hree 
things about the Johnson administration: 1) a very small, tightly-knit group was 
managing this legislative process; 2) the administration recognized opportunity and 
moved quickly on these opportunities; and 3) at every turn the political consequences 
were thoroughly examined. The first point is supported by the fact th t the President 
consistently relied on Wilbur Cohen’s advice and a small group of others with whom the 
President interacted directly. The second point is illustrated and supported by the speed 
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with which detailed memoranda were generated and delivered, often the same day as 
requested. Though this was an era before e-mail—an era rather of secretaries, 
typewriters, carbon paper, telephones, telexes, and couriers—responses could be 
expected within hours. For that matter, Cohen was able to draft the details of the “three-
layer cake” literally overnight.  
The third point in the preceding analysis, thoroughly examining political 
consequences, is perhaps best illustrated by the closure of the Ribicoff matter. As 
previously mentioned, Wilbur Cohen, at Jack Valenti’s request, had drafted a r sponse, 
typed on White House letterhead, from the President to Ribicoff. However, the spot 
where the President would have signed (and may well have signed), has been cut out of 
the letter (L. B. Johnson, 1965b). A carbon copy of the letter has a single trike through 
and the handwritten notation “not sent” (L. B. Johnson, 1965a). On March 9, Larry
O’Brien (1965c) returned the original letter to the President with a cover memo asking 
Johnson to reconsider sending the letter to Ribicoff. His rationale boils d wn to the fact 
that Mills has announced that Ways and Means will report out a medical care bill about 
March 15 (less than a week later), Ribicoff would likely make political capital of the 
letter, and Senator Anderson may feel that the letter gives too much credit to Ribicoff 
without mentioning Anderson who “still must carry the ball in the Senate.” On O’Brien’s 
advice, the letter was not sent. 
Moving Toward Final Passage 
Things were heating up in the House Ways and Means Committee. Beginning 
March 11, 1965, Cohen provided daily memoranda to Larry O’Brien on the committee’s 
progress. On that day, his one-page memo to O’Brien gave his update on th  day’s 
executive session of the committee, indicated several changes that would need to be made
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to the “253 page bill,” and that he would now not expect the bill to be on the floor of the 
House prior to the week of March 29 (Cohen, 1965f).  
The Committee met for half a day on Friday, March 12, discussing only the tax 
policy included in the bill. This addressed tax deductibility of healt  insurance premiums 
(one-half of premium regardless of age) and limits on retirement income above which 
Social Security benefits would be taxed (Cohen, 1965g). 
The Committee did not meet that weekend, but reconvened on Monday, March
15. According to Cohen (1965h), the discussion that day revolved around revising the 
Kerr-Mills program (Medicaid) and the Maternal and Child Health nd Crippled Children 
programs. The Committee requested technical changes to the bill for their consideration. 
Cohen projected that Tuesday would be devoted to the increase in Social ecurity cash 
benefits and increase in federal grants for public assistance. He projected that the 
voluntary supplemental program would be raised in markup on Wednesday, and that the 
completely revised bill might be before the Committee by the end of that week.
On Tuesday, March 16, 1965, Cohen (1965i) continued to report the daily 
proceedings of the Committee to Larry O’Brien. Cohen made the following statement 
about the day’s proceedings: “The major policy change was that the Chairman [Mills] 
instructed the draftsmen to exclude the Amish from social security taxes and benefits” (p. 
1), presumably because of Amish religious objections.  Bill Moyers had called Cohen 
earlier in the day to express the President’s concern that radiologists and pathologists 
were to be excluded from the basic hospital program, and to request that Cohen tell Mills 
that the President wanted the bill changed with respect to this point. Radiologists’ and 
pathologists’ charges would have been covered under Part B (physician services). At the 
time, these specialties tended to be hospital employees who did not bill services directly 
but rather through hospital billing. Therefore, if they were not covered under Part A, they 
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would be forced to either end the employment relationship with the hospitals and become 
independent practitioners (thereby being able to bill under Part B), or their charges would 
not be covered in the plan. The radiologists and pathologists preferred to maintain the 
employment relationship and have those charges covered as hospital charges. Mills did 
not want the Social Security part (Part A) to cover any doctors’ charges. Finally, Kermit 
Gordon, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and Gardner Ackley, Chairman of the 
Council of Economic Advisors, were planning to meet with Mills the following day 
regarding effect of the contributions on the economy in 1966. Cohen agreed to Gordon’s 
request that he attend that meeting. 
 On Wednesday, March 17, Cohen (1965j) met with Kermit Gordon, Gardner 
Ackley, HEW Actuary Robert Myers, and Mills to discuss the “fiscal drag” in 1966.  
Raising the payroll tax combined with the subsidies from general r venues for Medicare 
Part B premiums had the potential to remove too much capital from the economy. Mills 
asked Myers to prepare alternative financing rates that would reduce excess collections 
over disbursements below $1.27 billion for 1966. With respect to the radiologist-
pathologist problem Moyers raised on behalf of the President (and reported in the 
previous day’s memo to O’Brien) (Cohen, 1965i), Cohen spoke with Mills about it and 
Mills adamantly opposed the change. In the early afternoon, Cohen attended a meeting in 
Speaker McCormack’s office with the Speaker and Majority Whip Hale Boggs to discuss 
the problem. The Speaker subsequently asked Mills to join the three of th m where the 
Speaker tried to persuade Mills to make the change. Mills “want[ed] to be able to say on 
the House floor that physicians are not covered under the social security part” (p. 1). The 
Speaker was not successful at changing Mills’ mind, but the Chairman did agree to put in 
the Committee report that radiologist and pathologist charges must be “reasonable.” 
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The Speaker then called President Johnson and asked Cohen to explain the 
situation to the President. Cohen (1965j) reported that Mills would not stay in the room 
while they spoke with the President, who said that they should discuss it later and that 
“perhaps he [the President] should discuss it with Mills” (p. 2). Mills returned a few 
minutes later. Cohen reported that Mills was “’boiling mad’” because he had heard 
reports from some Democrats who had been at the White House the previous evening that 
the President was critical of Mills’ efforts. Cohen reports that e group (McCormack, 
Boggs, and Cohen) tried to calm Mills, but he remained adamant about the requested 
change for radiologists and pathologists. 
Why make so much of this radiologist/pathologist problem now? A memo from 
O’Brien (1965d) to the President on March 17, 1965, illustrates the importance of the 
point. In the memo, O’Brien explains the outcome of the meeting (attaching Cohen’s 
memo for the President’s review). He outlines possible alternatives that he had already 
explored with Cohen. In the final paragraph of the memo, he makes this revealing 
analysis: “Unfortunately with the exception of Al Ulman none of our Democratic 
Members are totally familiar with this bill and their total endency is as you know to 
support Mills in all Committee matters [sic].” This illustra es the extraordinary power 
Chairman Mills held. O’Brien goes on to say that he thinks the only way to resolve it in 
the Committee would be for Johnson to speak directly with Mills, and O’Brien holds out 
no hope that even that would be successful based upon Cohen’s judgment of the 
situation. 
On March 23, 1965, the Committee, having finished its work, released a summary 
of its decisions to the press (U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Ways and 
Means, 1965). The cover of the release indicated that the bill would be filed on March 23, 
and the Committee Report would be filed on Monday, March 29. On the same day as the 
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release (March 23), the previously reported telephone call from Speaker McCormack to 
the President (and including Cohen, Majority Leader Carl Albert, and Chairman Mills) 
took place ("Recording of Telephone Conversation between Lyndon B. Johnson, John 
McCormack, Wilbur Mills, Wilbur Cohen, and Carl Albert, March 23, 1965, 4:54 PM,
Citation #7141," 1965). This is the conversation where Johnson tells the Congressmen 
not to “let dead cats stand on your porch” and to “call that son of a bitch up before they 
can get their letters written.” 
The Committee voted 17-8 along party lines to report the bill. Some Republican 
Committee members indicated that they might support the bill on the floor (J. D. Morris, 
Special to The New York Times,, 1965). On April 8, 1965, the House of Representatives 
passed the Social Security Amendments of 1965 by a vote of 263-153 (David, 1985). The 
next day, the President sent Speaker McCormack an exuberant note congratulating him 
on the bill’s passage. Among the strong sentiments expressed in the note are these words: 
“This measure alone would be sufficient to secure this Congress an honorable place in 
American history” (L. B. Johnson, 1965c). 
On Larry O’Brien’s urging, the President also called a number of people to 
congratulate them on House passage of the bill. These included Speaker McCo mack, 
Majority Leader Albert, Majority Whip Boggs, Chairman Mills, bill sponsor 
Congressman Cecil King (D-CA) and Congressman John Dingell (D-MI) who presided 
over the debate. Dingell’s father had co-authored the Wagner-Murray-Dingell bills 
during the late 1940s and early 1950s and the original Dingell-Forand Medicar  bill 
introduced in 1958. O’Brien also suggested calling Aime Forand, former Rep esentative 
from Rhode Island; the President was unable to reach Forand but left word that he had 
called (O'Brien, 1965a). This illustrates an earlier-stated theme of the analysis: President 
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Johnson understood the personal nature of politics and the importance of his personal 
touch in the process. 
 
 
Figure 7:     Timeline for February 1, 1965 to April 8, 1965 
Much has also been made of the ways in which President Johnson rewarded his 
friends and punished his enemies. Attached to a memo in the files written on April 9, 
1965, from Charles D. Roche, Deputy Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, 
to Special Assistant to the President Marvin Watson, is a list of “incumbents in the 
critical 1966 campaign” including how they voted on Medicare. Roche, apparently 
Feb. 1965 – Hearings continue in House Ways & Means 
Committee 
Mar. 2 – Mills asks Byrnes to explain his bill to the Ways and Means 
Committee. At conclusion of hearing, Mills asks Wilbur Cohen to produce a 
bill overnight incorporating all three competing bills – the “three layer cake.” 
Mar. 3 – Cohen presents outline of “three-layer cake” to Mills and sends it 
to Bureau of the Budget. 
Mar. 3 – Ribicoff letter to LBJ about disillusioning elderly if only covering 
hospital charges. 
Mar 12 – Committee takes up tax-deductibility of health insurance 
premiums. 
Mar. 17 – Cohen meets with Gordon, Ackley, Myers and Mills to 
discuss “fiscal drag” in 1966 from increased taxes for Medicare. 
Mar. 23 – Bill Filed. 
Mar. 29 – Committee report filed. 
Apr. 8 – Social Security Amendments of 1965 passes House by vote of 263-153. 
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speaking for the committee, says “We are recommending that appropriate steps be taken 
to reward those Members who have distinguished themselves with loyal support of 
Administration recommendations” (Roche, 1965). However, no presidential response to 
the memo was found in the files. 
Desegregation and Medicare 
Under the chairmanship of Harry Byrd (D-VA) the Senate Finance Committee 
was now to take up the House bill. On April 13, 1965, Byrd (1965) sent a letter to HEW 
Secretary Celebrezze. Attached was a letter from Mr. J. F. Ditzell, President of the Board 
of Trustees of the Winter Park Memorial Hospital in Winter Park, Florida (Ditzell, 1965). 
Ditzell raised the issue of whether hospitals who receive money either through Medicare 
or through Blue Cross payments for federal employees would be considered as “receiving 
federal monies,” an idea that Ditzell finds “almost inconceivable.” The letter itself does 
not elaborate on why this is an issue. The subsequent flurry of corresp ndence clarifies 
the issue. 
Prior to Senator Byrd’s letter to Celebrezze, White House Counsel Lee C. White 
had requested a memorandum from the Department of Justice as to whether and to what 
extent Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 would apply to Medicare. If so, this would 
mean that hospitals receiving Medicare payments would have to desegregate. Andy 
Biemiller of the AFL-CIO had raised the question. On April 6, 1965, Norbert Schlei sent 
the requested 11-page memorandum to White (Schlei, 1965). The essence of th  
memorandum was that the Department of Justice held the opinion that payments under 
the program constituted insurance payments on behalf of covered persons and were, 
therefore, not direct federal payments to the providers. In such a view, Title VI 
prohibiting discrimination in facilities receiving federal funds would not apply. Neither 
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would the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution apply in 
the view of the Department of Justice as expressed by Schlei.  
Deputy Special Counsel to the President Clifford Alexander asked staff lawyer 
Steven R. Rivkin for his thoughts on the Schlei memorandum. Rivkin (1965) offered a 
number of methods by which the Administration might achieve desegregation of health 
care facilities under Medicare including rulemaking possibilities and constitutional 
theories. With respect to Schlei’s 11-page memorandum, Rivkin based much of his
response on a single paragraph from the memo. 
In a memo to the President on April 26, 1965, Counsel White states that the 
Justice Department had concluded that Title VI would not apply to hospitals receiving 
funds through Medicare, but that “they could support a theory that the Title does apply if 
it is desirable to do so” (White, 1965, p. 1). White went on to outline the delicate dance 
ahead in both the Finance Committee and the full Senate over the issue. On the one hand, 
if Celebrezze tells Byrd that the Administration “cannot prevent discrimination by 
participating hospitals, the liberals will insist on an amendment making this clear” (p. 1). 
On the other hand, if they indicate that they do have the authority to prevent 
discrimination, that may signal some southern Senators prepared to supp rt the bill to re-
examine their position. Apparently, Celebrezze’s initial reaction was to say that Title VI 
does not apply, but White was of the opinion “that the Secretary should be instructed to 
answer that it is applicable” (p. 2). Celebrezze was scheduled to testify two days later. 
White said that Celebrezze’s testimony plus his formal response would prove helpful in 
any judicial test of the Administration’s authority to prevent discrimination by indicating 
Congressional intent on the issue, presumably in a relatively low-key fashion. He 
recommended sending the reply from Celebrezze to Byrd on Tuesday an  provided a 
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proposed draft of the letter (White, 1965). Moyers supported this idea and ske White to 
see to it that HEW followed that line (Moyers, 1965a). 
By early May, Senator Russell Long (D-LA) was starting to become troublesome. 
He wanted to amend the Senate bill by combining the hospital care provision and 
physician services payments. He also wanted to eliminate the $3 per month premium for 
the Part B and put that cost on general revenue, which would create an estimated drag of 
an additional $400 to $500 million on the Treasury. His rationale for the first amendment 
was to be able to say to physicians that they would not have their income or practices 
severely affected by any attempt to provide the Medicare covrage to persons under age 
65. His rationale for the second amendment was to save the elderly the premium. Wilbur 
Cohen told the Senator that it would be unlikely that anyone would ever want to offer 
Medicare to persons under age 65 since they could mostly get their own coverage throuh 
employer-sponsored plans (Cohen, 1965k).7  
In what probably seemed fairly minor at the time, but is of certain interest today, 
Long also wanted to provide payments for drugs under Medicare. Cohen managed to 
persuade him that the financial costs would be excessive. Long still wanted to include at 
least antibiotics and other “major drugs” in the coverage provisions (Cohen, 1965k).  
By late May, Long was still seen as problematic to the bill’s passage. In a letter 
written May 28 to Jack Valenti, Elizabeth “Wicky” Wickenden, social welfar consultant, 
expressed her concerns: 
 
I am very worried about Senator Long’s advocacy of a substitute medicare 
proposal. This is tactically divisive, administratively infeasible, and substantively 
regressive. He makes it sound like a liberalization but in actual fact it plays 
directly into the AMA-Republican position. Coming from the Democratic whip it 
is most confusing and I think the President should talk to Senator Long directly 
                                                
7 Clearly, this was a rare occasion where Cohen’s foresight was limited, since there have been recent 
proposals to extend Medicare to the general public on at least a voluntary basis. 
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before the Finance Committee acts. I understand this will be next W dnesday. 
(Wickenden, 1965) 
 
Over the next six weeks, Long wandered in and out of the Finance Committee 
meetings several times a day to see how the votes were shaping up. On June 17, he 
brought his amendments up and said that the Administration had no problems with them. 
He called for an immediate vote and the two amendments—one combining Part A and 
Part B and the other eliminating the $3 per month premium for physician’s services 
coverage—passed. However, Clinton Anderson had Senator Fulbright’s (D-AR) proxy. 
Long claimed to have a more recent proxy of Fulbright’s. Both were produced and the 
clerk said that Long’s was more recent. The vote was 8-6. After the vote, Anderson asked 
to see the proxies. It turned out that Long’s was in fact more recent, but pertained to an 
entirely different matter. When Fulbright returned, he and Anderson went to Long. Mike 
Mansfield also spoke to Long. Long simply said that there must have been a 
misunderstanding and agreed to a second vote (David, 1985).  
Administration supporters, including Nelson Cruikshank and Andy Biemiller of 
the AFL-CIO, Wicky Wickenden, and Wilbur Cohen went into high gear to change votes 
on the committee (Cohen, 1965n). On June 23, Long’s amendments were defeated by  
vote of 10-7 (Valenti, 1965b). The next day, the Senate Finance Committee reported out 
the bill by a vote of 12-5 with 75 amendments to the House bill (Cohen, 1965o; David, 
1985). 
Russell Long was not yet finished. He was to be the floor manager for the bill. 
Anderson worried that Long would open the bill to other amendments on the floor. He 
wrote to the President on July 1 expressing his fear that the bill wou d be amended 
beyond the hope of reconciling it in conference (C. P. Anderson, 1965). 
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Figure 8:     Timeline for April 8, 1965 to July 31, 1965 
The Senate passed the bill on July 9, 1965 by a vote of 68-21. There were a total 
of 513 amendments; most were technical in nature. The conference committee began its 
work on July 19. It appeared for some time that Mills, Boggs, Long, and Smathers were 
actually trying to wreck the conference. However, on July 21, 1965, the conference 
committee reported out the final bill. On July 27, the House passed the bill by a vote of 
Apr. 8 – House bill passes. 
Apr. 13 – Harry Byrd letter to Celebrezze re: Civil Rights 
Act and implications of Medicare for hospital integration. 
Apr. 22 – Valenti passes along Celebrezze’s concern over 
getting questions re: drag on economy. 
Apr. 26 – Moyers meets with Gordon, Ackley, Fowler, 
and Celebrezze re: fiscal 1966 drag on economy. 
June 17 – Long amendments pass in Senate Finance 
Committee, combining Medicare Parts A and B and 
removing premium for physician coverage. 
June 23 – Long amendments on combining parts A and B and removing 
physician coverage premium reconsidered and defeated 10-7. 
June 24 – Senate Finance Committee reports bill out 
by vote of 12-6 with 75 amendments. 
July 21 – Conference committee reports out bill 
after only two days of deliberation. 
July 27 – House passes final bill. 
July 28 – Senate passe final bill. 
July 31, 1965 – LBJ signs Social Security Amendments of 1965 
into law at Truman Library in Independence, Mo. Presid nt and 
Mrs. Truman attend signing. 
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307-116. The following day, the Senate passed the bill by a vote of 70-24 (David, 1985; 
Marmor, 2000). 
All that remained was the President’s signature. Wilbur Cohen had advised that 
signing it by July 31 would mean a payment of an extra $30 million to widows and 
orphans. Time was of the essence. The President wanted to have the signing ceremony at 
the Truman Presidential Library in Independence, Missouri, with the former President 
and Mrs. Truman in attendance. Cohen and Horace Busby were radically opposed to this 
idea on the grounds that it would draw parallels between the new act and Truman’s 
objective, which was to provide medical coverage for the entire population regardless of 
age. This was seen as “socialized medicine” of the British form. Cohen and Busby feared 
that signing the bill at Independence would send the signal that the next step would be to 
enlarge Medicare to cover the entire population. They were further concerned that the 
signing might include “some distasteful remarks by President Truman himself about the 
medical profession” (Busby, 1965). By the time the bill passed, it was clear that the 
President intended to sign the bill at the Truman Library. On July 26, Cohen submitted a 
13-page list of potential invitees (Cohen, 1965c). The bill, which ran to about 400 pages, 
had to be engrossed before the President could sign it. This was rushed through. On July 
27, Johnson called former President Truman to tell him that he wanted to come to 
Independence for the bill signing. On July 30, 1965, President Johnson signed the Social 
Security Amendments of 1965 into law at the Truman Presidential Library in 
Independence Missouri. President Johnson later recalled that “It was a proud day for all 
of us, and President Truman said that no single honor ever paid him had touched him 
more deeply” (L. B. Johnson, 1971, p. 219). A timeline covering the period from passage 
of the House bill on April 8, 1965 to its signing on July 31, 1965 appears in Figure 8. 
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Though he did not take steps to extend Medicare to the entire population, 
President Johnson did consider Medicare a revolutionary step in that direc ion. In his 
1971 memoirs, he said “I had the same sentiments about Medicare, whose overriding 
importance to me was that it foreshadowed a revolutionary change in our thinking about 
health care. We had begun, at long last, to recognize that good medical care is a right, not 
just a privilege” (L. B. Johnson, 1971, p. 220). But, 38 years after the publication of his 
memoirs, more than 46 million Americans still have no health insurance. 
MEDICARE AND THE PRESS 
In 1964-65, there were no national cable news networks, there was no public 
Internet, there were no 24-hour news channels, and conservative talking heads had not 
yet taken over the AM radio band. People largely relied on the three major television 
networks, radio, newspapers, and news magazines for their news. By the time of the 
Clinton Administration, this had all radically changed. I have previously made the case 
that we could use newspaper coverage as a reliable indicator of media att ntion that could 
be accurately compared across the two eras. I rely upon the approach of McCombs (2004, 
2005) in this part of the endeavor. 
A search of the ProQuest Historical Newspaper Databases for The New York 
Times and The Los Angeles Times for the dates November 4, 1964 (the day after the 
election) to July 28, 1965 (the day the final bill was passed by the Senate) and searching 
for the terms “health care” or “aged” and “medicare” anywhere in the article text revealed 
a total of 224 documents between the two newspapers that met the search criteria. Of 
these 224 articles, only 26 appeared on the front page of the paper (ProQuest Historical 
Newspapers The Los Angeles Times [1881-1986], 2009; ProQuest Historical 
Newspapers The New York Times [1851-2005], 2009) . 
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The breakdown by newspaper shows 114 documents for The New York Times 
with 22 appearing on the front page (ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York 
Times [1851-2005], 2009). The Los Angeles Times provided 110 articles over the period 
with only four appearing on the front page (ProQuest Historical Newspapers The Los 
Angeles Times [1881-1986], 2009).  
Editorials comprised eleven documents in The New York Times. Of these, only 
two were negative towards Medicare. One was a more general editorial praising some of 
the President’s success with Congress early in his first full term. The other eight 
supported passage of Medicare (ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times 
[1851-2005], 2009). 
Over the same period, The Los Angeles Times carried eleven editorials. Of these, 
four would be considered “cautionary” in nature, and the other seven clearly opposed 
passage. Most of the opposition was on the grounds of increased taxes to pay for the 
program or increased medical cost as a result of the elderly’s demand for care increasing 
in light of government’s agreement to pay for the care (ProQuest Historical Newspapers 
The Los Angeles Times [1881-1986], 2009). Notably, one of the editorials was a guest 
column by Barry Goldwater (1965) in which he referred to the impending passage of 
Medicare as “the biggest step into welfarism since the passage of the original Social 
Security Act” (p. A5). 
Clearly, Medicare was not subject to intense media scrutiny during the period 
under study. Rather, the media was focusing its attention on the escalating Vietnam War 
and civil rights pressures building inside the country. This would not prove to b  the case 
nearly 30 years later when Clinton attempted to pass national health care reform.
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MEDICARE AND THE GALLUP POLL ’S MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM QUESTION 
While health care for the aged may have been a major focus of the administration, 
it was hardly the public’s major focus. During this period, the public was focused much 
more intensely on issues such as race relations, civil rights, and Vietnam. Results of The 
Gallup Poll’s Most Important Problem question illustrate this focus. 
Several times a year since the 1930s, The Gallup Organization has asked large 
samples of the public this question: “What is the most important problem facing this 
country today?” For the period from April of 1964 to May of 1965, the sample sizes 
ranged from 3,493 (Poll #706, completed February 24, 1965) to 4,003 (Poll #697, 
completed August 25, 1964). The number of respondents listing “Social Security – aid to 
aged, Medicare” in those polls ranged from a low of 13 (Unnumbered Poll, completed 
May 18, 1965) to a high of 88 (Poll #699, completed October 13, 1964). The percent of 
respondents listing “Social Security – aid to aged, Medicare” in those polls ranged from 
.37 percent (Poll #689, completed April 29, 1964) to a peak of 2.51 percent  (Poll #699, 
completed October 13, 1964; The Gallup Organization, 1964a, 1964b, 1964c, 1964d, 
1964e, 1964f, 1964g, 1965a, 1965b, 1965c).  
By comparison, over the same period and the same polls, percentages of 
respondents listing “race relations or civil rights” as the most important problem facing 
the country ranged from a low of 22.95 percent (Unnumbered Poll, completed May 18, 
1965) to a high of 58.03 percent (Poll #695, completed July 21, 1964). The percentages 
of respondents listing “Vietnam” as the most important problem facing the country 
ranged from a low of 0 percent (Poll #689, completed April 29, 1964) to a high of 28.71 
percent (Poll #706, completed February 24, 1965; The Gallup Organization, 1964a, 
1964b, 1964c, 1964d, 1964e, 1964f, 1964g, 1965a, 1965b, 1965c). Figure 9 illustrates the 
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Source: The Gallup Brain. The Gallup Organization. Retrieved July 11, 2008. Gallup 
Polls Nos. 688, 689, 694, 695, 696, 697, 699, 706, and 708 conducted between March 27, 
1964 and March 16, 1965 and an unnumbered poll conducted between May 13, 1965 and 
May 18, 1965. 
 
Figure 9: Gallup Poll Most Important Problem (MIP) Question – April 1964 to 
May 1965. 
 
It is widely held that public opinion and mass political behavior rarely result in 
direct political action on the part of the government or the elites running the government. 
Rather, public opinion largely has the capacity to constrain the parameters within which 
decision-makers can operate (Dye, 2007; Key, 1966; Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1980; 
Rochon & Mazmanian, 1993). In the case of Medicare in both 1964 and 1965, the public 
simply was not focused on the problem. In line with theories on the effects of public 
opinion, we would not expect it to drive the issue, and since it was not on the public’s 
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radar, neither did it constrain or restrict decision-makers’ actions to any appreciable 
extent. This is not to suggest that perceived future political ramifications of decisions did 
not in fact constrain the decision-makers’ parameters. Indeed, as previously explored, I 
find that the contemporaneous documentation at the time speaks often of the effects that 
certain decisions would have either directly on the next election in 1966, or at least on the 
potential positioning of the parties in that election. Concerns over how te opposition 
would use certain decisions to set the agenda are replete in the memoranda of the 
Administration participants. In fact, to a large extent, Wilbur Mills’ “three-layer cake” 
can be attributed to these constraints. Mills wanted a bill that would be difficult for 
Republicans to vote against because a) their own proposals were included, an  b) voting 
against the bill would negatively affect their positions at home in the next election cycle. 
In the “three-layer cake,” he found his solution. While on the subject of public opinion 
and Medicare, it is worth noting that Oberlander (1995) found, in part, that public opinion 
post-1965 had played a weaker role than the theoretical models would suggest in terms of 
subsequent legislative changes to the program. 
SUMMARY  
By the time Lyndon Baines Johnson took the oath of office aboard Air Force One 
in Dallas, Texas, on November 22, 1963, Medicare in some form or other had been 
before the Congress for at least 15 years. President Kennedy, whose assassination 
propelled Johnson to the Presidency, had failed to gain traction in Congress for Medicare. 
Johnson would succeed where Kennedy had failed, though not without the aborted eff  
of 1964 before final success in 1965. 
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Examination of the Johnson records reveals that the President clearly understood 
the importance of the way in which debate was framed, relied on a very select and tight 
group of advisors and staff to move the legislative agenda forward, h d an extraordinary 
command of both the “big picture” and the details, and understood the importance of 
interpersonal relations with both supporters and opponents of his agenda. 
That Johnson surrounded himself with some of the brightest political and 
economic minds of his time is virtually beyond dispute. Wilbur Cohen had been 
intimately involved with the Social Security Administration since its birth in 1935. He led 
the Administration’s team on Medicare. Larry O’Brien, a holdover from the Kennedy 
Administration, and a close personal friend and advisor of the late President and the 
entire Kennedy family, managed the President’s legislative affairs. The President’s 
extensive history as a member and leader in both houses of Congress meant that he had 
an intimate understanding of parliamentary maneuvering and political ogrolling, as well 
as the personal relationships necessary to promote his agenda in the legislatur .  
Wilbur Mills, the powerful Chairman of the House of Representatives Committee 
on Ways and Means, was instrumental in preventing Medicare’s enactment prior to 1965. 
He was equally instrumental in its eventual passage in 1965. It appears that Mr. Mills was 
primarily concerned with three things: 1) not getting too far ahead of the Committee, i.e., 
he would not bring matters to a vote where he did not feel he had the votes to get his way; 
2) not putting other Democratic Members of Congress in the position of casting votes 
requiring loss of some political support either way when passage of a bill was not certain; 
and 3) using the basic ideas of the opposition to strengthen the final bill by offering 
broader coverage while ensuring that the loyal opposition would have difficulty voting 
against the bill. 
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Finally, I examined media attention and public opinion. My examination of media 
attention was restricted to two major newspapers of the day, The New York Times and 
The Los Angeles Times. A count of relevant articles revealed that the topic appeared with 
relative infrequency over the time period, and that front page coverage w s extremely 
scarce. Editorial articles comprised only a small fraction of the coverage. The New York 
Times largely favored the passage of Medicare on its editorial pages. Th  Los Angeles 
Times overwhelmingly opposed it. Public opinion, as reflected by The Gallup Poll’s Most 
Important Problem Question, revealed that the public’s attention was ot very strong with 
respect to issues of Social Security, assistance to the aged, or Medicare during the 1964-
65 time frame. The public, instead, was largely focused on foreign relations issues such 
as the Vietnam War and the ongoing threat of communism in the form of both Russia and 
Cuba, and on the race relations/civil rights issues that were commanding the attention of 
the government and the press during that period. 
Therefore, neither the media nor the public drove the issue. Instead, it was the 
considerable efforts of two men: 1) the legislatively-experienced President, whose 
administration staff understood both the complexities of the proposed system and the 
political ramifications, and 2) House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Mills who 
was faced with little choice but to get out ahead of the troops and lead the way.  
The successful passage of the Social Security Amendments of 1965 (P.L. 89-97) 
was, at that time, the culmination of a path that had been set in motion in the early days 
of the 20th century. Consistent with path-dependence theory, early decisions had lasting 
effects on the path. For example, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’ d cision to 
forego national health insurance in the Social Security Act of 1935 (ch. 31, 49 Stat. 620)  
had the effect of leaving the path open to a fractured system of health care delivery and 
payment systems. With the formation of the Blue Cross and Blue Shi ld plans, private 
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coverage became available. As World War II and the remnants of the Great Depression 
heralded the Stabilization Act of 1942 (56 Stat. 765), unions were forced to negotiate 
wage increases (frozen under the Act) in the form of employer-provided benefit plans. 
This popularized, if not institutionalized, the nexus between employment and health 
insurance. Favorable tax treatment of these plans provided additional reinforcement to the 
early path decisions.  
In spite of all of this, health insurance for the aged languished from its 
introduction in 1948 with the Wagner-Murray-Dingell Bill supported by Truman until its 
final passage in 1965. However, during that time, the Social Security Amendments of 
1950 (P.L. 734) paved the way for direct payments (so-called “vendor payments”) from 
the federal government to health care providers. The full impact of this policy 
materialized with the passage of the Social Security Amendments of 1960 (P.L. 86-778), 
which included the Kerr-Mills Amendments providing federal funding for state-level 
medical coverage for the medically indigent—the forerunner of Medicaid. This signaled a 
slight shift in the path towards more government sponsored coverage. 
Had President Kennedy not been assassinated on November 22, 1963, it is 
questionable whether President Johnson would have ever been president. There is no way 
to know the answer to that question. However, as Johnson assumed the Presid ncy, the 
nation was in a state of crisis. This is similar to the state of crisis confronting President 
Roosevelt in the 1930s with the Great Depression. Johnson capitalized on the national 
sense of crisis to promote many of the plans envisioned by Kennedy, i cluding Medicare. 
His ability to convert this into the liberal landslide of 1964, combined with his 24 years 
of experience in the legislative branch, gave him the markers he needd to push his 
legislative proposals through. That experience also gave him the knowledge of House and 
Senate rules and committee structures. He used that, along with his connections, to 
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reorganize the House Ways and Means Committee in early 1965 in such a way as to load 
the committee with Medicare supporters (David, 1985; Marmor, 2000; Oberland , 
1995). None of this would have likely happened without some early milestones in 
Johnson’s career path, including his election to the House in 1936 and his rise to Senate 
Majority Leader before being elected Vice President (Caro, 1990, 2002; Goodwin, 1991). 
As Arthur (1994) posits, path-dependence theory rests on four major principles: 
unpredictability, inflexibility, nonergodicity, and potential path inefficiency. No one 
would have predicted in 1935 that FDR’s decision not to press for national health 
insurance would result in the fractured system of coverage that we have today 
(unpredictability). Similarly, it is unlikely that anyone involved in wage and price 
stabilization efforts in the early 1940s foresaw the nearly-unbreakable nexus it would 
create between employment and health insurance. The early decisions in the path have 
led to unpredictable results. In view of those early decisions, the pa o tions did narrow 
(inflexibility) as time progressed. Even the passage of Medicare and Medicaid, 
admittedly a major policy shift, did not change the treatment-based pproach and moral 
hazard culture of deductibles and co-payments that had by then become ntrenched in 
American medical culture. Relatively small changes, such as the advent of vendor 
payments in the wake of the 1950 Amendments, or the AMA and Republican proposals 
in early 1965 did not cancel each other out but contributed to the final evolution of the 
policy in major ways as evidenced by Mills’ three-layer cake. This is predicted by the 
nonergodicity component—small events not canceling each other out as noise—of path-
dependence theory. Finally, Medicare and Medicaid’s passage reinforc d the fractured 
and negotiated nature of health care payment systems in the United States. As will be 
revealed in short order in this dissertation, the case can also be made that Medicare (and 
to a lesser extent Medicaid) has contributed to the spread between ordinary inflation and 
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medical inflation that has characterized the American medical system since 1965. As the 
elderly population has continued to grow, their political strength has also increased. The 
elderly are not likely to voluntarily relinquish any of their Medicare benefits in order to 
see universal care passed. They are certainly not as likely to use their political influence 
to pass new universal reforms as they would have been had they not bee cov red since 
1965 by Medicare. Therefore, the path has led to an inefficiency of eventual outcomes. 
Whether that path inefficiency can be overcome remains to be seen. 
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Chapter 6: 
The Path Between Johnson and Clinton 
Johnson declined to run for re-election in 1968, knowing that Vietnam 
overshadowed any hope of his winning. Martin Luther King, Jr., was assassinated in 
Memphis on April 4, 1968. Barely two months later, Bobby Kennedy, the acknowledged 
forerunner for the Democratic nomination for President, was gunned down in the kitchen 
of the Ambassador Hotel in Los Angeles just after his victory speech for the California 
Democratic Primary. The party was in disarray. That November, former Eisenhower 
Vice-President and unsuccessful Republican nominee against JFK in 1960 Richard 
Milhous Nixon was elected President. 
Democracy advances incrementally. When Johnson successfully managed the 
passage of Medicare in 1965, many saw it as an incremental step towards national health 
insurance. President Johnson (1971) said that Medicare “foreshadowed a revolutionary 
change in our thinking about health care. We had begun, at long last, to recognize that 
good medical care is a right, not just a privilege” (p. 220). Betwen 1960 and 1970, 
health care costs grew by more than 170 percent, prompting Nixon to ask wh t we were 
getting in return for all this money. Nixon focused his energy towards maintaining the 
current health insurance systems in the midst of a cost crisis. Edward Kennedy, having 
assumed the family mantle after his brother Robert’s 1968 assassination, was considering 
a run for the presidency in 1972. His presidential hopes were dashed, however, by the 
Chappaquiddick accident in 1969 in which his young female passenger, Mary Jo 
Kopechne, perished. Still, Kennedy remained in Congress and a forerunner in pushing 
national health insurance, holding hearings around the country to increase support for 
such a plan. With aid from Wilbur Mills, chairman of the House Ways nd Means 
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Committee (the same Wilbur Mills who had pushed Medicare through the 89th Congress), 
Kennedy led the charge (Weathers, 2004).  
Nixon’s first health bill, submitted in 1971, took the approach of utilizing lower-
cost health care through an expansion of Health Maintenance Organizatio s (HMOs), 
combined with a companion bill that would require all employers to offer their 
employees a basic level of health care benefits. Fearing loss of it  political base in the 
1972 elections, the Nixon Administration returned to an antagonist position on u iversal 
health care. After the 1972 election, Nixon focused his energies on cost-containment with 
no intention of guaranteeing coverage to all Americans. Saddled with a sluggish 
economy, his proffered plans did little-to-nothing to reduce the gap in insurance 
coverage. Ultimately, the HMO bill passed but the employer mandate bill did not (H. 
Johnson & Broder, 1997; Weathers, 2004). This was the birth of so-called “managed 
care,” a concept that we still live with today. I take note here of two points of 
foreshadowing with respect to the HMO Act of 1973. First, Dr. Paul Ellwood, a 
Minneapolis physician and proponent of managed care coined the term “Health 
Maintenance Organization” as an alternative name for prepaid health practices (like 
Kaiser Permanente). Second, Stanford economist Alain C. Enthoven promoted the 
concept in the policy circles of the time. Both Ellwood and Enthoven werekey players in 
the Jackson Hole Group, the same group that devised the basic framework of the
“managed competition” plan that President Clinton would propose, and fail to pass, 
nearly twenty years later. In fact, it was at Dr. Ellwood’s vacation home in Jackson Hole, 
Wyoming, that the group met and from which it took its name (H. Johnson & Broder, 
1997; Marmor, 2000). 
It would appear that President Nixon’s decision to pursue the HMO route to 
reduce medical costs was influenced, at least in part, by Edgar Kaiser. I remind the reader 
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that Kaiser had made a strong, but unsuccessful, attempt to have Medicare configured so 
as to provide a subsidy to prepaid comprehensive health plans like his Permanente 
organization in 1965. In a White House meeting between John Ehrlichman and Nixon on 
February 17, 1971 at 5:25 p.m., Ehrlichman discussed health care with the President. This 
conversation is on tape in the now infamous, and once legally embattled, Watergate 
tapes. Ehrlichman relayed to Nixon that he had asked Kaiser to come in and explain how 
the plan worked. Nixon was unenthusiastic about health plans until he heard Ehrlichman 
say “This is a – a – private enterprise one.” That appealed to Nixon. Ehrlichman went on 
to explain that Kaiser is running his program for profit, and that the reason it worksis that 
“[a]ll the incentives are toward less medical care because—th less care they give them, 
the more money they make…and the incentives run the right way.” Nixon’s response? 
“Not bad” (Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 2003). 
In spite of the move to managed care, medical inflation has continued to outstrip 
retail price inflation as measured by the Consumer Price Index. In 2005, the latest year 
for which figures are available, national spending on health care in the United States 
increased at double the rate of general inflation, for a 6.9 percent increase in health care 
spending (The National Coalition on Health Care, 2007). 
Nixon resigned in disgrace in August of 1974 in the wake of the Watergate 
scandal. Gerald R. Ford assumed the presidency in a time of a crisis of confidence on the 
part of the American people towards their government. Ford’s tenure was limited to just 
over two years as he lost the 1976 election to Jimmy Carter, a loss largely attributed to 
his pardoning of Nixon (Chafe, 1999). Ford’s focus was largely on his “Whip Inflation 
Now” strategy. In spite of this, various health care bills continued to be introduced in 
Congress minus any from the Administration itself. Caspar Weinberger, then Secretary of 
Health, Education and Welfare, favored a program for insuring children of low-income 
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families. Weinberger resigned his post in August of 1975; Ford continued his moratorium 
on domestic spending programs (Weathers, 2004). 
About this same time, scandal struck again bringing to a close the care r of 
another strong national health care advocate, Democrat Wilbur Mills of Arkansas. Mills, 
longtime powerful chair of the House Ways and Means Committee, was found drunk in 
the company of an exotic dancer in 1974 (Green & Hornblower, 1974). He later admitted 
that he had spent much of 1973 and 1974 in an alcoholic haze and regretted not pushing 
national health care to the floor of the House in 1974 (Weathers, 2004). 
In the 1976 elections, Jimmy Carter needed an edge against George Wallace. He 
reluctantly embraced a national, comprehensive, mandatory and universal health 
insurance program as the edge he needed. Elected in November of 1976, Carter 
immediately faced an economy that continued to worsen rather than cycli g back to a 
position of strength. Elected by a slim margin, he dropped the universal health insurance 
idea until Edward Kennedy decided to run against him in the 1980 primaries. Meanwhile, 
his HEW Secretary, Joseph A. Califano, Jr., had tried to get a billpassed to help control 
hospital costs. That bill was derailed, at least partly due to the efforts, later publicly 
recanted, of freshman Representative Dick Gephardt (D-MO). WhyGephardt tried to 
derail the bill is not entirely clear. Less than two decades lat r, however, Gephardt would 
find himself as Senate Majority Leader leading the charge for the Clinton initiative. 
Interest rates and inflation continued to skyrocket. In 1979, Carter was trying to balance 
his need for support from labor (which had devised Kennedy’s Health Security Act 
mandating employer-provided coverage for all employees) and his desire to take a more 
friendly position towards business than had been traditional among Washington liberals. 
Carter, a fiscally conservative Democrat, believed he had a mandate to cut government 
spending. He would prove an unlikely champion for anything as expensive as universal 
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coverage. Carter’s own plan mirrored Kennedy’s HSA with the proviso that private 
insurers would likely continue to be involved. In the end, his wishy-washy brand of 
politics, combined with the political split between himself and Senator Kennedy, would 
mean that national health insurance would have no chance of passage during his 
administration (H. Johnson & Broder, 1997; Weathers, 2004). 
With the economy continuing to spiral out of control and the hostage crisis in 
Iran, Carter was not reelected in 1980. Instead, Ronald Reagan took the mantl in early 
1981 as President. Reagan was a conservative of the first order. He clearly espoused what 
Lakoff (2005) would call the “strict father” style of governance. This is evident in his 
trickle-down economic plan (so-called “Reaganomics”) as well as his dealings with the 
Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) in busting their strike and 
eliminating the union. No one would ever realistically accuse Reagan of being a friend of 
labor. Reagan did, however, oversee the passage of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage 
Act (MCCA) of 1988 (P.L. 100-360), which expanded Medicare benefits to cover 
outpatient drugs and capped enrollees copayments for other services. This law was 
repealed less than eighteen months later largely due to a public backlash led by those 
Medicare beneficiaries who had catastrophic coverage included in the r employer-
sponsored retirement benefits. These beneficiaries saw the 1988 bill as mposing 
additional premiums and taxes for relatively little benefit (Rice, Desmond, & Gabel, 
1990). The backlash points to the importance of policy structure in any new health care 
legislation to be proposed. The financial burden of the coverage cannot look as though it 
falls only on certain individuals. In the case of the MCCA, a relatively high premium 
compared to the expected benefit for higher-income beneficiaries amounted to a 
perceived “tax on the rich.” Depending on the mood of the country when health care next 
arises in Congress, this may threaten passage. From 1988 to 1992, there was no serious 
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Too Much Money, Too Little Time: 
Case Study of the William Jefferson Clinton Administration’s Attempt 
at National Health care Reform 
As with the Johnson case study in Chapter 5, this chapter is devoted to a 
chronological case study of the efforts of President Clinton, First Lady Hillary Rodham 
Clinton, the President’s Task Force on National Health care Reform, and the 
administration in general to pass national health care in the first Clinton term of office. 
From my examination of more than 8,000 pages of presidential documents, primarily 
from the files of Domestic Policy Advisor for Health Care Chris Jennings, as well as 
other members of the administration, several key themes emerged. These are: 
 A lack of available evidence that President Clinton remained actively engaged 
throughout the process, instead delegating the process to his wife. Whil Hillary 
Clinton had many of the skills necessary to do the job, opponents were abl  to 
paint her in a way that made her role, if not the woman herself, a target of public 
criticism beyond criticisms of the plan itself; 
 Naiveté on the part of the Clintons and many administration staff members with 
regard to the legal and political ramifications of their decisions; 
 A propensity to make the plan fully their own, sharing little credit for its 
development with Congress;  
 An attempt to incorporate (and, to a great extent, mollify) the existing corporate 
structures of health care delivery in the United States, e.g., insurance companies, 
hospitals, clinics, and corporate physician practices; and 
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 Extended time from launch of the task force to delivery of the administration’s 
overly complicated proposal giving opponents time to marshal their forces in 
opposition to the plan. 
First, one might say that it is not possible to discern President Clinton’s level of 
engagement because of the limited record available for examination at the time the data 
were gathered. However, as Chris Jennings was the lead domestic policy adviser for 
health care, it is reasonable to presume that most of the correspondence would have 
passed through his hands and be found in his files. Jennings’ files repreent the bulk of 
the files I examined in the Clinton Presidential Library and they lack evidence of 
President Clinton’s direct involvement in much of the process. Additional he th care 
files from Domestic Policy Adviser Carol Rasco and Director of the Domestic Policy 
Council Bruce Reed (who has served, since 2001, as president of the Democratic 
Leadership Council) yielded no additional evidence of President Clinton’s direct 
involvement in the process. 
Admittedly, many Clinton administration records have yet to be rel as d. The 
primary reasons are that staff have not had time to process the millions of documents in 
the archives and, perhaps more importantly, restrictions on what can be released and what 
must be redacted. However, with respect to the second reason, redactions from the files 
are noted in redaction memos which specify sender, recipients, and type of document or 
correspondence. In all of the examined files, only four redaction entries indicate 
“POTUS,” the acronym for “President of the United States” as a recipient. No other 
redaction record mentions the President either by name or by title. While one might 
reasonably presume that the President stayed informed of the process through his daily 
interactions with the First Lady, the record does not indicate that o er advisers or outside 
parties delivered documents on the topic directly to the President. Either the President 
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was relatively disengaged from the process, or the First Lady maintained tight control 
over what got through to the President in written form. 
Second, the naiveté of the Clintons and other members of the administration with 
respect to the legal and political ramifications of their decisions can be illustrated with 
several examples. The selection of Ira Magaziner, a long term friend of the Clintons, to 
be co-chair of the task force is indicative of the high degrees of trust placed in decision 
makers who were, to say the least, not intimately acquainted with the processes and 
politics inside Washington. Even the naming of the group as a “task force” had legal 
ramifications, especially in terms of the First Lady’s involvement as co-chair of the 
President’s Task Force on Health Care Reform. The upshot of these ramifications was 
that all of the task force’s working papers had to be made public in response to a 
Freedom of Information Act lawsuit, primarily because the First Lady was not a paid 
employee of the government (H. R. Clinton, 2003). Had anyone bothered to check with 
White House counsel, this mistake might have been avoided. Finally, and perhaps most 
dramatically to this point, the belief on the part of the administrat on that they could force 
the bill through the Senate as part of a reconciliation bill, which would have eliminated 
the possibility of a filibuster requiring 60 votes to bring cloture to the debate, proved fatal 
in the end as neither Hillary Clinton nor the President was able to persuade Majority 
Leader Robert Byrd (D-WV) to waive his “Byrd rule,” which states that only budget 
issues may be included in reconciliation bills. 
Third of these “themes” is the propensity of the Clintons and the administration to 
make the plan fully their own without sharing credit. This is primarly evidenced by two 
events: 1) Bill Clinton’s naming of First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton to co-chair the 
task force; and 2) not one, but two, separate ceremonies on Capitol Hill to deliver the 
final proposed legislation. In the first case, the effect of namig the First Lady to chair 
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such an important policy task force was certainly a historical first. No previous president 
had ever appointed his First Lady to such a role. Though other First Ladies have been 
known to exert influence on political matters with their husbands, none had ever played 
such an important role in a presidential administration is such a public way. Hilary 
Clinton’s appointment had the effect of placing a very hot spotlight on the process and 
raising the political stakes for Republicans to hand the Clintons—husband and wife—a 
major defeat before the first mid-term elections. In the second case, following a delay of 
eight months, the President made a speech to a joint session of Congress to discuss his 
Health Security Act. However, the plan was not yet ready and it was more than a month 
later that the Clintons returned to Capitol Hill for the final delivery of the complex bill 
comprising more than 1,000 pages. In a March 11, 2009, interview with Dr. Sanjay Gupta 
on Larry King Live, Bill Clinton disclosed that he wanted Congress to write the 
legislation, but Ways and Means Chairman Dan Rostenkowski (D-IL) insisted the 
administration draft it so that the committee could amend it (Hirzel, 2009). I had found 
no support in either the files (i.e., primary source documents), nor in the secondary 
sources for this statement by the former President.  
The fourth major “theme” from this case study relates to the ext nded period of 
time from the launch of the task force to delivery of the legislation. In the case of the 
Johnson administration, the Medicare bills were, respectively, H.R. 1 and S. 1, and both 
were introduced very early in the 1965 session of Congress, having failed in the 1964 
session.. President Clinton appointed his task force just five days into the President’s first 
term of office, and he wanted a plan delivered during his first 100 days in office. 
However, it took 10 months to produce the plan, and the plan was not introduced until 
mid-November of 1993, nearly the end of the first session of the 103rd Congress. These 
delays permitted opponents of the plan (e.g., Hospital Insurance Association of America, 
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American Medical Association, and others) to marshal their forces in opposition to the 
President’s plan. In fact, the President made a nationally televis d address to a joint 
session of Congress on September 22, 1993, in which he outlined the major points of h s 
plan. Yet, it was nearly another two months, and just days before Congress recessed, 
before the actual bill was introduced in the two houses. This lengthy interim, again, gave 
ample opportunity for the opposition to begin to work public opinion and the media in 
order to lay down political cover for the Republicans to ultimately defeat the Clinton 
proposal. 
I turn now to the detailed and chronological case study of the Clinton effort. This 
study is taken from the Clinton Presidential Library files and is tr angulated with 
secondary published sources as previously discussed. 
THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON NATIONAL HEALTH CARE REFORM  
William Jefferson Clinton, 42nd President of the United States of America, wasted 
no time in addressing health care. Five days into his presidency, on January 25, 1993,  
Clinton announced the formation of the President’s Task Force on National Health 
Reform to be headed by his wife First Lady Hilary Rodham Clinton and co-chaired by 
long-time Clinton associate Ira Magaziner. Magaziner and Clinton met when they were 
Rhodes scholars at Oxford. Magaziner was a successful business consultant before 
joining the Clinton White House as the President’s senior advisor for domestic policy 
development. He later served as senior advisor to the President on the Intern t (W. J. 
Clinton, 1993b). Clinton’s initiative towards comprehensive, universal coverage became 
mired in details and eventually failed to gain passage, but its story is worth telling. 
Ultimately, this failure became a major factor in the loss of control of both the Senate and 
the House by Democrats in 1994 (Hacker, 1997; Hacker & Pierson, 2005; H. Johnson & 
Broder, 1997).  
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The Clinton task force’s work was supported by people from across agencies of 
the government, staff representatives from the Legislative Branch, state officials, and 
private sector participants such as academics and policy advocates. This group, 
envisioned and created by Magaziner, originally was to have fewer than 100 members, 
but grew quickly to something in excess of 600 members as more constitue cies raised 
their hands and demanded seats at the table (H. R. Clinton, 2003; H. Johnson & Broder, 
1997). This group became known as the Interdepartmental Working Group (IWG).  
On February 24, 1993, the American Association of Physicians and Surgeons 
(AAPS) filed suit against Hillary Rodham Clinton and others to force open the records of 
the Task Force and the IWG pursuant to the Federal Advisory Committee Act. This 
litigation extended into late 1994 when the White House, in an attempt o end the lawsuit, 
announced the release of the IWG records through the National Archives and Records 
Administration. The announcement was made August 17, 1994, and the records were first 
opened to researchers on September 7, 1994. The records are now housed at the Clinton 
Presidential Library in Little Rock, Arkansas and comprise 689 boxes f files and other 
records (National Archives and Record Administration, 1994). 
IWG’s primary organizational and feedback mechanism were so-called 
“tollgates,” meetings held approximately every two weeks where each subgroup of the 
IWG would report its work and findings to Magaziner. These meetings, held almost 
around the clock, created a lot of discussion and input, but in the end, many participants 
felt that the Clintons and Magaziner would do whatever they wanted to anyway. The 
general feeling was that the purpose was more to be able to say hat they had consulted 
and built a plan based upon the input of many persons, agencies, and organizations (H. 
Johnson & Broder, 1997).   
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At least some Democrats were anxious to make their views known t  the First 
Lady and the task force. As an example, on April 26, 1993, David Prior, Democrat 
Senator from Arkansas, Chairman of the Senate Special Committee on Aging, and a 
Clinton political ally, sent a letter to Mrs. Clinton in her role as chair of the task force 
outlining his thoughts on reform of the pharmaceutical sector. Among the topics that 
Pryor discussed is using the power of Medicare to negotiate prices with drug 
manufacturers (Pryor, 1993). Pryor’s office also released the major points of the letter, 
and the fact of its existence, to the press on the same day as the letter was drafted (Senate 
Committee on Aging, 1993). Around this same time, The Wall Street Journal reported 
that market pressures were causing some pharmaceutical companies to lower their drug 
prices in order to remain competitive (Tanouye, 1993). Apparently, Pryor’s analysis 
garnered some weight within the task force, as evidenced by an analysis performed by 
Dr. Sophie Korczyk (1993) and submitted on April 30, 1993. 
Pharmaceutical costs were one of many important considerations in formulating 
the new bill. A briefing book for the President and the First Lady prepared by the 
Working Group on Pharmaceutical Access and Cost Containment (1993) comprised 42 
pages of discussion and bullet points on the matter. Perhaps the most revealing aspect of 
the briefing book is that price controls in the form of caps were b ing considered at that 
point, at least for the short-term control of drug prices. Additionally, at least some 
consideration was being given to whether seniors covered under Medicare would receive 
drug benefits if they were included in the final bill for younger Americans. It was 
recommended “as a matter of equity” (p. 23) that an outpatient drug benefit plan be 
developed for Medicare as coverage for older adults was not likely to be folded into the 
national plan immediately. In an equally poignant question-and-answer that demonstrates 
that at least someone in the group was aware of the historical path on which they found 
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themselves, a reference is made to the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act (MCCA) of 
1988 (P.L. 100-360), passed under Ronald Reagan, and which Medicare beneficiaries so 
summarily rejected that it was quickly repealed. The question in the briefing book goes to 
whether older Americans will support a drug benefit under Medicare. The answer is that 
the MCCA benefit was financed solely by Medicare beneficiaries while the proposed 
benefit here would be subsidized from general revenues making the financing “more 
broadly-based” (p. 42). 
Apparently at least some pharmaceutical companies were concerned about the 
potential for price controls. The Wall Street Journal reported on April 27, 1993 (as cited 
in Searle Corporation, 1993) that the administration was considering the option of 
voluntary cost-control agreements in lieu of actual mandated price controls, a fact borne 
out by multiple files in the Chris Jennings’ files of the IWG. On April 28, Rx Partners, an 
industry group comprising Searle, Upjohn, Hoffmann-LaRoche, Warner-Lambert, Eli 
Lilly, and Bristol-Myers Squibb, issued a press release responding that the member 
companies were ready to cooperate with the Administration to control costs (Searle 
Corporation, 1993). Kurt A. Furst (1993), Director of the Searle Washington Office, 
faxed a copy of the release to Chris Jennings with a note calling attention to the 
“supportive tone” of the response and suggesting that “If a formal submi sion of the 
health care plan to the Hill is delayed, why not utilize the extra time to sit down with 
progressive industry representatives and work out a viable plan?” (p. 1). 
Price controls on medical care had historically failed to curtail medical infl tion in 
the long run. In August of 1971, President Nixon had imposed wage and price controls on 
an economy that was suffering what was, at that time, historically ntolerable peacetime 
inflation. On April 30, 1974, price controls on medical care were lifted, a year later than 
price controls on other sectors of the economy. Over the period of the controls, medical 
 145 
inflation had been held to 4.9 percent annually, compared to general inflation r tes 
averaging 5.2 percent. However, medical providers were simply holding pr ce increases 
for later. The first year after the controls were removed, medical inflation hit 12.1 
percent, a full 2.9 percentage points ahead of general inflation. In 1975, they remained 
three points ahead of general inflation (Starr, 1982). An internal document of unknown 
authorship indicated that the task force knew this history ("The dangers of price 
controls," 1993). 
IWG staff were not the only ones frustrated by the sense of being ignored. 
Republican Congress members were equally frustrated. Senator Dve Durenberger (R-
MN) said “By May, when Hillary knew she wasn’t going to have a bill for a long time, 
she started coming up here and doing that PR thing so at least sh  could say Republicans 
are being consulted. The reality is we may have been consulted, but we weren’t involved” 
(H. Johnson & Broder, 1997, pp. 131-132).  
Within the administration itself, Magaziner had his detractors. Secretary of Health 
and Human Services Donna Shalala and her close friend Alice Rivlin, the  deputy 
director of the Office of Management and Budget, expressed serious misgivings directly 
to the Clintons about the process Magaziner outlined. Their advice fell on deaf ears (H. 
Johnson & Broder, 1997). 
 A full exploration of the documents relating to the IWG and the Task Force is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, two important points have been made in 
the literature surrounding the Clinton effort that deserve attention here.  
First, many have suggested that the Clinton Administration was largely staffed by 
people who were too young and too inexperienced for the positions they held (a charge 
that had also been leveled about War on Poverty programs). That may or may not have 
been the case. What is apparent, in the case of health care, is that mistakes, sometimes of 
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a seemingly inconsequential nature, were made that caused later he daches. A prime 
example was calling the group a “task force.” Though this may seem like a trivial point to 
the uninitiated reader, this unfortunate terminology formed the basis for the AAPS 
lawsuit which claimed, among other things, that the meetings of the task force were 
subject to open meetings laws, and that the First Lady, who was not  federal government 
employee, was not allowed to attend or chair closed meetings (H. R. Clinton, 2003; H. 
Johnson & Broder, 1997). According to Johnson and Broder (1997), Hillary Clinton 
never attended another task force meeting after the suit was filed. Bob Boorstin, who 
managed communications on health care for the administration, said “If I’ called it a 
working group, there never would have been a question about Hillary. We were young 
and stupid and we didn’t check with legal counsel” (H. Johnson & Broder, 1997, p. 112). 
Indeed, in reviewing the files of the Domestic Policy Council, and in particular those of 
Chris Jennings, Bruce Reed, and Carol Rasco, I found very few indications that the 
Office of the White House Counsel was consulted during the process. 
The second picture that emerges is of an administration that was woefully 
unaware of the rules of “inside baseball” that permeate political Washington. Dick Morris 
(D. Morris & McGann, 2004), a pollster and political consultant who worked with the 
administration at various points, recounts meetings with the President aft r the 1992 
election and prior to the inauguration. Morris recalls telling the President that he did not 
have the necessary 60 votes in the Senate to break a Republican filibuster. Morris and 
McGann recount that the President spoke of utilizing public opinion to force Republicans 
in his direction or of getting enough liberal Republicans to join forces with the 
Democratic majority to close debate. But, according to Morris & McGann (2004), “it was 
clear he had no idea what he was up against” (p. 155). Other examples abound, including 
underestimating resistance from Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY) based on his 
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perception that at that point, Clinton had abandoned the promised welfare r fo m in favor 
of health care reform (H. R. Clinton, 2003; H. Johnson & Broder, 1997; D. Morris & 
McGann, 2004; Weathers, 2004). Likely the most important example was 
underestimating Senator Robert Byrd’s (D-WV) objection to including healt  care reform 
as part of the budget reconciliation bill, which would have limited debate without the 
need for a supermajority to break a filibuster. Reconciliation bills, under Senate rules, are 
not subject to filibuster. The Clinton team considered this the most likely route to 
passage. One man blocked that route (H. R. Clinton, 2003; H. Johnson & Broder, 1997; 
D. Morris & McGann, 2004). In her memoirs, Hillary Clinton (2003) concedes that she 
later came to agree with Byrd’s contention that health care was simply too complex a 
problem to be subjected to limited debate. 
The task force ended its work on May 31, 1993 (H. Johnson & Broder, 1997). The 
President had asked for a bill to be ready to submit to Congress within 100 days. With 
127 days gone, the task force had not yet prepared a bill that was ready to submit, but the 
effort was far from over. Let us now turn to the files of Chris Jennings, domestic policy 
advisor for health care, and others from the Clinton Presidential Library to see how the 
Administration tried, and ultimately failed, to pass the Health Security Act. 
AFTER THE TASK FORCE – MAY , 1993 TO SEPTEMBER 1994 
Before launching into the examination of the records, I should explain the sources 
chosen and the rationale behind those choices. The primary source available t the time 
of this research in the Clinton Presidential Library, beyond the IWG files, were the files 
of Chris Jennings, the White House domestic policy advisor for health c re. It could be 
said, and would certainly be true, that these files were selected out of convenience, since 
they were the files that were open and available at the time. However, Jennings’ files are 
likely the most complete source of information among all available files that covered the 
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period after the end of the task force itself. Almost every correspondence related to the 
matter would have passed at some point through Jennings’ hands or that of his office 
staff. I also examined Jennings’ files from the IWG. 
Additionally, I examined Domestic Policy Council files, and in particular, those 
of Carol Rasco and Bruce Reed. Rasco served as a domestic policy adv sor (H. Johnson 
& Broder, 1997), and Reed was chief domestic policy advisor and director of the 
Domestic Policy Council. From 1990 to 1991, when Bill Clinton was chairman of the 
Democratic Leadership Council (DLC), Reed served as its policy director. Today, Bruce 
Reed is President of the DLC (Democratic Leadership Council, 2008). Finally, I looked 
at selected files of the White House Press Office, including press releases relevant to the 
work of the Task Force and Administration efforts to pass the Health Security Act.  
Before the task force finally shut down on May 31, 1993, the White House was 
already considering how particular outside interest groups could be persuad d to come 
aboard. A memo to the First Lady from Special Assistant to the President for Public 
Liaison Mike Lux (1993) on May 5, 1993 has the subject: “Closing the Deal With
Interest Groups” (p. 1). This was almost five months before the President’s address to 
Congress proposing the Health Security Act. In the memo, Lux breaks the groups into 
three categories: 1) Groups essentially ready to come aboard; 2) Groups still negotiating 
with the task force over key details, but likely to end up supporting the bill (the National 
Association of Social Workers was listed in this category); and 3) major organizations 
whose position would depend on major policy decisions not yet made. This last group 
included the AMA, Blue Cross/Blue Shield, the Big Five Insurance Companies, 
pharmaceutical and druggist associations, and the American Trial Lawyers Association. 
Lux pointed out that once the key policy decisions were made internally, they would 
 149 
“know whether we should proceed with a ‘close the deal’ strategy or a ‘how do we 
manage the opposition’ strategy” (p. 2).
Meanwhile, the First Lady had been busy working the Hill, meeting w th Senators 
and Representatives as well as their staffs. In spite of the fact that she had been out of 
Washington, D.C., for most of the period from March 19, when her father Hugh Rod am 
suffered a massive stroke in Little Rock, until his funeral in early April (H. R. Clinton, 
2003; H. Johnson & Broder, 1997), Hillary had managed to attend most of the 71 
congressional meetings that had been held by key task force members. These included 28 
Senate meetings, 32 House meetings, and 11 with representatives of both houses. Forty-
five of the meetings had been held with Democrats only, while 10 were bipartisan 
meetings, and only 6 were held with Republicans only. All but eight senators had met 
with the First Lady. The eight remaining included Democrats Jo eph Biden (D-DE), 
Robert Byrd (D-WV), and Richard Shelby (D-AL) and Republicans Hank Brown (R-
CO), Alphonse D’Amato (R-NY), Trent Lott (R-MS), John McCain (R-AZ), and John 
Warner (R-VA). The First Lady or her designees had metwith 28 of the 175 House 
Republicans and 131 of the 255 House Democrats in the course of the 71 meetings 
(Jennings & Edelstein, 1993b).  
The First Lady (H. R. Clinton, 2003), in her memoirs, noted that “Every 
Democratic emissary we could think of, including the President, had asked [Senator 
Byrd] to allow health care reform into reconciliation. But on March 11, [1993], in a 
phone call with the President, the Senator said he objected on procedural grounds and 
that the ‘Byrd Rule’ would not be waived” (p. 154).8 Yet, on May 5, almost two months 
                                                
8 The Byrd Rule prohibits the Senate from considering a ything extraneous to the budget as part of a 
reconciliation bill. The reconciliation process, under Senate rules, is not subject to filibuster. Therefore, it is 
not necessary to obtain a 3/5 majority (60 votes) in order to pass a reconciliation bill. For this reason, it is 
often deemed desirable to include in reconciliation bills other things that might be blocked by the minor ty 
party using the filibuster. The Byrd Rule prohibits this by excluding “extraneous matter” from the 
reconciliation process. It is enforced by raising of a point of order. If the point of order is sustained, the 
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after the reported date of the phone call, the memo recapping meetings with Senators and 
Representatives explicitly states that the First Lady had not met with Senator Byrd 
(Jennings & Edelstein, 1993b). A review of the 27-page memorandum, which includes 
extensive lists of all such meetings whether with the First Lady or any other member of 
the task force team or the President, shows no meetings at all on ny count with Senator 
Byrd. If the record is correct, the First Lady herself had never met face-to-face with Byrd 
to press for including health care in the reconciliation bill. 
In June, at the urging of Senator Tom Daschle (D-SD) and House Majority Leader 
Dick Gephardt (D-MO), the First Lady asked for a proposal for a “Health Care 
University” to offer legislators presentations on health care issue . These meetings were  
to be open to legislative Members of both parties ("Health Care University 
Concept/Implementation Proposal," 1993). The proposal was developed and circulated. 
On July 27, 1993, a staff meeting was held to discuss the Health Care University and to 
review materials being prepared for distribution to Congress before the August recess 
(Jennings & Edelstein, 1993a). 
The Health Care University meetings took place in late September, 1993. Among 
the speakers was former Surgeon General of the United States C. Everett Koop, a Reagan 
appointee (Koop, 1993). Koop indicated that the President had told him that he viewed 
the health care proposals “not as a take-it-or-leave-it package, but as what they are – 
proposals: proposals that will lead to constructive debate, and not just o constructive 
debate, but then to constructive legislation” (p. 1). Koop acknowledged that he had some 
disagreements with the proposal draft he had read, but found it to be sufficiently detailed, 
and that his concerns would not “stop [him] from fighting for the many reforms the 
                                                                                                                                                 
provision is excluded from the bill unless the proponents can get it waived by a 3/5 majority. This is 
important in the current political context as well as the Clinton historical context as the Obama 
administration is considering putting its health care reform spending plans, as well as other controversial 
matters, into reconciliation bills. They may learn the same lesson that the Clintons did in the end. 
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American health care system so desperately needs” (p. 2). He went on to note that over 
the prior months, physicians, nurses, hospitals, patients, pharmaceutical and insurance 
companies and others had begun to reform themselves. Very likely, he was referring to 
such things as the noted decrease in premiums, hospital billings, and prescription drug 
costs that had occurred in response to the pressure of an unwanted n tional health care 
reform package.  
Koop (1993) clearly had an understanding of the path that health care refo m had 
taken. He also had an interesting theory about the forces that had continually interacted in 
the health care debate: individualism and altruism. He attributed the last major reform 
effort – Medicare and Medicaid – to altruism, and to the fact that it “happened at a time 
when we thought we could afford it” (p. 3). Koop saw individualism as pre enting some 
of the more intractable problems in passing health care reform “as physicians insist upon 
autonomous practice, hospitals want to make market choices but be free from market 
competition, insurance companies want the freedom to deny coverage to high-risk 
people, pharmaceutical companies want to control development and distribution of heir 
products, patients want choice in access to care without gatekeepers or waiting lines, and 
taxpayers want more money for themselves” (p. 4). In this relativ y short speech, the 
former Surgeon General had encapsulated both the motivators and the barriers to passage.
Finally, Koop (1993) espoused the idea that the problem driving health care costs 
(and medical inflation) could be found in the irony that while some Americans had too 
little health care, a great many had too much health care. Universal insurance, then, could 
have the effect of driving costs higher. This, in fact, is one of the lasting impacts of 
Medicare and Medicaid. More people, in that case elderly people who would have a 
tendency to have more demand for care, were granted access to a plan where such care 
was largely paid for by government dollars. The simple laws of supply and demand had 
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driven the costs higher and that quite quickly. Koop admitted that little was known about 
what worked in this costliest of American enterprises, and that patients were getting tests 
and procedures from doctors who did not fully understand those tests and proceures. He 
estimated that 25-30 percent of medical care was medically unnecessary. He called for 
greater outcomes research to battle these forces and control costs over a projected five 
year period. He called for changes in the medical education system and a move from an 
emphasis on “curing” to an emphasis on “caring” (p. 7). 
Shortly before the disbanding of the President’s Task Force on Health Care 
Reform, the Republicans, under the auspices of the Republican Caucus of the House 
Committee on the Budget, put out a White Paper on Health Care Reform (Kasich & 
Republican Members House Committee on the Budget, 1993). The 24-page report is 
essentially a position paper on freeing the health care market, putting consumers back in 
charge of negotiating their own care (and the prices for it), and reducing government 
spending on health care which has put upward pressure on costs. Notably, access to 
health insurance is addressed briefly under the heading “Additional Concerns for 
Reform” (p. 12). In this section, the Republican authors of the paper rely heavily on the 
argument that access to health insurance is not the same as acces to health care because 
no one is denied access if they present themselves for treatment at an emergency room. 
The White Paper was issued “as a contribution to the House Republican Leader’s Task 
Force on Health Care” (p. 1). I have found no reference to this task force in any of the 
literature surrounding the Clinton health care reform efforts.  
The Kasich et al. (1993) White Paper puts forth what has been the consistent 
Republican approach, not only to health care but to myriad other cases: fre  market 
economics. The paper, perhaps unintentionally, also gives credence to the path-dependent 
nature of health care in that it quite correctly states that a) government spending on health 
 153 
care increased in the wake of Medicare; b) those increases contributed to the rapid rise of 
costs of health care; c) tax-favored treatment of employer-based health insurance had 
acted as a premium subsidy to mostly larger employers and their employees; and d)  
consumers were insulated from market-based decisions (that is to say price-based 
decisions) about their health care as were doctors and other treatment professionals. 
Notably, these conditions remain in effect today, especially the tax-favored treatment of 
employer-based plans and consumer insulation from market-based decisions.  
Where the Kasich et al. (1993) White Paper fails, perhaps unintentionally, is in 
the description of the “free market” for health care. The paper makes no allowance, for 
instance, for the fact that such a market is hampered by asymmetric information— 
consumers have very limited information about the “market price” of any given 
procedure or service. In the absence of that information, the purchaser is at a 
disadvantage in the marketplace and market power accrues to the providers. This point is 
examined more closely in Chapter Nine “The Road to Somewhere.” The Whit Paper, in 
fact, advocates that consumers should be more directly responsible for n gotiating their 
own price structures in lieu of the present market structures in which insurance 
companies and large self-insured employers negotiate those structures on their own 
behalf, and presumably on behalf of their plan participants. In other words, the 
Republicans advocate an individualist approach, even preferring individual coverage over 
employer-based group coverage in this paper, rather than having large employer-based 
groups collectively negotiating price structures. This should come as no surprise to the 




Figure 10:     Timeline for January 20, 1993 to December 31, 1993 
We do know that the First Lady was aware of the Kasich et al. (1993) White 
Paper, as it was supplied to her in a briefing packet on Saturday, June 12, 1993 (Tilley, 
Jan. 20 – Bill Clinton sworn in as 42nd President of the United States. 
Jan. 25 – President announces his Task Force on National Health 
Reform. Names First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton and Ira 
Magaziner Task Force co-chairs. Magaziner holds “tollgate” 
meetings every 2 weeks. Before disbanding, approximately 600 
people join the Interdepartmental Working Group.  
 
Feb. 24 – American Association of Physicians and Surgeons file suit 
against HRC to force open records of Task Force and 
Interdepartmental Working Group. 
May 31 – President’s Task Force on National Health 
Reform ends its work. 
Mar. 11 – Robert Byrd calls WJC to inform him that “Byrd 
Rule” will not be waived and health care bill cannot be 
attached to reconciliation bill avoiding filibuster. 
June – Daschle & Gephardt urge HRC to establish “Health 
Care University” for legislators of both parties. 
September – Health Care University meetings held  
Sep 22 – WJC addresses joint session of 
Congress on national health care reform. 
Oct 27 – Ceremonial delivery of the Health 
Security Act to Congress 
Mid-Nov. – Actual introduction of Health 
Security Act in House and Senate. 
Nov. 3 – McDermott  “single-payer” 
alternative bill has 89 sponsors. 
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1993) as she prepared for a dinner at Congressman Kasich’s home the following Monday, 
June 14. The dinner is characterized in the schedule (Office of the First Lady, 1993) as an 
“Informal dinner/Open discussion on health care” (p. 600). Approximately 12 people 
were to attend the dinner, including the First Lady, three of her staff, and presumably 
Kasich. The record does not indicate who the other attendees were. 
 Republicans were clearly not sitting idly by as the administrat on worked on its 
bill. Senator John Chafee (R-RI) led the Republican effort to crafta health care reform 
bill. The Jennings files contain a comparison ("Comparison of Chafee/Dole legislation to 
Clinton proposal," n.d.) of the anticipated Chafee bill to the Clinton proposal, based on 
the 1992 Chafee/Dole bill. The unknown author of the comparison anticipated tha the 
Chafee plan would likely have individual mandates but no employer mandate; would 
create a federal system to encourage early settlement of malpractice disputes; would be 
similar to the Clinton proposal in shifting the focus of health care to arly intervention, 
preventative, and primary care; would propose a standard minimum package of benefits 
similar to the Clinton proposal (though likely not as comprehensive in nature as the 
Clinton plan); and would have a smaller, and thus weaker, version of purchasing allia ces 
compared to the Clinton plan. 
The administration was well aware by summer that they would havea battle on 
their hands over health care reform. In a July 20, 1993 memo to Jeff Eller, the White 
House communications aide charged with running the Health Care Wa Room (H. 
Johnson & Broder, 1997), with the subject “Fight Strategy,” Chris Jennings and Steve 
Edelstein (1993c) outlined their assessment of the battle before them. T y believed that 
“the most extreme elements of the Republican party” would lead the opposition. Jennings 
and Edelstein rightly assessed the coming conservative portrayal of the Clinton proposal 
as “too expensive, harmful to American business and the economy, over-reliant on 
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government regulation, and limiting physician choice and rationing care.” They also 
accurately predicted the alliances between the conservative members and outside 
organizations such as the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) and the 
Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA), though the memo gives no indication 
that the Administration had any inkling of the overwhelming importance those alliances 
would come to have in the debate. It is worth remembering here that it w s the HIAA 
who produced and promoted the “Harry and Louise” ads depicting a middle-class couple 
fearful about the effects of the Clinton plan on their health care. 
One of the prime arguments against the Clinton proposal was that employer 
mandates would cause job losses. In mid-July, Richard Hinz (1993) of the Department of 
Labor produced a memo for the First Lady outlining, from a strictly economic point of 
view, the elements of the widely-ranging job impact analyses. The bottom line of this 
analysis was “[a] reasonable expectation...that there will be some employment losses 
concentrated among very low wage workers and in small businesses because they do not 
currently provide health benefits to these workers” (p. 2). According to the Hinz memo, 
the NFIB had sponsored a report indicating “some [estimates] as high as 15 to 20 
million” lost jobs. Hinz called the NFIB studies “essentially meaningless” (p. 2) because 
they did not incorporate the key elements and processes of analysis. Hinz may well have 
been correct in his assessment of the NFIB studies from a purely economic/scientific 
point of view. Political reality, however, can be quite different from economic reality or 
anything produced by the scientific method. Producing studies designed to scare the 
public and thereby provide political cover are standard fare for politicians, and it is well-
known that certain political factions have devoted a great deal of energy and money to 
largely very successful efforts to produce such “science” and use it to frame the political 
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debate in ways that are most effective for their positions (Hacker & Pierson, 2005; 
Lakoff, 2004, 2006). 
As the summer of 1993 ended, the White House was gearing up for Congress to 
return from its August recess. The President’s speech announcing his health care reform 
bill was approaching in late September. About three weeks ahead of the speech, an 
internal memorandum (Yager, 1993) listed all of the businesses and business associations 
whose representatives had met with some member of the task force along with an 
assessment of the position of each with respect to the Clinton plan. The assessments were 
on a four-point scale which included: a) Likely support; b) Maybe or unclear; c) Helpful, 
but not endorse; and d) Unlikely.  Of the 150 businesses or business associations listed in 
the memo, only 21 were categorized as likely supporters of the Clinton proposal. Nearly 
twice as many (40) were believed to be unlikely to support the plan, with 80 of the 150 
listed as “maybe or unclear.” This last group likely reflected the fact that the proposal in 
its final form as the Health Security Act was still almost sixty days from release, and was, 
thus, not yet adequately solidified for this group’s assessment of support. 
On September 22, 1993, at 9:10 p.m. Eastern Time, Bill Clinton stood in the 
House chamber before a joint session of Congress to deliver his address on national 
health care reform. In spite of serious problems with the teleprompter at he beginning of 
the speech, he delivered a convincing address. Pollsters for both parties found that public 
response to the televised address was overwhelmingly positive (H. Johnson & Broder, 
1997). Naturally, it was the President who gave this nationally televised speech, but the 
First Lady was not going to be out of the main spotlight for long. At the conclusion of the 
speech, the President, Vice-President Gore, and Mrs. Gore returned o the White House 
and dropped in to the Health Care Task Force War Room. Meanwhile, the First Lady 
remained on Capitol Hill for a live interview with Dan Rather of CBS News. The next 
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morning, prior to the afternoon health care rally, she taped interviews with Paula Zahn 
(CBS Morning News), Joan Lunden (ABC’s Good Morning America), Katie Couric 
(NBC’s Today Show), and Judy Woodruff (CNN). Clearly she was staying in the 
spotlight (Office of the First Lady, 1993). 
The next day, the President spoke at a rally for supporters on the South Lawn of 
the White House. Nearly 70 representatives of groups supporting the Clinton health care 
reform plan were slated to appear on stage with the President (including Dr. Ann Abbot, 
President of the National Association of Social Workers), and hundreds more were 
invited to attend. The press office released a list of invitees along with a large packet of 
letters of support from those in attendance (White House Office of the Press Secretary, 
1993a). How well did the White House gauge the strength of these supporters? One 
striking example, involving someone who would later become quite notorious, can be 
seen in the files. 
On September 28, just five days after the South Lawn event, an internal 
memorandum (Lux & Yager, 1993) was circulated listing “groups, CEOs, and business 
owners [who] would be the best testifiers to Congressional Committees from our 
perspective” (p. 1). Among those on the list was Kenneth Lay, Chairman and CEO of 
Enron Corporation. However, a closer examination of Lay’s (1993) letter of support 
(included in the previously mentioned press packet), reveals his “commit[ment] to 
reasonable and equitable reform of the health-care system.” Lay then defines what he 
means by the statement:  
[A]ll Americans should pay for a portion of their health-care bills thereby 
becoming informed consumers; a competitive health-care system must be 
nurtured where the most efficient and highest quality providers will flourish; the 
current legal system must be reformed to reduce the deadweight cost of 
unjustified malpractice lawsuits and the enormous cost of defensive medicine to 
prevent them; and uniform administrative processes need to be implemented 
which will greatly reduce the administrative cost of all health care. 
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Even the most generous reading of Lay’s letter does not reveal an overwhelming support 
for either progressive principles or the employer mandates envisio ed in the Clinton 
proposal. Lux and Yager (1993) had, in at least one case, misunderstood the “support” 
being offered. 
The same day, September 28, the First Lady testified before the House Ways and 
Means Committee and the House Energy and Commerce Committee. On the 29th, she 
testified before the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee in he morning and 
the House Education and Labor Committee in the afternoon. On the morning f the 30th, 
she testified before the Senate Finance Committee, chaired by Daniel Patrick Moynihan 
(D-NY) and taped an interview with Larry King that afternoon (Office of the First Lady, 
1993) 
On October 1, an event took place that has little to do with the path-dependence 
per se of health care policy, but illustrates at least some apprciation of its history. The 
First Lady traveled that day to New York City to attend the Lasker Awards Ceremony, a 
function of the Lasker Foundation whose benefactors Albert and Mary Lasker had been 
early pioneers of medical research. The Laskers had also been early champions of the 
Wagner-Murray-Dingell Bill, forerunner of Medicare, during theTruman administration. 
While at the event, Mrs. Clinton had a photo op with 93-year old Mary Woodard Lasker 
herself (Office of the First Lady, 1993; The Lasker Foundation, 2008). 
Public and organizational sentiment was running high in support of the 
President’s plan. The actual bill, however, was still not ready for delivery to the Hill. A 
ceremonial delivery of the bill (the actual bill was still not ready) took place on October 
27, more than a month after the President’s address to Congress and the South Lawn 
rally. The event, held in the old House chamber, included remarks from both the 
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President and the First Lady. Among other speakers invited to address the group was 
House Minority Leader Bob Michel (R-IL), a moderate Republican. Unexpectedly, 
Michel delivered “an unsparing attack on the very premise of the Clinton plan” (H. 
Johnson & Broder, 1997, p. 191). Michel concluded his remarks, laying down the 
gauntlet of opposition, by framing the debate as a battle between the private-sector 
system that had provided care for so many and “an uncharted course of government-run 
medicine” (Michel, B. as quoted in H. Johnson & Broder, 1997, p. 191). This signaled 
that Republicans were ready to mount a full frontal attack on the Clinton plan, which 
would have been unlikely had they not believed that public support for the Clinton plan 
was rapidly eroding. 
In the month between the September address and the October ceremonial (but not 
actual) delivery of the Clinton bill, trouble had erupted in Somalia and Haiti, creating a 
situation in which the President was forced to cancel nearly ever scheduled health care 
event (H. Johnson & Broder, 1997). At the very least, foreign affairs overrode his focus 
on the Health Security Act. On top of the myriad delays in getting a proposal before the 
Congress, the act seemed all but stillborn.  
Problems on the foreign affairs front were not the only issues to crop up in 
October. As sometimes happens with large organizations (and there is no larger 
organization than the federal government), enthusiastic people have a tendency to 
occasionally get ahead of the message. Such an event occurred in mid-October when the 
Small Business Administration (SBA), under the leadership of Administrator Erskine 
Bowles, released a publication entitled “The Health Security Act: Benefits to Business.” 
This publication, apparently released to the public on September 28, indicated th t an 
outside group comprising actuaries and economists had validated cost and savings 
projections. Of course, the bill had not yet been finalized at that time and the President 
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had yet to make final decisions, which meant that such a validation by outside experts 
would not have been possible. Ironically enough, in light of the later “Harry and Louise” 
ads, the publication also featured characters named “Charles” and “Danita and her 
husband” with illustrations of how much Americans would save under the Clinton plan. 
This was not lost on the Republicans in Congress. On October 18, 1993, 62 members of 
the House of Representatives, including Newt Gingrich, Dick Armey, Tom DeLay, Rick 
Santorum, Denny Hastert, and Duncan Hunter, sent a letter to the President requesting 
clarification of this and several other points in the SBA brochure (Hancock, et al., 1993). 
No response to the letter was uncovered in the files. 
In mid-November, Senate Majority Leader Mitchell and House Majority Leader 
Gephardt introduced the administration’s bill in their respective chambers. In preparation 
for high public and media interest in the bill, Chris Jennings sent a rough draft of non-
technical changes to the bill (from its original October 27 version released by the White 
House) to the First Lady on November 19 (Jennings, 1993). That same week, th  First 
Lady and Tipper Gore hosted a two-hour briefing on the Hill for spouses of members of 
Congress and Cabinet members (Blinder & Greenberg, 1993). 
Almost as if baiting the Republican opposition, Senator Moynihan, Chairman of 
the powerful Committee on Finance, introduced legislation on November 3 to increase 
federal taxes on handgun ammunition. Increases from 11 percent to 50 percent on most 
handgun ammunition, plus a 10,000 percent tax on the Winchester 9-mm hollow tipped 
“black talon” bullets and all .50 caliber bullets were part of the legislation. What was 
most striking was that the Senator also announced that he planned to incorporate his 
legislation into the health care reform bill (Senate Committee on Finance, 1993). 
Moynihan was irritated with the President for wavering on welfar reform (H. Johnson & 
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Broder, 1997), and one might speculate that he proposed attaching the handgun ammo tax 
legislation to the President’s health bill as a result. 
On December 8, 1993, the White House sponsored a breakfast with House and 
Senate cosponsors of the Health Security Act in the Indian Treaty Room at the Old 
Executive Office Building. By that time, the bill had 101 House cosponsors (H.R. 3600) 
and 31 Senate cosponsors (S. 1757; Ricchetti, Verveer, Jennings, & Lew, 1993). The 
McDermott alternative bill (H.R. 1200) had 89 sponsors as of November 3 (Office of 
Congressman Jim McDermott, 1993).  
The Lewin-VHI group, a leading private health care accounting and econometrics 
firm headquartered in Virginia, conducted an independent review of the Health Security 
Act and found it to be fully funded (Lewin-VHI, 1993). Based on the Lewin-VHI report, 
Alice Rivlin, Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget (and close friend 
of HHS Secretary Shalala), issued a statement saying, in part, that “[t]he study confirms 
that the Health Security Act is fully financed and that it will reduce the deficit over the 
period from 1995-2000” (Rivlin, 1993). The next day (December 9), Treasury Secetary 
Bentsen and OMB Director Leon Panetta held a press briefing in the White House 
Briefing Room to discuss the report in more detail. Bentsen was particularly pleased that 
the study’s estimate of government subsidies required under the plan was less than the 
administration’s estimates (White House Office of the Press Secretary, 1993b). 
Within weeks, if not days, of the delivery of the actual bill to the Congress, the 
campaigns for and against the Clinton plan were in full swing. The media was not above 
sensationalizing the debate. A Philadelphia Inquirer  article by Shaw (1993) reported that 
a number of biotech firms had halted or slowed development of promising treatments for 
a variety of diseases ranging from rheumatoid arthritis to breast cancer to AIDS as a 
result of fears that the new Clinton health care plan would create a market in which 
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development of these treatments would not be profitable. The article caught the eye of the 
President (W. J. Clinton, 1993a), who clipped a note to it asking Ira Magaziner whether 
there was “anything we can do about this.”  On January 6, 1994, some six w eks after the 
article had appeared in the Philadelphia newspaper, Magaziner and Jennings (1994) 
issued a five-page memo to the President outlining the relevant aspects of the plan and 
that there were certain “options…being reviewed by Administration and Congressional 
representatives that the biotech industry finds quite appealing” (p. 4). This is one of only 
a handful of indications of correspondence directly with the President n the Jennings 
files. What makes it extraordinary is the nature of the response. On  cannot know for 
certain what the President (W. J. Clinton, 1993a) had in mind when he wrot the note to 
Magaziner. Knowing, as we do, that the President was a political man, considered by 
many to be one of the finest political minds of his generation, we can make an educated 
guess that the President’s interest was less in what the Administration could do to 
appease the biotech industry than in what they could do about damaging stories. 
Magaziner, known to have been tapped by the President for his organizational skills and 
technical prowess, gives an answer framed in the terms with which he was most 
comfortable, i.e., how the bill could be technically changed to appe se the biotech 
companies. This mismatch between a political President and the co-chair of the task force 
is illustrative of the myriad internal barriers to success that the Administration 
confronted. 
 In one example of many articles, interviews, and interpretations o come, an early 
February, 1994 New Republic article by McCaughey (1994b) emphasized such 
misleading notions as the government setting a national budget for health expenditures, 
every person being forced to buy only a government plan, a severe reduction in 
consumer-based choice of providers, and limited choices of insurance companies. The 
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article was sufficiently important to command an eleven-page rebuttal from White House 
Press Secretary Dee Dee Myers (White House Office of the Press Secretary, 1994). 
The Clinton plan had its media champions as well. Michael Kinsley (1994), in a 
January 30, 1994 editorial responding to McCaughey’s, said “[I]t is pointless o compare 
the Clinton plan with some idealized version of the classic American system, in which 
you can go to any doctor you want, who can perform any treatment he wants, order any 
test she wants, prescribe any drug he wants, and charge whatever sh  wants, all paid for 
by insurance. That system is disappearing, whatever we do” (p. D3). In hindsight, 
Kinsley may have been prophetic, but it was not that difficult a prophecy as so-called 
“patient choice” had been eroding rapidly since the passage of the HMO Act under Nixon 
in the early 1970s.  
Legislative strategy was a hallmark of the Johnson Administration s documented 
in Chapter Five. I have hypothesized that one contributing factor to the Clinton failure 
was a lack of understanding of legislative strategy and the “inside ball” of Washington 
politics on the part of the Clintons and the young White House staff. It now occurs to me 
that this hypothesis assumes only a benign ignorance of the formulation of legislative 
strategy, while the truth may be that there was a more malignant lack of interest in the 
process. Johnson had the advantage of a landslide election. Clinton was elected by a 
plurality of the vote and not a majority. Johnson had a much stronger, filibuster-proof 
Senate base of Democrats and a larger base in the House as well (and he knew how to 
maintain party discipline). Clinton did not have a congressional background, and his 
party’s majorities in Congress were slimmer than Johnson’s making it arguably even 
more important for him to actively understand and pursue a workable legislative strategy. 
Evidence of the lack of interest comes from a memo prepared by Assistant to the 
President for Legislative Affairs Pat Griffin (1994a) on Saturday, January 22. The memo 
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was, in essence, a briefing paper for the President and the First Lady for a meeting to be 
held on Monday, January 24, 1994 in the Oval Office with the President, First Lady, key 
White House staff, Speaker of the House Foley, and Senate Majority Leader Mitchell. A 
key to the President and the First Lady’s lack of interest comes from the First Lady’s 
schedule (Office of the First Lady, 1994, pp. 110-125). The President and the First Lady 
spent that weekend at Camp David, having left on the afternoon of Friday, January 21, 
the day before the memo was prepared. The meeting with the Speaker and the Majority 
Leader was held at 3:00 p.m. the following Monday, January 24. The First Lady’s 
schedule indicates that the briefing for the meeting took place at 2:45 p.m., only 15 
minutes before the actual meeting itself. This was the preparation for the legislative 
strategy meeting with the Congressional leadership! 
As to the content of the legislative strategy memo (Griffin, 1994a) itself, a certain 
level of hubris on the administration’s part can be read between its lines. Griffin 
envisioned a “reasonable timetable and strategy that, while somewhat flexible to 
currently unforeseen developments, serves to discipline the process” (p. 1). Griffin 
recognizes that the timetable, once agreed to by the President, th  First Lady, Speaker 
Foley, and Majority Leader Mitchell, will have to be sold to the fiv committee chairmen 
who have control over the legislation. [A subsequent meeting with the partici nts of this 
first meeting and the five chairmen was held on February 3, 1994 (Griffin, 1994d; Office 
of the First Lady, 1994, p. 189)]. Unlike the adept LBJ and his staff, however, Griffin 
proposed that the Clintons adopt the stance that “it would be counterproductive for the 
Administration to be involved in the day to day actions/decisions of the Committees. This 
does not mean the Administration is not engaged in the work of the Committees; it does 
mean, however, that it is a role that is primarily technical and behind the scen s until later 
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in the process” (p. 3). Rarely, if ever, did Wilbur Mills hold a meeting on Medicare where 
Wilbur Cohen was not present representing the Johnson Administration’s interests. 
Finally, in a display of either hubris or an almost stunning naiveté, Griffin (1994a) 
proposes that the “optimal outcome from this proposal would be an agreement to 
establish a bicameral, Committee Chairmen coordination mechanism” (p. 3). This 
suggestion arises out of the perceived, and likely justified, fear of the House to be forced 
to go first and take a tough vote in an election year only to be “whip-sawed by the Senate 
[in a] repeat of what they feel they went through in last year’s budget process” (p. 2). In 
other words, the House would be looking for cover, and Griffin feared that the absence of 
political cover would result in the House adopting a watered down version of the bill that 
would not meet the promises of universality and affordability the President and the First 
Lady laid out. Griffin’s proposal to provide this cover was essentially to put in place a 
mechanism, not already envisioned under the rules of either chamber, to coordinate the 
timing of the legislative process. It is hard to imagine that anyone thought that the 
Administration would be in a place to impose, much less manage, such a mechanism 
(Griffin, 1994a). Apparently, however, this passed the muster of the first meeting (with 
the Speaker and the Majority Leader), as the briefing memo (Griffin, 1994d) for the 
second meeting (including the five chairmen) includes the same proposal. 
Apparently, the chairmen agreed to the necessity for coordinated scheduling, 
though the implementation of a specific mechanism appears not to have been agreed to in 
the February 3 meeting, as indicated in a subsequent memo (Griffin, 1994b). Following 
the February 3 meeting, the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office had issued its 
report on the Health Security Act, which Griffin (1994b) described as “potentially very 
damaging” (p. 1). A second meeting with the same group (including the five Chairmen) 
was scheduled for February 9. At this meeting, Griffin envisioned th  President outlining 
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his minimum acceptable “bottom line provisions” (p. 2). Furthermore, this memo 
introduces Griffin’s fear that the press was looking for signs of infighting among the 
Democrats and that the President should take advantage of the meeting to: a) request 
private airing of differences; and b) discuss whether the meting itself might present a 
good opportunity for the President, First Lady, Leadership and Chairs to present a united 
picture to the press.  
Meanwhile, trouble was also brewing in the form of the single-payer dvocates 
who were co-sponsors of the McDermott alternative bill. Subsequent to a dinner with the 
President and Republican leaders, there was concern that the single-payer co-sponsors 
might view the administration as negotiating with the Republicans and cutting the single-
payer co-sponsors out of the decision processes. Further concern was express d over the 
change in language from “universal coverage to guaranteed private heal h care” (Griffin, 
1994c, p. 1), a change that would concern the co-sponsors but could be allayed by 
emphasizing that the Clinton bill allowed states to choose a single-pay r option if they so 
chose. A meeting was held in late February with the President, the Vic  President, the 
First Lady, key White House staff, and eleven single-payer co-sponsors led by Jim 
McDermott for the purpose of allaying these fears (Griffin, 1994c). 
McDermott’s bill was not the only Democrat alternative being offered. Ted 
Kennedy, long a champion of health care, had also put forth a bill which proposed, 
among other things, that the Federal Employees Health Benefit Program (FEHBP) be 
used as the insurance vehicle to cover those not insured through a large group-sponsored 
plan and that the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) provide state-level contracting 
functions to facilitate the proposal. The Administration took the Kennedy proposal at 
least seriously enough for Chris Jennings to generate a memo to Ira N. Forman, Director 
of the OPM Office of Congressional Relations, concerning technical changes that would 
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need to be made to the Kennedy plan in order to ensure sufficient finacing for OPM to 
carry out the proposed contracting functions (Jennings, 1994). The idea of opening up the 
FEHBP to segments of the uninsured or in the reform of Medicare continues to garner 
interest (Daschle, 2008; Merlis, 2003; The White House, 2009). 
In addition to the McDermott and Kennedy bills, a group known as the 
Mainstream Coalition, led by liberal Republican Senator John Chafee (R-RI), was 
proposing its own legislation. Comprising about 20 senators from both sides of the aisle, 
the Mainstream Coalition proposed a more conservative approach to the probl m 
including the absence of employer mandates. Attempts were made to resolve differences 
between the Mainstream Coalition plan and the Mitchell bill, including meetings between 
Mainstream staff, the Majority Leader’s staff, and White House staff. On June 27, 1994, 
negotiations apparently proceeded around the clock with memoranda of proposed 
agreements appearing in the Jennings files at 3 a.m., 12:15 p.m., and 6 p.m. ("Mainstream 
Coalition Proposed Agreement, June 27, 1994, 3 a.m.," 1994; Mainstream Coalition 
Proposed Agreement, June 27, 1994, 6 p.m.," 1994; Mainstream Coalition Proposed 
Agreement, June 27, 1994, 12:15 p.m.," 1994).  
These discussions continued during the August recess with Mainstream staff 
meeting with Mitchell’s staff to identify areas of agreement a d disagreement. The 
Mainstream plan would have called for a $250,000 cap on non-economic damages from 
malpractice claims (tort reform), while the Mitchell bill had no such cap. Additionally, 
the Mainstream bill called for increasing deductibility of premiu s, eventually to full 
deductibility, for self-employed and individuals whose employers did not otherwise cover 
them, while the Mitchell bill offered 50 percent deductibility forself-employed and no 
deductibility for employed individuals whose employers did not provide group cverage. 
Finally, the Mitchell bill offered prescription drug coverage under M dicare while the 
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Mainstream Coalition objected to any non-means-tested coverage but proposed making 
commercial prescription plans available to seniors on a voluntary basis (Mainstream 
Coalition Staff, 1994). What is most important about the Mainstream Coalition is that it 
peeled off Democratic votes from direct support of the administration’s Health Security 
Act. 
In early July, the Administration was still concerned about the ord r in which the 
chambers would act. The previously expressed ideal was that the Senate would act first 
which would give the House political cover in the wake of the budget bill. If the Senate 
would move up to a universal coverage bill, the House would have the best possible 
political coverage, according to an analysis by Pat Griffin, Assistant to the President for 
Legislative Affairs (1994a). However, it would be “extremely unlikely to sustain a 
majority in the Senate” (p. 1). The House Democrats were unwilling to go too far out on 
a limb to pass a bill that the Senate would then either weaken greatly or fail to pass 
altogether.9 Griffin was concerned that starting with too strong a package could result in a 
free fall to an unacceptable package since failure of the higher bill would undermine 
Mitchell and his proposal. On the other hand, if the White House tried to broker a deal 
between the administration, Senate, and House leadership, members on both left and right 
would likely perceive it as too much of a compromise which could also lead to failure.  
Majority Leader Mitchell’s bill (S. 2357) was introduced on August 9, 1994. On 
that same day, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) sent Mitchell estimates of the 
effects of the proposed legislation on the budget. The CBO estimated that the Mitchell 
                                                
9 The House had already experienced this particularly painful lesson once. During the budget negotiations, 
the President had forced the BTU tax on energy on his own party claiming he would not sign the budget 
bill without it. The House passed the bill with the unpopular tax in it. However, when it got to the Senate, 
David Boren (D-OK) balked at the tax making its removal from the bill the price of his vote for the budget 
bill. Clinton caved and the BTU tax was dropped, but the House members had already gone on record 
voting for it. They did not want to be caught like this again (H. Johnson & Broder, 1997). 
 170 
bill, with or without mandates, would achieve 95% coverage of the American public by 
1997 with no increase in the federal deficit by the year 2000 (Reischauer, 1994). 
In late August, the President met with a group of CEOs to discuss health care. 
During that meeting, he asked Letitia Chambers, a public policy consulta t attending the 
meeting, for a memo outlining her ideas regarding streamlining health care reform by 
making the employer mandated coverage the actuarial equivalent of the Federal 
Employees Health Benefits Plan (FEHBP; Herman, 1994)10. The problem related to the 
wide variety of plans already in force in the marketplace. The President’s original 
proposal would have called for a federally mandated minimum level of benefits. While 
many companies had plans that went well beyond the value of the minimum level 
proposal, they might not have certain particular benefits and would have to purchase 
these benefits and alter the plans accordingly, which would potentially increase both 
administrative costs and premiums. Business leaders were having difficulty with this 
aspect. Chambers proposed that the language be changed such that any existing employer 
plan for which the actuarial value of the benefit was equal to or greater than that of the 
Blue Cross/Blue Shield version of the FEHBP would be considered a certified plan 
(Chambers, 1994). Clinton apparently liked the approach well enough to pass it along 
with a handwritten note to Harold Ickes and Ira Magaziner (Herman, 1994). Ickes 
received the memo but did not pass it on to Magaziner until September 8, some fifteen 
days after it was received in the White House (Ickes, 1994). 
                                                
10 “Actuarial equivalence” is a method of comparing the value of the benefits provided by two different 
policies. The method incorporates the risk that a given covered expense will be incurred across the 
population. In this case, it was proposed as an alterna ive to a “minimum mandated benefits package.” As 
long as the value of the benefits was actuarially equivalent they would not have to be identical in order to 




Figure 11:     Timeline for January 1, 1994 to November 1, 1994 
. In the end, it was the Senate that would be the initiative’s downfall. Fractured 
multiple proposals from Democrats and the bipartisan Mainstream Coalition group 
insured that a filibuster of the bill would not be broken with a cloture vot  requiring a 
supermajority of 60 senators. Finally, on September 26, 1994, Majority Leader Mitchell 
Jan. 24 – meeting at White House with WJC, HRC, Speaker Foley, S n. 
Majority Leader Mitchell and key White House staff. 
Feb. 3 – meeting with WJC, HRC, Foley, Mitchell, and five 
committee chairmen to discuss legislative process. 
Late Feb. – meeting with WJC, HRC, Vice-President Gore, and 11 
sponsors of McDermott “single-payer alternative” bill. 
June 27 – around-the-clock negotiations with the 
Mainstream Coalition led by liberal Republican Senator 
John Chaffee of Rhode Island. 
August Congressional recess – discussions 
with Mainstream Coalition continue. 
Aug. 9 – Majority Leader Mitchell introduces S. 
2357 – The Health Security Act of 1994. 
Late Aug – WJC asks Letitia Chambers for 
proposal to streamline reform by making mandated 
coverage actuarial equivalent of FEHBP. 
Aug. to Sep. 26 – Fractured multiple Democrat 
proposals and bipartisan Mainstream Coalition 
insure that Mitchell will not get the 60 votes 
needed for cloture. Filibuster continues. 
Sep. 26 – Mitchell ends battle. 
Nov. 1 – Election Day. Republicans take 
control of House and Senate. 
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ended the battle that Clinton had launched just over a year earlier in his address to 
Congress. Mitchell attributed the defeat to a combination of outside forc s (insurance 
industry) and internal forces (majority of Republicans who opposed any sort of health 
care measure). The Health Security Act was dead. Six weeks lat r, with the defeat of the 
Health Security Act providing fodder for Newt Gingrich’s Contract with America’s anti-
welfare and anti-big government crusade, Republicans gained the majority in the House 
of Representatives for the first time in 40 years (H. Johnson & Broder, 1997; Marmor, 
2000; Quadagno, 2005; Skocpol, 1996). A timeline of the major events in 1994 appears 
in Figure 11. 
NATIONAL HEALTH CARE REFORM AND THE PRESS 
As noted in Chapter Five, McCombs’ (2004, 2005) work is instructive in utilizing 
newspapers as markers of media attention during both Administrations. Media 
availability had virtually exploded between the Johnson and Clinton eras. Growth in 
cable market penetration, availability of 24-hour news channels, and the Internet made 
public access to news of the day much more prominent in the 1990s than ithad been in 
the 1960s. However, newspaper coverage has been shown to mirror other media 
attention. 
I initially searched the ProQuest Databases for The New York Times and The Los 
Angeles Times for the search words “Clinton” AND “health care” OR “Health Security 
Act” in the document text field of the records. I further specified a date range of January 
20, 1993 (date of Clinton’s inauguration) to September 26, 1994 (date that Majority 
Leader Mitchell pulled the plug on the Health Security Act). Betwe n the two 
newspapers, a total of 5,853 articles met the search terms with 1,376 of these appearing 
on the front page (ProQuest Historical Newspapers The Los Angeles Times [1986-
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present], 2009; ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times [1851-2005], 
2009). 
The initial New York Times earch yielded a total of 3,276 articles. Front page 
coverage comprised 405 articles over the time frame (ProQuest Historical Newspapers 
The New York Times [1851-2005], 2009). The same initial Los Angeles Times earch 
yielded 2,577 articles; of these, 971 articles appeared on the front page of The Los 
Angeles Times (ProQuest Historical Newspapers The Los Angeles Times [1986-present], 
2009).   
After examining a number of articles, it became apparent that the search was 
including many articles which mentioned health care and the Clintons, but were not 
specifically about the health care reform effort. Subsequently, I reran the search, 
changing the second search term from “health care” to the more restrictive “health care 
reform.” The results of these searches yielded a total of 2,308 articles: 984 from The New 
York Times and 1,324 from The Los Angeles Times. Of these, 646 articles—125 from the 
New York paper and 521 from the Los Angeles paper—appeared on the front page 
(ProQuest Historical Newspapers The Los Angeles Times [1986-present], 2009; 
ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times [1851-2005], 2009). 
In an effort to determine the editorial position of the press during the Clinton era, 
I first refined the search on each of the two newspaper databases to reflect only those 
articles showing either a document type of “editorial” for The New York Times or 
appearing in the “opinion” section of The Los Angeles Times. This yielded a total of 110 
documents for The New York Times (ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York 
Times [1851-2005], 2009) and 51 articles in The Los Angeles Times (ProQuest Historical 
Newspapers The Los Angeles Times [1986-present], 2009). Search parameters for 
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document text and date remained the same as in the second (more restrictiv ) set of 
searches above. 
I examined each of the editorial articles in both newspapers. Reading each 
editorial, I coded it according to whether the writer was endorsing the reform effort 
(positive), opposing it (negative), or included both positive and negative sentiments 
toward it (neutral or balanced). This examination revealed a relatively similar editorial 
position on the part of the two newspapers, with The Los Angeles Times showing a 
slightly more negative editorial slant on the issue. Overall combined results showed 
26.7% (n=43) of editorial articles were positive toward reform, 16.8% (n=27) were 
negative toward reform, and 24.2% (n=39) were neutral or balanced on the issue.  A 
combined 32.9% (n=53) were not directly related to the reform effort pe  se, but 
mentioned it in the context of addressing some other issue. Both papers wer  at least 
marginally more positive than negative about the reform bill. Together,  positive 
editorials outweighed the negative editorials by almost a 2-to-1 ratio (26.7 percent 
positive versus 16.8% negative). To the extent that this reflects the editorial bent of the 
totality of media covering the reform effort, it further illustrates the point that the valence 
of the media is far less important to outcomes than is the attention paid by the media. The 
editorial valence was not radically different between the two eras. If anything, the 
editorial position of The Los Angeles Times was more negative during the 1965 effort 
than during the 1994 effort. What did differ was the amount of attention paid to the issue, 
with far greater numbers of relevant newspaper articles appearing in the Clinton 
administration than the Johnson administration. This analysis will be further explored in 





Table 2:     Editorial Valence of The New York Times and The Los Angeles Times 
 
 The New York Times The Los Angeles Times Combined Results 
 n % n % n % 
Positive 31 28.2% 12 23.5% 43 26.7% 
Negative 17 15.5% 10 19.6% 27 16.8% 
Neutral 24 21.8% 14 27.5% 38 24.2% 
Not Directly Related 38 34.5% 15 29.4% 53 32.9% 
 
NATIONAL HEALTH CARE AND THE GALLUP POLL ’S MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM 
QUESTION 
Polling data regarding health care is much richer during the Clinton 
administration than it was during the Johnson administration; perhaps this i a reflection 
of the attention that the issue received in the press/media and among the public. Before 
looking at some of the other Gallup polling data available during that time frame, 
however, let us look again at the Gallup Organization’s “Most Important Problem” 
question, i.e. “What do you think is the most important problem facing this country 
today?”  
Prior to the general election in November of 1992, health care was relatively low 
on the nation’s radar as a “most important problem.” The poll ending March 29, 1992 
showed that only 10.78 percent of respondents (174 of 1,610) listed health care asthe 
most important problem, while 41.43 percent listed the economy in general as most 
important (The Gallup Organization, 1992a). By May, only 7.42 percent (297 of 4,007) 
listed health care with 28.54 percent listing the economy in general as the most important 
problem (The Gallup Organization, 1992b). By Labor Day, just two months ahead of the 
election, health care was back up slightly to 11.52 percent (400 of 3,473), with the 
economy at 36.9 percent (The Gallup Organization, 1992c). 
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The election occurred on November 3, 1992, and William Jefferson Clinton 
became the 42nd President of the United States on January 20, 1993. Just prior to the 
inauguration, Gallup reported that 18.44 percent of respondents had indicated that health 
care was the most important problem with 35.35 percent listing the economy in general 
(The Gallup Organization, 1993a). By September, just prior to the President’  address to 
the joint session of Congress, health care had jumped slightly ahead of the economy in 
general with 27.9 percent listing health care and 26.22 percent listi g the economy (The 
Gallup Organization, 1993b). Meanwhile, crime and violence had jumped from single 
digits in the earlier mentioned polls to 16.89 percent in the September, 1993 poll (The 
Gallup Organization, 1992a, 1992b, 1992c, 1993a, 1993b). 
The public spotlight on health care continued to grow, peaking around 30.81 
percent on the MIP poll by late January of 1994, a year into the Clinton administrat on. In 
that same poll, only 16.53 percent listed the economy in general as  problem, but 
crime/violence had jumped to 48.67 percent (The Gallup Organization, 1994c). By mid-
summer, the public heat was a bit less intense with only 21.32 percent listing health care 
as the most important problem, 13.42 percent listing the economy in general, and 29.97 
percent listing crime and violence (The Gallup Organization, 1994b). By mid-August, 
just a month later, health care was back up to just shy of 30 percent (29.49 percent), with 
the economy at 17.3 percent and crime/violence up to 52.38 percent. However, when 
asked whether they approved or disapproved of the way Bill Clinton was handling health 
care policy, 56.68 percent disapproved; only 35.26 percent approved (The Gallup 
Organization, 1994a). The health care debate was firmly in the public’s sights. Not only 
were the media focused on the efforts, but the public was paying ttention as well, 
ranking the problem high in importance. Unfortunately for the President, the spotlight 
was working against him rather than for him. 
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Congress was faring no better than the President. In the 1994 Labor Day 
Benchmark poll, Gallup found that 52.02 percent of respondents thought Congress had 
moved in the wrong direction on health care reform. This same poll, however, showed 
that a full 65.89 percent would support a health care reform package th t guarantees 
every American private health insurance that can never be taken away (The Gallup 
Organization, 1994d). Clearly, the operative word was “private.” By this time, the HIAA 
had aired the “Harry and Louise” commercials raising the specter of government-
controlled health care limiting the choices of ordinary Americans. Finally, in the same 
Labor Day 1994 poll, 42.63 percent favored Congress passing minor health care reforms 
and continuing to work on major reforms in the next session, with only 19.76 percent 
favoring passage of a major comprehensive health care reform bill in the current session 
(The Gallup Organization, 1994d). 
SUMMARY  
Bill Clinton ran his campaign on fixing the economy. Five days after his 
inauguration in 1993, he put national health care reform on the front burner by naming 
his wife, First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton, co-chair (with long-time friend from 
Oxford days Ira Magaziner) of the President’s Task Force on National Health Reform. 
Though the Task Force was given 100 days to report back with legislation for the 
President to submit to Congress, it was not until nearly the end of 1993 that the 
Administration’s bill was ready for delivery. This might easily be attributed to the fact 
that the Task Force grew from an initial projection of just under 100 persons to more than 
600 people by the end of the hundred-day process, making the process extremely 
unwieldy. 
Despite literally hundreds of meetings between the Task Force co-chairs and 
members of both houses of Congress, many of them with the First Lady present, 
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Congressional support was difficult to muster. Among Democrats, competing proposals 
combined with a skittish House of Representatives due to the handling of the budget bill 
made legislative strategy difficult. The House was still smarting over having the BTU 
(British Thermal Unit) energy tax rammed down their political throats by the 
administration only to have the President bail on the tax when Senator Boren demanded 
its removal from the budget bill as the price for his vote on the budget bill (H. Johnson & 
Broder, 1997). The Clintons had initially hoped to roll their health care reform package 
into the budget reconciliation bill, but Senator Robert Byrd refused to waive the “Byrd 
rule,” which held that only budget items could be included in reconciliation bills (which 
were subject to automatic limits on debate rather than filibuster). In spite of that ruling, 
the Administration went ahead with its proposal, working closely with Majority Leader 
Mitchell.  
Because the reform package was so broad, it touched, in major ways, on the 
authorities of at least five separate Senate and House committees, with at least minor 
interest from an additional nine committees. Attempts were considered to appoint an ad 
hoc committee to move the legislation to the floor more quickly, but both Senate and 
House leadership, including Speaker Foley, House Majority Leader Gephardt, and Senate 
Majority Leader Mitchell rejected these attempts (Quadagno, 2005; Skocpol, 1996).
The media spotlight was focused intently on the attempts to reform health care in 
the early 1990s, as evidenced by the extraordinary number of articles appearing in the 
press. Additionally, opinion polls indicate that the public was focused on the issu  as 
well, likely a result of both news media attention and the public relations campaigns 
conservatives and their policy allies (e.g., health insurance industry) waged against the 
Clinton plan. In the end, the Senate was unable to invoke cloture and bring the bill to the 
floor. The public wanted reform—as late as August, 1994, 61.76 percent thought 
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Congress should pass a bill to reform the health care system—but the same poll showed 
that 47.79 percent opposed the plans proposed by Democratic Congressional party 
leaders, with only 38.7 percent favoring those plans (The Gallup Organization, 1994a). 
To what extent would path-dependence theory have predicted the Clinton 
outcome? Again, we turn to Arthur’s (1994) four principles: unpredictability, 
inflexibility, nonergodicity, and potential path inefficiency. The same early decisions 
about federal health policy that had set the path for Medicare wer  still in play in 1993. 
Since the passage and implementation of Medicare, a heightened emphasis on managed 
care had entered the path, as evidenced and reinforced by the Health Maintenance 
Organization Act of 1973 (P.L. 93-222) passed under President Nixon. Evidence that this 
turn had affected the path Clinton inherited can be found in the “managed competition” 
structure of the eventual legislation that Clinton and the Task Force proposed in late 
1993.  
Nearly 28 years had passed between the passage of Medicare and Clinton’s first 
inauguration. This would mean that the path would be even more ingrained and 
inflexible. Americans had come to expect at least an illusion of patient choice, the loss of 
which was a fear on which the anti-reform parties capitalized in the national media and in 
paid advertising. The path also exhibited nonergodicity in that events that might normally 
be considered relatively “minor” or not having a direct impact on he outcomes did not 
cancel each other out. A good example of this is that the Clinton administration found 
itself saddled with a transparency requirement that was not present during the Johnson 
administration. The call for transparency was (and still is) ingrained in American public 
discourse, and it was codified in the Freedom of Information Act (P.L. 89-554). 
Ironically, it was President Johnson who signed that Act into law in 1966. Clinton’s effort 
was directly impacted by the act as it formed at least a partial legal basis for the lawsuit 
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against the President’s Task Force by the Association of American Physicians and 
Surgeons. This lawsuit forced the files of the Task Force to be opened to the public and 
ended First Lady Hillary Clinton’s attendance at the Task Force me tings (H. R. Clinton, 
2003; H. Johnson & Broder, 1997; Winfield, 1997). 
As for potential path inefficiency, one could make the argument that no serious 
reform effort has emerged in the 14 years since the Clinton effort failed, attributable in 
part to a lack of Republican will to provide health insurance to most of the millions of 
uninsured, although the State Children’s Health Insurance Plan (SCHIP) and Medicare 
Part D prescription drug coverage for Medicare beneficiaries have emerged. During the 
2008 presidential campaign, a number of proposals for national health care were put 
forth. President Obama has requested $634 billion over the next 10 years to support such 
a program, though the specifics of his proposal are not yet clear. The Clinton failure can 
provide important lessons for Obama and his administration. Since it failed to 
materialize, its influence on the path was less direct. Expansion of the State Child Health 
Insurance Program (SCHIP) under President Clinton and the enactment of Medicare Part 
D prescription drug coverage under President George W. Bush have been relatively large 
incremental steps that are more likely than the Clinton plan to influence the path 
President Obama has inherited. 
In spite of general public sentiment favoring reform, Republicans and outside 
opponents managed to stop it in its tracks. Along the way, they handed Bill Clinton and 
the Democratic Party a major defeat, and managed to deflect any bl me for the failure 
onto the proponents themselves, resulting, at least in part, in the Republican takeover of 
both houses of Congress in the 1994 elections. I turn now to a comparison of the J hnson 
and Clinton attempts and the lessons to be drawn from them. 
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 Chapter 8: 
 Lessons Learned 
 Having discussed the politics and history of federal health care policy, it is time to 
examine comparatively the paths, processes, and factors by which poly development 
and its ultimate success or failure materialized during the Johnson and Clinton 
administrations. My analysis focuses on the four orienting questions, previously outlined 
in Chapter One, and the three domains of path-dependence: historical, institutional, and 
political, discussed in Chapter Three. Many of the historical factors leading up to the 
Johnson effort as well as the factors occurring between the two administrations have been 
documented here and elsewhere. However, a comparison of the two presidents’ efforts 
has been missing. A brief recap of the emerging themes regardin  the differences 
between the Johnson and Clinton administrations sets the stage for a discussion of the 
lessons learned. I have taken the liberty of adding my understanding of the situation in 
the current, though very early, Obama administration: 
 President Johnson assumed office in the wake of an immediate crisis and the face 
of ongoing domestic and geopolitical crises. President Clinton assumed office in a 
time of general peace. Crises are often the paths to policy change. President 
Obama has inherited a recession which is likely the worst since the Great 
Depression and he has said that the state of the economy rests largely on 
healthcare reform. Whether the current economic crisis will lead to major policy 
change in the healthcare arena remains to be seen; 
 Johnson was elected in 1964 by a landslide majority. His electoral attails were 
long, resulting in overwhelming majorities for the Democratic Party in both the 
House and the Senate. Clinton was elected with only a 43% plurality of the vote. 
While Democrats also controlled both houses of Congress, the margins were 
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considerably slimmer than under Johnson. Obama won with 53 percent of the 
vote, far less than Johnson, but a full 10 percent greater than Clinton. Democrats 
also increased their margins of majority in both houses of Congress. With the 
defection of former Republican Senator Arlen Specter to the Democratic Party, 
and should Al Franken be declared the winner of the contested Senate s at from 
Minnesota, Democrats will hold a 60-vote supermajority in the Senate 
(Lexington, 2009). The time may again be right, as it was when Johnson was 
president, for Democrats to see that health care reform is achieved;  
 Johnson placed control of the administration’s legislative agenda, especially 
regarding health care for the aged, in the hands of a small, select group of 
seasoned political operatives and career policymaking professionals. He then 
managed the process with close attention to detail. Clinton’s Presidential Task 
Force on National Health care Reform, by contrast, had over 600 members before 
disbanding. There is no evidence in the archival documents to suggest that Bill 
Clinton paid anything like the same level of attention to the political process 
surrounding health care that Lyndon Baines Johnson paid. At just over 100 days 
into the new Obama administration, it is too early to tell how the new President 
will choose to run legislative operations out of the White House, but he might 
benefit from taking a lesson from the Johnson administration; 
 Johnson maintained a high legislative tempo, flooding Congress with multiple, 
important legislative initiatives, preventing sustained focus on any one proposal 
over long periods of time. Clinton appears to have favored tackling one strat gic 
goal at a time. So far, Obama has been very aggressive in getting Congress to pass 
multiple initiatives of a large nature, including his $787 billion stimulus package, 
an additional $350 billion in funds to rescue the financial sector of the economy 
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and a $3.4 trillion budget that includes $630 billion to help overhaul the nation’s 
health care system, among others (Seib, 2009); 
 Johnson put a relatively modest proposal (as compared to the final outcome) on 
the table and enabled key figures in Congress to take credit for beefing up the 
final legislation. He moved swiftly after the election to put the legislative wheels 
in motion. Clinton moved swiftly to announce his task force and to name First 
Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton and Ira Magaziner as co-chairs of it. However, the 
complex plan the task force delivered in its 1,000 plus page document was not 
sent to Congress until just before the end of the first session, a full 10 months 
after Clinton took office. It is too early to tell how President Obama will proceed. 
He has put forth a funding request, and Congress has agreed to it in princ ple, but 
he has yet to give any particulars of his anticipated process;  
 The Vietnam War and the civil rights actions in the United States consumed most 
of the media attention during the Johnson administration. As a result, the public’s 
attention, as evidenced by its responses to the Gallup Poll’s Most Important 
Problem question, focused on these priorities rather than health care for the aged. 
This lack of a spotlight on Medicare relative to other issues facilitated the passage 
of the Medicare bill. Clinton’s media world was considerably more cmplex than 
Johnson’s with the advent of 24-hour cable news outlets and the Internet. As 
measured by newspaper coverage, the spotlight on health care reform was uch 
more intense (than that on Medicare) and led to increased public attention on the 
matter and likely contributed to the failure of the initiative. It may well be 
impossible for Obama to avoid the spotlight on any health care initiative as health 
care has grown to be an even larger segment of the Gross Domestic Product. 
However, as business struggles to survive in the current economic cris s, 
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opportunities for the government to relieve business of the burdens of certain 
benefit plans, i.e., health insurance, in return for a fixed increase in payroll tax 
may become more attractive; and 
 All members of President Johnson’s healthcare administration team were men. 
First Lady Lady Bird Johnson played no public role in the passage of Medicare. 
Clinton named his wife to co-chair his task force. Hillary Rodham Clinton, a 
successful lawyer and public policy advocate prior to Bill’s election to the 
presidency, became the public face of the Clinton health care initiative—a  target 
for Republicans and their allies in opposing, and ultimately defeating, the Clinton 
plan. First Lady Michelle Obama has not been tapped for any major policy 
position in the Obama administration, at least during the first 100 days. Obama’s 
team, however, does include some influential women. In the case of health care, it 
may be that the new Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), former 
Kansas governor Kathleen Sebelius, will play a prominent role. At this time, the 
Secretary has not yet named a permanent Administrator of the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). In any event, President Obama might be 
well served to consider fielding a small, select team that includes a career policy 
professional from CMS or HHS to work with Congress on his health care
legislation. 
HISTORICAL FACTORS – ORIENTING QUESTION NUMBER ONE 
The first orienting questions asks: a) what historical factors, including political, 
economic, and direct health policy components, set the stage for the resp ctive success 
and failure of the Johnson and Clinton health care policy initiatives; b) were those factors 
natural, accidental, or planned; and c) in what sequence did they occur t  facilitate the 
respective outcomes?  
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President Johnson took office as a result of the assassination of Jhn F. Kennedy. 
Johnson had served in Congress from 1936 until he was elected to the Vice-Presidency in 
1960. He had risen to power in the legislative branch, eventually serving as Majority 
Leader of the Senate. The historical evidence points to his effectiveness as Majority 
Leader, though his tactics to achieve success have received mixed revi ws (Caro, 2002; 
Goodwin, 1991). Often portrayed as crude and boorish, employing high-pressure tactics 
to wrest support from reluctant congressmen and senators, his astute political mind and 
intense efforts to build consensus in much more refined ways has often been discounted. 
His knowledge of and relationships with the major legislative leaders of his day was 
critical to his extraordinary legislative success, not only with Medicare and Medicaid, but 
in the arenas of civil rights, voting rights, poverty policy, education, improved 
government, and job creation, to name but a few of his successful legislative initiatives. 
When Johnson was elected President in his own right in 1964, he secured a 
landslide victory not only for himself, but for the Democratic Party in the Congress. With 
a filibuster-proof majority in the Senate and an overwhelming majority in the House of 
Representatives, he was poised to make legislative history as President. This began with 
his restructuring, with the cooperation of Senate and Congressional leadership, of the 
legislative committee system. This restructuring enabled Democrats to essentially 
overwhelm Republican opposition to the President’s programs. 
Furthermore, Medicare was hardly a new idea in 1964 and 1965. National health
insurance proposals had been floated as early as 1908. President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
had initially intended to include it in the Social Security Act of 1935, but his advisors—
among them social worker and Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins—dis uaded him from 
doing so because they feared losing the entire bill if the President overreached for 
medical care as well. President Truman had pushed, particularly after his election in 
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1948, for national health care. From 1948 until Johnson became President, every 
Congress saw some form of medical care for the elderly and indigent introduced, many of 
these by the Murray-Dingell-Wagner trio followed by the Forand legislation in 1958. In 
1960, the Kerr-Mills Act was passed; it became the forerunner of the eventual Medicaid 
program—a means-tested, state-controlled, and partially federally funded medical 
assistance program for those living in poverty. 
By the time Johnson took the Oval Office, most Americans who had helth 
insurance coverage at all were covered by employer-provided commercial plans. This 
was an almost accidental outgrowth of wage and price controls during World War II. 
Since employers could not increase wages, the unions pressed for and employers agreed 
to provide fringe benefits, much of this in the form of medical insurance (S ofea, 1994a). 
A second reinforcing early decision in this vein occurred when the Treasury Department 
issued a ruling that such benefits, while deductible to the employer, were not wages and 
were therefore not reportable as taxable income to the employee. This practice, still 
enjoyed to the present day, resulted in a massive tax subsidy for employer-provided 
plans, lowering the cost of coverage provided in that system, increasing the attractiveness 
of the system to employers and employees alike, and, thereby, creating an increasing 
return to reinforce the growth of that system as the provider of ch ice for health 
insurance (Scofea, 1994a; Weathers, 2004). 
A naturally occurring factor that facilitated the eventual successful passage of 
Medicare was that retirees were no longer contributing to the productivity of their pre-
retirement employers, and were thus either cut from the rolls of the insured or were 
permitted to retain their employment-based coverage at a cost that soon began to 
overwhelm employers. As the population aged, this change in employer cost-benefit for 
retiree coverage became an increasing problem (Marmor, 2000; Oberlander, 1995). 
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Added to this were advances in modern medicine, many of which had come as a result of 
taxpayer supported research. These advances meant that seniors were living longer at a 
time when they had decreasing access to medical/hospital insurance coverage. These 
factors could hardly be called “planned,” but they were far from “accidental” as well. 
Their convergence, however, was inevitable in the natural order of things, and this 
convergence resulted in increasing health care costs for employers, government, and 
individual Americans. 
By 1965, the idea of a social insurance system was well-established n American 
culture. In fact, the Social Security system was 30 years old by that time.  As a 
consequence, it was not an entirely new concept that people would pay into a system to 
insure themselves against the vicissitudes of medical necessity any more than it would 
seem strange that they would insure themselves against the ravages of old age or 
disability. Much of the infrastructure—through the Social Security Administration—was 
already in place for handling such an expansion. In this respect, M dicare and Medicaid 
might well be characterized as incremental policy changes, though the increment was 
certainly substantial. Still, Medicare’s passage did not set aside the culture of employer-
based coverage provided by multiple profit-seeking corporations and in a variety of 
available plans. The government was to be the insurer for older Am icans and the poor, 
but these were people who: a) would not have had affordable access to commercially 
available insurance; b) in the case of retirees, included many who were either not covered 
or becoming a burden on the employer systems of care; and, c) as a result were not a 
desirable part of the commercial market. Government intervention was therefore not a 
major threat to the insurance industry. 
By comparison, not only was Bill Clinton’s election to the Presidency ot a 
landslide; he did not even receive a majority of the popular vote, being elected instead by 
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a plurality of the vote. He had no “mandate” from the electorate and therefore had 
considerably less political capital than Johnson. Additionally, Clinton had never served in 
the Congress and therefore did not have the nearly thirty-year advantge of both 
knowledge of and relationships with the legislative players that Johnson enjoyed. 
All of the historical factors surrounding employer-based systems of care and 
commercial for-profit insurers (e.g., tax-advantages for employer-provided benefits, 
negotiated contracts between insurers and providers, increased cost-shifting from 
employer to employee, treatment models instead of prevention models)  continued, and in 
fact had become deeply entrenched in the culture of health care in the United States, post-
Johnson. The intervening years had seen a rise in managed care operations, a path-
dependent choice largely reinforced by President Nixon with the Health Maintenance 
Organizations Act of 1973. The idea behind managed care, of course, was to reduce the 
total costs for medical care through negotiations between insurers and providers as well 
as a system of utilization review designed to prevent overuse of unnecessary tests or 
procedures. It could be easily argued that managed care had failed to control the rising 
costs of medicine given that medical inflation during the period outpaced general 
inflation by a factor of three to one. 
Bill Clinton had another major factor to deal with that Johnson did not have: 
Medicare itself. The introduction of government dollars into the medical system through 
Medicare, and to a lesser extent Medicaid, was a major factor in he rising medical care 
costs (Oberlander, 1995; Starr, 1995). Even the simplest economic model would predict
that a growth rate in spending that exceeded the growth rate in services would result in 
increased prices. Add to this the oft-forgotten fact that it waseleven months from the 
signing of the Social Security Amendments of 1965 (which brought us Medicar  and 
Medicaid) until Medicare was implemented. During that time, doctors and hospitals 
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scrambled to increase charges for services, since the bill imp emented a system of 
payments based on the “usual, customary, and reasonable” charges for the specialty, 
procedure, and locale of services. This meant a decline in the amount of charity care 
being provided as such pro bono care would reduce average charges and therefore the 
amount that would be covered under the Medicare system. This factor alone accounted 
for an increase in medical inflation in the middle 1960s, an unintended consequence of 
the new programs. 
In 1964, medical assistance for the aged was hardly a new idea. As previously 
stated, bills to offer such coverage in one form or another had been around since 1948. 
With the exception of the limited funds made available under Kerr-Mills, there had been 
no serious federal intervention in health/medical markets. The Kerr-Mills funds, 
furthermore, required matching funds from the states (which meant that poorer states 
were unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the Kerr-Mills funding), and participation 
required a state-administered means test, i.e., people had to prove they were too poor to 
afford care by any other means. This served to keep costs down. The Social Security 
Amendments of 1965 transformed Kerr-Mills into the current day Medicaid program, 
while Medicare expanded coverage to include virtually all persons over age 65 regardless 
of their means. As the population aged in the wake of decline in post-baby boom birth 
rates, more people became Medicare-eligible while the tax base to upport the system 
faced serious decline with fewer younger workers to support Medicar through payroll 
taxes.  
It could be argued that the government did not really understand how big 
Medicare would become. This argument would be strengthened by the fac  that the major 
government economists were expressing concern only about the fiscal drag on the 
economy in 1966 and not beyond that point in time (Cohen, 1965j; O'Brien, 1965d; 
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Valenti, 1965a). Though the Johnson files contain multi-year projections, I found no 
evidence of any serious alarm being raised beyond the effects on the economy in fiscal 
year 1966.  
Though there had been small incremental changes to the system between Johnson 
and Clinton, no attempt at a federal system of health insurance had gotten as far or 
garnered as much attention as Clinton’s 1993 attempt. America’s cultural heritage gave 
no indication that such a system would either be workable, or most importantly, 
desirable. The Cold War was not so far behind us that the idea of “socialism” was not still
a very powerful archetype used to frame the argument against national health care. 
“Socialized medicine,” which had also been used as a rallying cry against Medicare, 
reared its head again, this time pushing the idea that the government would decide what 
kind and amount of care individuals would receive and from whom and in what facilities 
they would receive that care (H. Johnson & Broder, 1997). 
The irony is that the Clinton plan was far from socialized medicine. In fact, it 
might have had a better chance of success had the President and the First Lady embraced 
a true paradigmatic shift. Instead, the eventual plan was overly complicated, largely as a 
result of trying to maintain the culturally-ingrained concepts of employer-provided 
insurance and managed care/managed competition all within the private sector. Also 
thrown into the mix was the federalist idea of state-level control. This infused the process 
with myriad problems, not the least of which were rules under the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (ERISA; P.L. 93-406) that denied states th  right to regulate fringe 
benefits and the problems that would arise when multi-state employers had to purchase 
coverage from different purchasing alliances in each state in which they had employees. 
Such an arrangement would mean that employees of multi-state employ rs might well 
end up with different benefits depending on the state in which they lived. One can only 
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imagine the havoc this would have wreaked with collective bargaining agreements 
between organized labor and these large corporations. A single-payer approach would 
have at least eliminated these obstacles. 
PLANNING AND REACTING – ORIENTING QUESTION NUMBER TWO 
The second orienting question asks: To what extent did the two presidents, their 
staffs, and legislators of the two time periods act to foment or facilitate these (historical) 
factors, and if not planned, in what ways did they react to or utilize these factors in 
pushing for passage of the respective presidential health care policy initiatives. 
As previously discussed, Lyndon Johnson had been a Washington insider since 
1936, intimately acquainted with the rules, the procedures, and the players in both House 
and Senate. It would be difficult, however, to say that he “planned” any of the historical 
factors leading up to passage of Medicare at least prior to 1964; to my knowledge, no one 
has suggested that he did. One could say that he actively worked to se that there was a 
liberal landslide, at least insofar as his own 1964 campaign had long coattails that helped 
Democrats expand their majorities in the Congress. Furthermore, it is well-documented 
that he planned the restructuring of the Ways and Means Committee in 1965 (Cohen & 
McComb, 1968; L. B. Johnson, 1971; Kearns, 1976; Mills, 1971). Traditionally, the 
Ways and Means Committee had a 2-to-1 ratio of majority party members to minority 
members. This would have resulted in 15 Democrats and 10 Republicans in the wake of 
the 1964 elections. Working closely with the President, Speaker McCormack restructured 
the committee to more accurately reflect the actual balance of s ats in the House as a 
whole. This resulted in a 17-to-8 majority on the committee for the Democrats. More 
importantly, the new members were hand-selected to be supporters of the Medicare 
concept (Cohen & McComb, 1968; Marmor, 2000). Historically, Chairman Mills had 
been reluctant to bring any bill on any topic up for discussion or a vote if he did not feel it 
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had enough support to pass the Committee or, having passed the Committee, to pass the 
House. Johnson and McCormack solved that problem for the Chairman. 
Johnson kept a good many of Kennedy’s staff even after the 1964 elections. One 
key staffer that fit that bill was Larry O’Brien who managed legislative affairs for both 
presidents. Additionally, Johnson took the approach of surrounding himself with a small 
group of experts, empowering them to carry out his initiatives, and closely following up 
on his expectations of them. When one examines the White House Central Files related to 
Medicare and Medicaid, one does not see hundreds of people involved in the process. 
Only a limited number of people dealt with this issue in any depth on behalf of the 
administration. This core group included Wilbur Cohen, Larry O’Brien, Mike Manatos, 
Bill Moyers, and, to a lesser extent, Jack Valenti and Walter Jenkins. Even HEW 
Secretary Anthony Celebrezze, though copied on all of Wilbur Cohen’s memoranda to 
the President or O’Brien, was not a major player in the negotiations. Johnson utilized a 
small group, and he kept each member within calling distance at all times. This is 
evidenced by notes written in the President’s own hand on many of the memos and at 
least an initial “L” on many others indicating he had read them. This certainly speaks to 
the importance the President placed on the issue. 
Though Johnson has often been accused of micromanaging his staff and bullying 
legislators—accusations that would certainly not be unfounded—it is interesting to see 
the subtle ways in which he also applied influence and power. Overall, he laid out the 
general scope for what he wanted accomplished and then tended to stp back from the 
minutiae of the process until he was needed. This is not to say that he did not stay 
informed or involved. The prime example of this is in the final form that the Medicare 
bill took. The President’s initial proposal was to cover hospital charges only. Republicans 
and the AMA actually put forth more comprehensive plans, but loaded them with 
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provisions that they felt would ensure the ultimate failure of their own proposals. When 
Chairman Mills realized that passage of the President’s hospital-only coverage would 
disillusion seniors who thought the bill would cover their total medical expenses, only to 
find out it would cover on average perhaps 20 or 25 percent of those expenss, he 
approached the President about making the bill more comprehensive. Mills (1971, 1987a, 
1987b) reported that the President essentially told him to do whatever h  thought was 
best as long as he could get it passed.  
As for how legislators may have planned or reacted to the factors, Mill  himself 
orchestrated both the demise of the 1964 attempt and the eventual 1965 passage of 
Medicare. In the 1964 case, this largely came down to Mills honoring the request of 
fellow Democrats not to force them to vote on a bill that would be unpopular with many 
of their constituents while very popular with their elderly constituents. Had he forced a 
vote on the bill in 1964, the bill likely would not have passed, and the damage, especially 
to Democrats from southern states, might have meant a significant reduction in the s ze of 
the 1964 liberal landslide. With the President’s long coattails in that election, Mills was 
ready to do business and promised to introduce Medicare if the President so desired. The 
word came back that this was precisely what the President desired. 
In comparing the two Presidents, it is useful to look at the institutional domain, as 
outlined in Chapter Three. First, with respect to legislative tempo, it is well-known that 
LBJ was the most legislatively productive President in history  date. In addition to 
virtually flooding Congress with legislation, which meant that opponents had to fight on 
many fronts at one time, the President understood the value of moving swiftly once 
decisions were made – hence the phone call where he told Mills, Speaker McCormack, 
Majority Leader Albert, and others not to “let dead cats stand around on [their] porch” 
("Recording of Telephone Conversation between Lyndon B. Johnson, John McCormack, 
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Wilbur Mills, Wilbur Cohen, and Carl Albert, March 23, 1965, 4:54 PM, Citation 
#7141," 1965). Johnson fully understood that delay gave the opposition time to marshal 
their forces. 
Clinton, by comparison, seemed to prefer to tackle one thing at a time. Since the 
economy was a major concern of the public and had been the centerpiece of his 
campaign, he focused early efforts on the budget bill. Since Robert Byrd blocked him 
from rolling health care reform into the reconciliation bill, Clinton decided to put the 
health care bill on hold until the budget bill could be passed.  
Where Johnson had had a handful of key advisors working on Medicare, the 
Clinton Task Force grew to more than 600 people representing Congressional committee 
staff, cabinet departments, White House staff, and industry representatives from the 
medical and insurance industries in particular as well as general business representatives. 
This effort to include everyone with an interest (and to attempt to incorporate all those 
interests into the final legislative proposal) sounds good on the surface. However, this 
massive cast of players resulted in a bill so complex as to be completely opaque to 
understanding by all but the most educated experts. In attempting to please all, the 
Clintons ended up pleasing none. This also meant long delays in getting the bill prepared 
for Congress. Indeed, when the President addressed Congress in late September of 1993, 
the bill was still not ready. A month later he and the First Lady attended a formal 
ceremony to deliver the bill to Congress, but it was another month still before the actual 
legislation was ready to be introduced. This meant that the bill wou d not be taken up 
until early 1994; and, 1994 was an election year. This played into the hands of Newt 
Gingrich and the Republicans who were looking to deliver a massive legislative defeat to 
the administration in order to facilitate a massive electoral defeat that fall. In this, they 
succeeded. 
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This aspect of the Clinton failure might provide an interesting future route for 
research utilizing the advocacy coalition framework. This framework h lds the policy 
decision itself as the dependent variable while public positions of policy actors, types of 
actors, and policy venues are among the independent variables that are used to explain 
policy outcomes. The rise of these alternative policy subsystems or coalitions acting 
antagonistically shapes the ultimate decision (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999; Schlager, 
1999). In this case, the Task Force might be looked at as comprising a rather large set of 
subsystems itself. These actors then gave rise to a larger subsystem, the faces of which 
were the First Lady and ultimately the President. An antagonistic poliy subsystem, in the 
form of Republicans and their conservative allies, then acted to res rict the success of the 
President’s initiative. The advocacy coalition framework holds that i  t kes a decade or 
longer to produce significant change. An examination under this model, while beyond the 
scope of the original proposal, would certainly provide an alternative to exploring the 
Clinton failure. 
Johnson was a master of positioning strategies. He knew well when to speak up 
and when to stay quiet. He understood the power of the bully pulpit that he had as 
President. He also was quick to share credit with as many as possible for victories, 
knowing that the public would credit him with them eventually. He also knew the power 
he had to reward legislators ranging from favors for their district  (such as decisions 
about military base closings) all the way down to photo opportunities with the popular 
President (Goodwin, 1991). Johnson also knew how to use the press to his advantage, 
even going so far as to put Harry Byrd on the spot in front of the press regarding raising 
Medicare in the Senate Finance Committee. (In doing so, he put Byrd in the unenviable 
position of having to either go along with the President or make a case in front of the 
press as to why he would not. He chose to go along with Johnson.)  He also kept the press 
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guessing and was even known to change travel plans if they leaked out arly to the press 
(Kearns, 1976). 
Bill and Hillary Clinton, by comparison, did not have the personal knowledge and 
relationships that enabled Johnson to exercise his power and influence through the 
“Johnson treatment.” Additionally, Clinton enjoyed being out front. For example, in late 
August of 1994, while the Mainstream Coalition was negotiating with Majority Leader 
Mitchell—negotiations being both encouraged and facilitated by White House staff—
Clinton was making public statements criticizing the Mainstream plan for its lack of an 
employer mandate (Clymer, 1994). It is difficult to imagine Johnson doig such a thing. 
His style is evidenced by his handling of economists who expressed public concern about 
the fiscal drag of Medicare on the economy. He sent a handwritten not to Jack Valenti to 
“ask Ackley and Fowler to ask their friends to pipe down” (Valenti, 1965a). Johnson 
could have made a public criticism, but he undoubtedly knew that to do so would be to 
raise the stakes and give more exposure to the economists’ concerns. Clinton apparently 
did not understand this concept, as evidenced by his public criticism of the Mainstream 
plan. 
The two presidents’ perceived level of engagement in their respective health care 
initiatives is less clear from the examination of the files. It is abundantly clear that 
Johnson was well-informed of what was going on legislatively with Medicare. Cohen’s 
memoranda alone would support such a conclusion. To be fair to Clinton, the Johnson 
files are almost entirely open, it having been forty years since Johnson left office. 
Clinton’s files are considerably less available. This limited my ability to reconstruct as 
complete a presidential record for Clinton in my analysis. This restricted availability 
largely arises out of two factors: passage of time and staff av ilability. The Presidential 
Records Act of 1978 (44 U.S.C. ¶ 2201-2207) requires that files be opened after twelve 
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years with certain exemptions. It has not yet been twelve years since Clinton left office. 
Additionally, the staff available to process the Clinton files are limited in number; 
therefore, fewer files have been processed in the eight years since Clinton left office. 
However, as Chris Jennings was the President’s domestic policy adviser for health care, 
one could reasonably assume that most of the correspondence between, for xample, the 
legislative staffs and the President would have passed through his hand . Only a handful 
of memoranda to or from the President appear in the Health Security Act (HSA) series of 
Jennings’ files. 
One exception to the disclosure rules covers confidential memoranda between the 
President and his advisors. Such correspondence is protected to encourage frankn ss in 
the advice given to a president. When a document is not released, a redaction record is 
placed in the file to show that the document has been redacted from the record available 
to the public. In the Jennings HSA series through September, 1994 (when Mitchell pulled 
the bill), only four memoranda to the President (listed as “POTUS” in the redaction 
records) have been redacted.  
While it would be unfair to say that the written evidence shows that President 
Clinton was not as engaged as President Johnson, it is entirely fa to s y that at least the 
Chris Jennings files do not support the engagement by President Clinton. Rather, it would 
tend to support the idea that the President delegated the responsibility to Mrs. Clinton 
and, for reasons that readers can conjecture for themselves, backed off from 
micromanaging the process. 
Legislative priority is another dimension of the institutional domain. In the cas of 
Medicare, Senator Anderson (D-AZ) and Congressman King (D-CA) both requested that 
their respective bills be given number one designations (S. 1 and H.R. 1 respectively) to 
denote the administration’s priority with respect to the bills. It might be a stretch to say 
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that Medicare was President Johnson’s top priority, but it would not be a stretch to say 
that it was a major priority. Johnson meant to see Congress pas all of his legislative 
agenda, and he was very successful in that respect. Medicare and Medicaid were certainly 
no exception. Indeed, the eventual bill, thanks to Wilbur Mills’ “three-layer cake,” 
encompassed far more than the President initially proposed. And, when Mills,
McCormack, Albert, and Cohen called the President to tell him that the bill was to be 
reported out of the Committee on Ways and Means, there was a concomitant discussion 
about the start-up costs to general revenues to cover seniors who had never paid into the 
Medicare trust fund. These costs, which were substantial at the time, were estimated to be 
about $600 million. Johnson revealed to the callers that “by absolutely sitting on the 
Cabinet” he had managed to save close to a billion dollars below what he had gotten 
appropriated from the Congress. Therefore, the $600 million expense to general r v nue 
was already covered by the President’s own management efforts, evidence of Johnson’s 
ability to plan for all contingencies ("Recording of Telephone Conversation between 
Lyndon B. Johnson, John McCormack, Wilbur Mills, Wilbur Cohen, and Carl Albert, 
March 23, 1965, 4:54 PM, Citation #7141," 1965). Johnson had pushed cabinet 
secretaries to control spending in their respective departments. In so doing, he had 
planned for the eventual startup expenses for Medicare, removing what would otherwise 
have been a potential stumbling block to passage. For comparison of the priority Clinton 
placed on his national health care reform effort, one need only look at the extended 
period of time it took to even deliver the bill to Capitol Hill. 
Finally, outside factors and forces certainly influenced the outcomes of the two 
initiatives. In the Johnson case, it could be argued that the escalation of conflict in 
Vietnam was a critical, if indirect, factor in his success, for at least two reasons. First, 
Goldwater handed Johnson voters in the political center by going too far t  the right on 
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the scare of communism. Johnson used Vietnam to show that he was not soft n the 
communists, having recognized that Goldwater was indeed handing him the political  
center (L. B. Johnson, 1971). Grubin (1991) suggests that Johnson orchestrated the Gulf
of Tonkin incident in order to permit escalation of U.S. military activities. Whether that is 
true or not, Johnson certainly did use it to his advantage in the 1964 election. Perhaps 
even more directly, Vietnam consumed both the media and the public’s attention during 
this period. Gallup polls in early 1965 showed that from 22 to 28 percent of the public 
saw Vietnam as the most important problem facing the country, while health care never 
rose above 1.26 percent in the same polls (The Gallup Organization, 1965a, 1965b, 
1965c). 
A second outside influence that indirectly kept the focus off of Medicare was the 
growing issue of race relations. In August of 1963, just over three months before 
Kennedy was assassinated, Martin Luther King, Jr. gave his famous “I Have a Dream” 
speech on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial as the culmination of the March on 
Washington for Jobs and Freedom. Racial tensions, particularly in the South, surrounding 
civil rights marches, Jim Crow laws, voting rights, and access to higher education were 
brewing. On the same Gallup polls referenced above, in which Medicar  got less than 2 
percent of responses to the “most important problem question,” race rel tions garnered 
between 22 and 52 percent of the responses (The Gallup Organization, 1965a, 1965b, 
1965c). The stakes to defeat Medicare were high for doctors (as represented by the 
AMA) and for Republicans standing for doctors and the insurance industry, but the public 
was not paying attention. 
By comparison, the public paid extraordinary attention to Hillary Clinton and the 
Clinton Task Force and subsequent legislation. Bill Clinton had virtually assured that 
when he named his wife as co-chair of the Task Force. This is not to say that she was not 
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qualified. It is to say that he effectively painted a target on the back of his health care 
reform initiative in giving her such a prominent role. Indeed, this wa the first time in the 
country’s history that a First Lady had taken on a role as significa t to national policy as 
Hillary Clinton’s portfolio on national health care reform. Certainly, other First Ladies 
had been very active publicly; Eleanor Roosevelt and Lady Bird Johnson both come to 
mind. But none had ever, during their husbands’ presidencies, headed a policy task force 
or initiative.11 It should have come as no surprise that a prominent policy role for a First 
Lady would be met with some resistance. Rosalynn Carter had endured a great deal of 
criticism over the news that she had attended some of her President’  cabinet meetings in 
the late 1970s, and Nancy Reagan was similarly excoriated for repots that she had 
consulted astrologers concerning policy decisions in the Reagan White House (Burden & 
Mughan, 1999; Carlson & August, 1992). Hillary Clinton’s personality and teency to 
wear business attire, combined with statements such as the comment about staying home 
and baking cookies made during the campaign, permitted her opponents to frame her as 
too masculine, too powerful, and too aggressive for a First Lady (Buckley Jr, 1993; 
Burden & Mughan, 1999; Carlson & August, 1992; Clift & Miller, 1992; H. R. Clinton, 
2003) 
While the specifics of the First Lady’s role might not have been d termined 
during the campaign, there certainly were hints that she and her husband intended for her 
to have a significant role in the event of his successful campaign for the presidency. 
Clinton was reported to have spoken of possibly appointing Hillary to the Cabinet 
                                                
11 I exclude Edith Galt Wilson from this analysis on the grounds that her critical role following Woodrow 
Wilson’s stroke was surreptitious. Historians have ll ged that she effectively usurped the power of the 
Presidency by making decisions in her husband’s stead. However, her role as such was not known widely at 
the time and certainly not to the general public. By contrast, Mrs. Clinton’s role was, at the risk of 
understatement, one of high visibility. 
 201 
(Carlson & August, 1992),12 and both of them were overheard to refer to Bill’s election 
as either “buy one, get one free” (Carlson & August, 1992, p. 40) or “vote one, get one 
free” (Deacon & Mackenzie, 1993, p. 39). By the start of Clinton’s second term, the 
White House press office was quick to disavow any policy role for the First Lady, but 
this was two years after health care reform had failed (Schorr, 1997).  
. Hillary Clinton’s entrance to the White House was not her firstb ush with 
national notoriety. Her commencement address to her 1969 Wellesley class was reported 
in Life Magazine (Cooper & Gest, 1992). She is a lawyer in her own right having 
graduated Yale Law in 1973 (H. R. Clinton, 2003), and just a year after her graduation, 
she served a summer on the 1974 House Judiciary Committee which was considering 
impeachment charges against President Richard Nixon at the time (Bruning, 1996; 
Cooper & Gest, 1992). She had an active legal practice with the prominent Rose Law 
Firm in Little Rock, where she reportedly made $160,000 per year in salary compared to 
her then-governor husband’s $35,000 salary (Deacon & Mackenzie, 1993). She was 
widely criticized for an alleged disdain—perhaps overblown in the press—for women 
who had not chosen the same careerist track that she had, epitomized in her remarks that 
she could have “stayed home and baked cookies and had teas” (Burden & Mughan, 1999, 
p. 238; Cooper & Gest, 1992, p. 30).  
When the Clinton’s moved into the White House on January 20, 1993, it quickly 
became apparent that Hillary intended to participate in governance at least in terms of 
being a close advisor to the President. This was signaled early when she became the only 
First Lady to have an office in the West Wing. She also maintained the traditional office 
                                                
12 Such an appointment would, in fact, be illegal under 5 USC IIIB 31 §3110 which prohibits the 
appointment by public officials of their relatives including spouses. This law was passed in 1967 primarily 
in response to John F. Kennedy’s appointment of his brother Robert Kennedy as Attorney General ("5 USC 
IIIB Chaper 31 §3110. Employment of relatives; restrictions," 1967). 
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of the First Lady in the East Wing of the White House (Burden & Mughan, 1999; Deacon 
& Mackenzie, 1993). This prompted the late conservative libertarian commentator 
William F. Buckley, Jr. (1993) to refer to Hillary Clinton as “a woman who does not 
hesitate to act as chief of staff for her husband” (p. 70). 
Hillary Clinton had a reputation for ruthlessness in her dealings with 
counterparties and even with her own staff. This was reinforced by her involvement in 
the travel office scandal that became known as Travelgate (Burden & Mughan, 1999). 
Accustomed to getting her way, many viewed her, rightly or wrongly, as too aggressive. 
She certainly did not fit the public’s archetype of a First Lady. This resulted in a 
cognitive dissonance that was reflected in the media’s coverage. Winfield (1997) said it 
this way, “The extent of her public power appears unprecedented, yet it is difficult to 
explain as a first lady news story, except negatively” (p. 243). Her relationship with the 
press was further damaged by her preference for secrecy during Health Care Task Force 
deliberations, a factor that prompted the lawsuit against the administration by the 
Association of American Physicians and Surgeons which resulted in a December 1993 
ruling that the task force had withheld documents in violation of federal law (Winfield, 
1997). 
During her last year as First Lady, she successfully ran for Senate representing the 
state of New York. She was re-elected to that seat in 2006. In 2007, she announced her 
candidacy for the Democratic nomination for President of the United S ates. Initially 
considered the favorite to land the nomination, she was outmaneuvered by Barack Obama 
who went on to capture not only the nomination but the presidency. He subsequently 
named Hillary Clinton as his Secretary of State, a post she holds currently. This is a 
strong woman by any definition, and one who has never shied away from either the 
spotlight or controversy. 
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Whether Hillary Clinton envisioned running for President (or even the Senate) at 
the time she was running the Clinton health care reform efforts is not clear. In the event 
that she was entertaining such ambitions, it is a matter for speculation as to whether 
success with the health care reform initiative might have changed the outcome of the 
2008 presidential elections. Had she and Bill been successful at passing the Health 
Security Act, her chances of being elected to the presidency in 2008 might have been 
enhanced, but this would have depended on the ultimate outcomes that the plan produced 
in the intervening years. What can be said with certainty is that such ambitions, to the 
extent they were perceived by the opposition party, would have raised the stakes 
providing ample incentive for Republicans to defeat the proposal.  
By defeating the plan, Republicans handed the President a defeat in which he had 
a personal stake as well as a political one. As it played out, they did not even have to cast 
a vote against the Clinton plan. It simply died a whimpering death by fili uster. The 
timing could not have been worse. Mitchell pulled the plug on September 26, 1994, just 
36 days before the mid-term elections that would put Gingrich in te Speaker’s chair as 
his Contract for America denounced big government—and government does not get any 
bigger than a national health care program—and put Republicans in charge of the House 
for the first time in 40 years. 
This brings us to the third question relating to the barriers to passage of national 
health care in the early 1990s and what could have been done to overcome those barriers. 
The bulk of this analysis rests in the political domain. 
BARRIERS AND STRATEGIES – ORIENTING QUESTION NUMBER THREE 
The public does not always get what it wants. Generally, public opinion acts less 
as a catalyst for action and almost exclusively as a constrait on legislative or executive 
action (Hofferbert, 1986; Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1980). The press—electronic and 
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print—mediates the setting of the public agenda through its editorial process in selecting 
what gets covered, how prominent that coverage is, how extensive it is, and how it gets 
reported (McCombs, 2004, 2005). How the press frames a given initiative c n certainly 
be influenced by how public figures speak about that initiative, and there is no more 
influential speaker on the planet than the President of the United States. It is accepted that 
the framing of the debate can be more important than the actual argments themselves, 
and Republicans are so keenly aware of this as to have spent considerable sums to study 
and determine exactly how any given debate must be framed for success (Hacker, 1997; 
Hacker & Pierson, 2005; Lakoff, 2004, 2006). For example, during the Johnson 
administration, Medicare was sometimes framed as “socialized medicine,” but trying to 
go to the far right on Johnson proved to be disastrous for the Republicans, especially for 
Barry Goldwater. During the Clinton initiative, Republicans also frequently framed the 
Clinton plan as “socialized medicine.” Both Republicans as well as their political allies 
(such as the health insurance industry) framed the debate as a (f l e) dichotomy over 
patient choice versus government deciding what treatment the patient will rece ve.13 
As Johnson worked to pass Medicare, the press was paying relatively littl  
attention compared to the focus during the Clinton attempt at national health care reform. 
Examination of newspaper databases covering The New York Times and The Los Angeles 
Times for the two periods is quite revealing. Between November 4, 1964 (day after the 
election) and July 28, 1965 (passage of the Social Security Amendments of 1965 by the 
Senate), a total of 145 articles containing the words “health care” nd “aged” or 
“medicare” appeared in the two papers, and of these only 18 appeared on the front page 
of one or the other newspaper. In comparison, between January 20, 1993 (Clinton’s 
                                                
13 I call this a false dichotomy because patients have very little choice under the present system. The 
difference is that instead of government making treatment decisions, insurers make them based on their 
profit profiles. In any event, those who have no health insurance have even less of a choice of treatmnt. 
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inauguration) and September 26, 1994 (date Mitchell pulled the bill) there was a stunning 
total of 5,853 articles containing the terms “Clinton” and “health care” or “Health 
Security Act,” more than 40 times the number of articles in the 1960s. Of those 5,853 
articles, an equally stunning 1,376 appeared on the front page of one of thetwo 
newspapers (ProQuest Historical Newspapers The Los Angeles Times [1881-1986], 
2009; ProQuest Historical Newspapers The Los Angeles Times [1986-present], 2009; 
ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times [1851-2005], 2009). 
How does this compare with public attention to the issue? I point the reader again 
to the “Most Important Problem” question asked by the Gallup organization. For the polls 
I reviewed in the relevant time frames, the 1964-65 polls showed responses relevant to 
Medicare or health care for the aged in the range of 0.37 percent to 2.51 percent. Over the 
same time period, 6.19 to 28.71 percent of respondents listed Vietnam as the most 
important problem (The Gallup Organization, 1964g, 1965a, 1965b, 1965c). (The 6.19 
percent was on October 13, 1964, less than two months after the Gulf of Tonkin 
Resolution was passed.)  Over the same time period, “Vietnam” appeared in a total of 
8,700 articles between the two newspapers (ProQuest Historical Newspapers The Los 
Angeles Times [1881-1986], 2009; ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York 
Times [1851-2005], 2009).  
Relating press focus to public attention for the Clinton era, I recall for the reader 
that while 5,853 articles appeared in either The New York Times or The Los Angeles 
Times related to the national health care reform attempt (ProQuest Historical Newspapers 
The Los Angeles Times [1986-present], 2009; ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New 
York Times [1851-2005], 2009), 18.44 to 30.81 of responses listed health care as the 
most important problem in the Gallup polls of the same time frame (Th  Gallup 
Organization, 1993a, 1993b, 1994b, 1994c). While one cannot draw a causal inference 
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between media coverage and public focus from these figures, they are highly suggestive 
of a correlation between public attention and press attention on the subject . The extent to 
which the press influences the public and the public influences the press is difficult to 
say. Likely, the influences are reciprocal. However, since the press has the advantage of 
communicative and collective power over that enjoyed by the individual, it would not be 
unreasonable to presume that press attention would be the stronger influence. 
As for the relationship between the media attention and legislative outcomes, it is 
somewhat remarkable that newspaper coverage prior to the Clinton failure was 40 times 
greater (as measured by the two newspapers used as markers) than the newspaper 
coverage prior to the successful Johnson initiative. I contend that this in ense media 
spotlight and scrutiny served to raise the stakes for the opposition party to defeat the 
legislative initiative. Information availability increased exponentially between the 
Johnson and Clinton administrations with much broader cable access, advent of 24-hour 
news programming, conservative talk radio, and the rise of the public Internet. Media 
coverage of issues continues to expand. If my contention regarding intesity of the media 
spotlight is correct, then this expansion could have a chilling effect on future attempts, at 
least in terms of raising the stakes for the opposition party. Finding common ground will 
become even more important at the same time that it is becoming ore difficult, 
particularly in view of the current partisan political divide in America. 
As to how the Clinton administration and other interested supporters mighthave 
overcome these barriers, it would seem that better framing the debate would have been 
appropriate at the least. Permitting the opposition to frame the plan as “socialized 
medicine,” and as “limiting patient and provider choice,” with very little or at least 
ineffective challenge proved disastrous. The “Harry and Louise” ads alone provided 
political cover (i.e., gave the public reason to fear a government takeover of health care 
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under the Clinton plan) to Republican efforts to block the legislation. The Administration 
claimed large numbers of supporters among big business, small business associations, 
and professional associations like the NASW. Yet, none of these organizatio s funded 
memorable public relations campaigns in support of the Task Force initiative. 
The administration also suffered from the inexperience at the national level of its 
leader, Bill Clinton. The staff was young and equally inexperienced. The Clinton 
administration lacked the power that Johnson had to discipline and to manage at least his 
own party members in the legislative branch. The selection of Ira Magaziner, who had a 
failed record as a business consultant and frequently admitted to lacking any 
understanding of the political process (H. Johnson & Broder, 1997), as co-chair of the 
Task Force, is illustrative of the level of incompetence. Simply put, LBJ had Wilbur 
Cohen. Bill Clinton had Ira Magaziner. Clinton either did not understand, did not fully 
appreciate, or simply lacked the ability to bring experienced hands aboard and to manage 
them in a tightly held circle of power with himself at the center. Had he done so, he mig t 
have been successful. 
LBJ had an even bigger Wilbur in his arsenal as well: Wilbur Mills. The powerful 
Chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means was as good at Washington’s 
brand of “inside baseball” as they come. Far from engaging in a battle with the opposition 
(Republicans and AMA), Mills took their proposals apart, folded the parts he liked best 
into his own bill, and created the “three-layer cake” of Medicare Part A, Medicare Part B, 
and Medicaid. This not only improved the final bill in a way that would be a major asset 
in the next election cycle, but it made it very nearly impossible for the opposition to vote 
against the final bill, at least in Committee and for many of the opposition in the Hous as 
well. Clinton needed an ally on the inside as shrewd as Mills. It does n t appear that he 
had any such allies in the Congress. He wanted to stake a big and early victory with 
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health care, but his ambition may have gotten the better of him. Rather than wait and 
build good will, he initiated the process too soon, still had to wait, and even then, his 
proposal was ultimately defeated. 
Johnson did not write the final Medicare bill. In fact, his original bill would only 
have covered what eventually came to be known as Medicare Part A, i.e., hospital-only 
coverage. When Mills proposed expanding that to include physician fees as well, in an 
attempt to avoid disillusioning the elderly members of the electorate, Johnson told him to 
put it together however he wanted it. Whether Johnson knew that Mills (and Abe 
Ribicoff) would expand his vision is not known. That he was willing to allow others to do 
the heavy lifting and then to share the credit is well-documented (Goodwin, 1991; 
Gordon, 1965; Johnson's Special Message to Congress Outlining Broad National Health 
Program," 1965; L. B. Johnson, 1965c, 1965d, 1971; Recording of Telephone 
Conversation between Lyndon B. Johnson, John McCormack, Wilbur Mills, Wilbur 
Cohen, and Carl Albert, March 23, 1965, 4:54 PM, Citation #7141," 1965). Johnson had 
a clear understanding that when he was sharing the credit around, everyone could see that 
it was he who was doing the sharing. Clinton, by contrast, fielded a 600-plus member 
task force, sought input from industry groups, social welfare organizations, organized 
labor, physician groups, and others before submitting a 1,000-page plus plan almost  
year after starting the process.14 His plan was complicated by the need to not upset the 
special interests in the “Turkish bazaar” we have inherited as ahealth care system. 
Clinton may have been more charismatic and more eloquent than Johnson. He fa cied
                                                
14 In a 2009 interview with Dr. Sanjay Gupta on Larry King Live, Clinton revealed that he would have 
preferred that Congress write the legislation, but tha then-Chairman of the House Ways and Means 
Committee Dan Rostenkowski (D-IL) told him he would prefer that the administration provide the 
legislation and then the committee and Congress could amend it (Hirzel, 2009). I have not previously come 
across this information in other accounts of the period. This point would be worth following up. Perhaps 
when the oral history interviews being collected anprocessed at the University of Virginia Miller Cent r 
are completed and released, we may find more information on that aspect of the process. 
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himself as the successor of John F. Kennedy. It is worth remembering that Kennedy was 
unable to pass Medicare. Johnson, the less eloquent Texan, knew how to work his 
contacts, which were myriad, and how to apply power in the background without ever 
having to seek the spotlight himself. 
In the case of Johnson and Medicare, one cannot deny that this was a massive step 
forward for the health care of the elderly. Yet, it was stillan incremental step forward. 
The culture demanded then, as it does now, that only the deserving receive help. In order 
to “deserve” Medicare, elders have to pre-pay during their working years to insure their 
access to health insurance and health care in their retirement years. The poor must meet 
stringent means tests administered at the state level in order t  receive Medicaid benefits. 
Johnson was even concerned that the deductibles and co-pays be high enough to “keep
down the hypochondriacs” ("Recording of Telephone Conversation between Lyndon B. 
Johnson, John McCormack, Wilbur Mills, Wilbur Cohen, and Carl Albert, March 23, 
1965, 4:54 PM, Citation #7141," 1965), reflecting the insurance culture as it was then and 
continues to be today, i.e., a propensity to cut costs by eliminating coverage for first-
dollar benefits which discourages preventive care. 
When Bill Clinton became president, nearly 30 years had passed since Medicare 
and Medicaid became law. Because health care insurance and service provision remained 
rooted in the private sector in spite of the large public Medicare and Medicaid programs, 
Clinton was perhaps even more culture-bound than was Johnson. Clinton’s managed 
competition approach was deeply rooted in the managed care concepts that Edgar Kaiser 
and others had promoted and which President Nixon had strengthened by signing 
legislation twenty years earlier. The plan attempted to incorporate the employer-provided 
system along with purchasing alliances on a state-by-state basis to attempt to encourage 
competition and control costs. Subsidies for the uninsured would have been based on 
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means tests tied to income as a percentage of the federal poverty le l. None of this was 
based in any truly new conception of how health care ought to be deliv red. Rather, it 
devolved into a complicated, if not convoluted, attempt to preserve the status quo of a 
profit-based negotiated delivery system while attempting to cover more of th population.  
Perhaps Arthur (1994) is correct from an economic modeling perspective that 
early decisions have a tendency to become locked into a system. Perhaps he is correct 
that increasing returns accrue to lock the path in the direction first determined by those 
early decisions. However, it seems that at some point those ecnomic constraints resolve 
themselves into culture and tradition and a sense of “how things are supposed to work” in 
a society. The United States is the only developed nation on the plan t that does not have 
universal health care. It spends more per capita than any other nation, yet its health 
outcomes are far from the best. Apparently citizens of other countries just accept the idea 
that they can go to the doctor or a hospital and “the government” (i.e., their taxes) will 
cover the tab. That is how their systems were designed. It is the r tradition and their 
culture. They truly cannot imagine anything different; the idea that health care would be 
denied to them because they cannot afford to pay it is unthinkable.  
There is an old parable about a little girl asking her mother why she always cut 
the legs and wings off of the turkey before she baked it. Her mother referred her to her 
grandmother since that is where she first learned to do it that way. Her grandmother 
passed her on to her great-grandmother, as that is who had first taught her t e magic of 
cooking the turkey with its wings and legs removed. When the little girl asked her great-
grandmother why they always cut the legs and wings off the turky before they baked it, 
great-grandma replied, “I don’t know why these people are doing it. I d d it because I 
didn’t have a pan that was big enough to hold the bird.”  
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Here in the United States, we still cut the legs and wings off the turkey because 
that is what mama and grandmother and great-grandma all did. We have forgotten that 
great-grandma did it because her pan was too small for the turkey. It is how we have 
always done it. As much as citizens of other countries could not imagine paying a 
deductible or a co-payment for medical care, much less being turned away for lack of 
ability to pay, Americans cannot imagine a system that is design d to take care of every 
person. This is what we mean by a “culture.” Americans will come closer to achieving 
health insurance for everyone when the culture changes and agreement is reached on the 
philosophical underpinnings for the type of society we want. We cannot afford to do 
health care “the way we always have.” The economics are simply unsustai able (Daschle, 
2008; Herzlinger, 2007; Kotlikoff, 2007). 
L IMITATIONS AND ADVICE FOR FUTURE SCHOLARS  
In this study, I have relied on existing published accounts covering the two 
presidential administrations and their efforts to change health care. L rgely due to 
feasibility restraints, specifically time and money, I elected not to conduct interviews of 
participants. In the case of the Johnson administration, many of the ficials of that time 
are now deceased. However, a rich collection of oral history interviews is available in the 
LBJ Library, and I availed myself of these quite freely. A similar oral history project is 
underway for the Clinton administration under the aegis of the University of Virginia 
Miller Center for Public Affairs. As of this date, those intervi ws have not been released 
and will not be released until the interview process is completed some years from now.  
The records of the Clinton administration remain largely inaccessibl  even eight 
years after the administration ended. This is a function of (1) the rules under the 
Presidential Records Act of 1978 (44 U.S.C. § 2001-2207) and Executive Orders 12667, 
13233, and 13489 which govern the release of presidential records, and (2) the limitations 
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of staff time required to process records for release. As further ecords become available, 
the findings of this study may well be altered. Additional archival records may also be 
available, particularly at the Social Security Administration archives in Baltimore, 
Maryland, which may shed light on these legislative processes. Future scholars may also 
wish to examine the archives of legislators with a specific interest or role in these two 
health care reform efforts. 
Since I began this dissertation 12 years after the failure of the Clinton effort, 
memories of participants are likely to be clouded by time. Alicia Shepard (2006, personal 
communication), who has published her findings from archival studies of the Woodward 
and Bernstein papers on Watergate housed at the University of Texas at Austin, further 
advised me that interviews with those specifically engaged at the time were likely to 
reflect not only the time-clouded memories of those persons but to have been revised, 
intentionally or unintentionally, to put the participants and their allies in the best possible 
light. Therefore, these would be of limited historical value in considering the path and 
processes of the two eras. Instead, I have relied on the records to speak for them. 
Dissertations are, by nature, usually the work of a single individual. As such, and 
particularly in the case of qualitative analyses, they are subject to interpretive bias. I have 
addressed my biases elsewhere in the document. Future scholars would benefit from 
having multiple people code the documents to provide additional rigor in the aalysis. To 
counter that problem, I have attempted to use the published interpretations of other 






The Road to Somewhere 
Not much has changed in terms of the American health care delivery system in 
the wake of the Clinton failure. With two exceptions, Medicare Part D and the State 
Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP; passed as part of the Balanced Budget Act 
of 1997: P.L. 111-251), Americans have not had a major addition to the government run 
programs. Congress has tweaked the SCHIP program to cover more childr n, and has 
recently passed a long-needed expansion to that valuable program. The other thing that 
has changed is that there are more uninsured citizens today than in 1994. In 2009, 
medical costs are projected to account for 17.6 percent of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), perhaps even more in the wake of the current economic and financial crisis and 
recession. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services project that it will climb to 
20.3 percent of GDP, an outlay of $4.4 trillion, by 2018 (Sisko, et al., 2009). The last 
government report actually shows a small decline in the number and percentage of 
uninsured (DeNavas-Walt, et al., 2008), but that may be a result of more pe ple falling 
into income brackets that make them eligible for Medicaid as well as more retirees 
coming to Medicare age (Sisko, et al., 2009). 
To be fair, the George W. Bush Administration and the then-Republican-
controlled Congress did pass the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and 
Modernization Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-173), which instituted Medicare Part D, a federal 
program to subsidize prescription costs for Medicare beneficiaries. To be equally fair, the 
program has a large gap in coverage, commonly referred to as the “donut hole,” which 
kicks in after the first $2,400 of expense, leaving about $3,600 to be paid by the insured 
before catastrophic coverage begins paying for prescription drugs again (Families USA, 
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2007a, 2007b). Once again, culture prevailed: this program is administered through the 
private sector. 
Furthermore, the act specifically prohibits the federal government from 
negotiating prescription drug prices under the program. Consequentially, a study by non-
profit health care consumer advocacy group Families USA (2007b) found that, for the 
twenty most commonly prescribed drugs, seniors covered under Medicare Part D paid a 
median difference of 58 percent more than those covered by Veterans Administration 
plans. The Veterans Administration is permitted to, and does, negotiat prescription drug 
prices on behalf of its members. A later report by Families USA (2007a) found that, for 
the fifteen drugs most commonly prescribed to seniors, the price had risen by a median of 
9.2 percent from April 2006 to April 2007, during a time when the January 2007 Social 
Security Cost of Living Adjustment (COLA) was a mere 3.3 percent.  
The reader can draw the conclusion as to whether the program is more help to 
seniors or more hindrance when weighing the benefits received against what Hacker and 
Pierson (2005) call “coverage that…has the dubious distinction of being at once stingy 
and costly” (p. 86). Certainly, many seniors who take medications and would otherwise 
have no prescription coverage have benefited from Medicare Part D. Had the Congress 
not restricted the program administrators from negotiating price with the pharmaceutical 
companies, the same benefits could have been provided at substantially lower cost to the 
federal government, and by definition the taxpayers who fund the government. In the 
more desirable alternative, the savings from negotiated pricing could have been used to 
reduce, and perhaps eliminate, the “donut hole” in coverage. Additionally, since the 
prices would clearly have been lower, based on the experience of the Veterans 
Administration, the initial coverage limits would have covered even more of the total 
prescription costs of each insured senior.  
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Such a change might have doomed the plan to failure, i.e., it never would have 
passed. The prohibition against government negotiating prescription prices amounts to a 
huge subsidy to the drug companies. After all, it was President George W. Bush and a 
Republican-controlled Congress who enacted Part D. These are the same people who 
fomented the current fiscal crisis through utter disregard for regulatory obligations of the 
government, outsourcing to no-bid contractors, and a host of other means of pushing 
public funds into private pockets in what Galbraith (2008) calls “The Predator State.” 
PROJECTIONS OF THE PATH FORWARD  
Path-dependence theory suggests that major policy shifts occur only at critical 
junctures (Arthur, 1994). Findings in this study support the theoretical position. President 
Johnson took office in the wake of a national crisis—the assassination of President 
Kennedy. He also faced mounting national unrest surrounding both the civil rights 
movement and the Vietnam War. President Clinton faced no such crises. Johnson 
succeeded in passing Medicare and Medicaid; Clinton failed at the national health care 
reform effort. President Obama has stepped into the Oval Office at a point of severe 
economic crisis; a recession that may be the worst since the Great Depression 
(Puzzanghera & Oneal, 2009; Reckard, 2009). Obama’s proposed budget outline calls for
more than $600 billion in additional spending to decrease the health insurance coverage 
gap, though he has not yet outlined a specific plan for achieving this goal. Congress, 
meanwhile, is considering changing the favorable tax treatment of employer-sponsored 
medical plans to tax at least some portion of those benefits. Organized labor opposes any 
such change (Levey, 2009). 
The treatment model of health care delivery, as opposed to a preventiv  model, 
will be much more difficult to change. The historical path clearly suggests that the 
treatment model has become embedded in American culture. Even the major ch nges 
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brought about under Medicare and Medicaid did not move the culture away from this 
model, as evidenced by the continuation of deductibles and co-payments in government 
plans, just as under private and employer-sponsored plans, in an effort to h ld down costs 
attributable to “hypochondria” or “moral hazard” ("Recording of Telephone Conversation 
between Lyndon B. Johnson, John McCormack, Wilbur Mills, Wilbur Cohen, and Carl 
Albert, March 23, 1965, 4:54 PM, Citation #7141," 1965).  
If the culture shifted at all with regards to medical care, it likely came in the form 
of increased use of managed care plans as a result of the Health M intenance 
Organizations Act of 1973 (P.L. 93-222) under President Nixon. According to the United 
States Department of Commerce Bureau of the Census (2008), enrollmet in HMOs rose 
from 33 million Americans in 1990 to 73.9 million in 2006. Rather than move towards a 
preventive model and further close the coverage gap, however, the net effect of managed 
care has been to increase cost-sharing to the employee resulting in a reinforcement of the 
treatment model. Clinton’s Health Security Act was based largely in the idea of managed 
competition, a concept closely related to managed care. This is further evidence that the 
cultural path has not shifted substantially in the hundred-year history of national health 
care efforts. 
It is of interest that in recent years, the medical profession has begun to change its 
stance regarding health care reform. In early 2004, the American College of Physicians 
(ACP), a group representing more than 115,000 internists and medical student , issued a 
statement to the House Ways and Means Committee Subcommittee on H alth to be 
included in the record of their hearing on the uninsured. In the statemen , the ACP (2004) 
acknowledges the hidden societal costs of having more than 40 million uninsured 
Americans and calls for “Congress [to] enact legislation to expand health insurance 
coverage to all Americans by the end of the decade, starting with the working poor and 
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near poor who do not qualify for coverage under public safety net programs and those 
who do not have access to affordable employer-provided and individual insurance” (p. 5).  
The American Medical Association (AMA) has also revised its stance on health 
care reform and is using the Internet to promote its proposal (American Medical 
Association, 2008) called “Voice for the Uninsured.” The AMA proposal rests on three 
points: (1) need-based subsidies for lower-income people to purchase health insurance 
funded partly by shifting some of the tax incentive currently enjoyed by employer-
sponsored plans to vouchers or tax credits; (2) patient choice of what health plan to join; 
and (3) streamlining of federal and state insurance regulations to a more uniform set of 
standards. At least one physician group, Physicians for a National He lth Program 
(2009), has challenged the AMA’s proposal, saying that the AMA’s recommendations 
fall short of achieving affordable, comprehensive, and universal health care.   
As President Obama and the Democratic-controlled Congress look at another 
attempt at national health care reform, the lessons of the past should be brought to bear. 
Three major points from this study bear revisiting. First, knowledge of the inside 
legislative game and rules will be important in passing major health care legislation. 
Johnson understood how the Congress worked, having had 34 years of experience in the 
two houses, and having served as Senate Majority Leader just prior o his election to the 
Vice Presidency. This also meant that he had done a lot of favors and had a lot of chits he 
could cash in as necessary. Clinton had no experience in Washington, and few, if any, 
chits. His staff was young and largely inexperienced as well. Johnson’s staff, by 
comparison, comprised seasoned political operatives and, in the case of Wilbur Cohen at 
least, people intimately familiar with the current Social Security system. Obama has 
slightly more Washington experience, with his time in the Senate, than Clinton had. How 
many chits he has is a matter yet to be seen, but it is unlikely he has as many as LBJ had. 
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Obama would be well-served to choose people to lead his health care efforts who have 
legislative experience as well as those with a keen understanding of the current 
government medical care systems. He should avoid high-profile targ ts in authoritative 
positions, unlike Clinton who named Hillary to chair the task force. Obama should also 
keep the administration’s efforts in the hands of a fairly small and tightly-knit team as 
Johnson did. Clinton’s task force grew to more than 600 members with every 
constituency represented. The result was an unwieldy mechanism where “too many cooks 
began to spoil the broth,” as evidenced by the complexity of the final Clinton bill. 
One area where Obama appears to be poised to repeat a Clinton mis ake is in the 
area of budget reconciliation. Under Senate rules, budget reconciliation bills are not 
subject to filibuster. Clinton had planned to use the reconciliation process to include his 
health care reform package in the budget reconciliation bill. This would have eliminated 
the need for 60 votes to attain cloture of the Senate debate. However, the Byrd rule 
prohibited including anything that was not directly budget-related in a reconciliation bill. 
Senator Byrd was unwilling to waive the rule for health care, a decision that Hillary 
Clinton (2003) later acknowledged as the correct stance. Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-
NV) has indicated his willingness to consider using reconciliation in place of the regular 
legislative process to pass top policy priorities including health care reform. Peter Orszag, 
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, has also refused to take reconciliation 
off the table on behalf of the administration. While Orszag has no real authority to make 
this decision, the fact that he is not taking it off the table publicly is an indicator that the 
administration is continuing to consider the option. The fact that Senate M jority Leader 
Reid is willing to go this route bodes better for an Obama success using the reconciliation 
rules than Byrd’s leadership did for Clinton. Nevertheless, using the reconciliation 
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process virtually guarantees a bitter partisan battle and one that could ultimately backfire 
on the Democrats (Sands, 2009). 
Second, Obama is more likely to succeed in bringing about major reform if he 
permits Congress to write the legislation. If he decides to submit legislation, he might 
consider making the administration proposal more modest than what he eventually hopes 
to achieve. Johnson’s initial proposal, as an example, would have provided hospital- nly 
coverage for the elderly and had no new provision for the medically indigent. In 
submitting this relatively modest proposal, as compared to the eventual outcome, Johnson 
left room for Mills to expand on it as he fashioned the “three-layer cake” out of the 
administration’s proposal, the Republican proposal, and the AMA-endorsed bill. Clinton, 
by comparison, took almost a year to fashion his administration’s proposal, striving to 
satisfy every constituency and provide a comprehensive bill to the Congress. In a recent 
television interview, Clinton indicated that he preferred to have Congress write the bill 
but that then-chair of the House Ways and Means Committee Dan Rostenk wski (D-IL) 
had insisted that the administration write the bill and allow Congress to amend it (Hirzel, 
2009)  Though the former President did not say so in the interview, this conversation 
must have occurred between election day and the inauguration, since Cli ton named his 
wife and Ira Magaziner to head the President’s Task Force on National Health Reform 
just five days after the inauguration (B. Clinton, 2004; H. R. Clinton, 2003; H. Johnson & 
Broder, 1997).. Allowing Congress to write the legislation also speaks to Johnson’s 
ability to share credit broadly for his legislative achievements. Johnson instinctively 
understood that when he was sharing the spotlight, he was in the spotlight. Clinton 
seemed rather to try to play for a few big initiatives that would focus the spotlight directly 
on him and on Hillary. 
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Third, the administration needs to do what it can to control the framing of the 
debate (Lakoff, 2004, 2006) and the media focus. Johnson managed the message by 
keeping Congress busy with a flood of legislative initiatives. Clinton seems to have 
preferred to run one or two big initiatives at a time. Medicare and Medicaid consumed 
very little press attention compared to Clinton’s efforts (ProQuest Historical Newspapers 
The Los Angeles Times [1881-1986], 2009; ProQuest Historical Newspapers Th  Los 
Angeles Times [1986-present], 2009; ProQuest Historical Newspapers Th  New York 
Times [1851-2005], 2009; ProQuest Historical Newspapers The Washington Post [1877-
1992], 2009), and the Gallup Poll’s Most Important Problem Question indicates that 
Medicare and Medicaid were far less prominent in the public’s mind than were the 
Clinton initiatives (The Gallup Organization, 1962, 1963, 1964a, 1964b, 1964c, 1964d, 
1964e, 1964f, 1964g, 1965a, 1965b, 1965c, 1992a, 1992b, 1992c, 1993a, 1993b, 1994a, 
1994b, 1994c, 1994d). Johnson was aided in these respects by the media’s focus on 
Vietnam and civil rights which deflected attention away from other domestic legislative 
initiatives including Medicare. Obama may be able to parlay coverage of the financial 
crisis and government efforts to alleviate the recession into shielding health care from the 
spotlight. 
Hacker (1997), in his seminal work “The Road to Nowhere,” made a case for why 
the Clinton effort failed and why any future effort at achieving universal health care is 
likely to fail. I am grateful to Hacker for that book on two accounts. First, it introduced 
me to the idea of path-dependence theory which led me to read more about it and gave 
me the model for this dissertation. Second, and far less importantly, it inspired the title of 
this chapter which is a transparent parody of Hacker’s title. While I do not have the 
temerity to disagree completely with Hacker’s argument about the fu ure of health care, I 
am not yet cynical enough to agree with it either. 
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Now the world, including the United States, is in a great fiscal crisis precipitated 
by the failure of the housing market in the wake of sub-prime mortgage lending. 
Congress has already appropriated $700 billion to bail out the financial sector, and an 
$819 billion stimulus package. Some estimates go as high as $2 trillion o $3 trillion that 
will eventually be required to jump-start the economy. Many would, and likely will, say 
that this is not the time to consider expanding government health care. Still, President 
Obama’s recently-released budget outline proposes a health-care rese ve fund of $634 
billion over the next ten years, and the President recently convened a White House 
summit on health care reform. He has taken the public position that health care reform is 
a fiscal necessity if the economy is to recover fully. 
Uwe Reinhardt (2009), one of America’s leading health economists and professor 
at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public Affairs at Princeton University would 
apparently agree. Reinhardt says that the cost to insure those presently uninsured in this 
country would be an estimated $122 billion per year, about twice President Obama’s 
estimate. As Reinhardt points out, “this was once real money, but in the light of trillions 
of dollars to bail out the aristocracy, this is all right of the decimal point.” Furthermore, 
Reinhardt makes the point that this would be a very quick way to infuse this money 
directly into the economy, since health care expenditures are fast approaching twenty 
percent of GDP.  
President Johnson saw Medicare’s passage as a sign that the countryhad finally 
begun to look at health care as a right and not a privilege (L. B. Johnson, 1971). If he was 
correct, it was a very slow beginning. Forty-four years later, h alth care is still not 
considered a right in the United States. Reinhardt (2009) maintains that before we get 
bogged down with the nuts and bolts of how such a system should work—the new HHS 
Secretary will have “a free army of experts” to help figure that out—we should first ask 
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ourselves as Americans whether we want to live in a society where a family is at risk of 
bankruptcy or homelessness if a member gets cancer or some other illness. What 
Reinhardt is asking goes to my earlier contentions on the role of culture in these 
decisions. How timely that I should have written that section the morning of his afternoon 
keynote address at the Families USA Health Action 2009 National Grassroots Meeting in 
Washington, DC. Reinhardt feels strongly that we must agree on this bas c philosophical 
issue before hammering out the nuts and bolts of national health care. Whether we can 
achieve any philosophical consensus on universal health care access or even how various 
population segments should obtain health care is questionable. What seems more likely is 
that large corporate interests, particularly in the manufacturing sectors, will eventually 
demand relief from the high costs of medical care. This has the potential to lead to a 
Gladwell-like tipping point (Gladwell, 2002) that may actually bring a paradigmatic shift 
in the health care payment and delivery system—a shift that, if corporate interests 
demand it, could come from Republicans. 
SOCIAL WORKERS AND POLICY ALLIES – ORIENTING QUESTION FOUR 
So, the fourth orienting question remains: What can social workers and allied 
policy activists do to hasten the process by reducing political barriers, recognizing 
opportunities to advance reform initiatives, preparing for swift action when the path 
opens new policy change options, and utilizing clinical and other professinal strengths 
to ease the transition to national health care if and when that time arises? Here I will 
attempt to outline what I hope will be received as concrete steps that we can take. 
Step One: Train ourselves and our students to speak the languages of 
business and politics. For many schools of social work, policy amounts to one or two 
mandatory survey courses with the major focus on clinical or generalist practice skills. 
Social workers are in a unique position to influence policy, but many of them are poorly 
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trained in the skills and techniques. In addition to the human biology and statistics 
prerequisites of admission to many programs, I recommend that socil workers have at 
least one survey course in economics, one in political science, and one in business 
management. 
Our policy focus has been on social justice, and this is a noble cause. How ver, at 
the risk of being accused of cynicism, our government rarely spends money simply 
because it is “the right thing to do.” The social contract has been adly damaged by the 
predator state (Galbraith, 2008). What will motivate the renewal and expansion of the 
welfare state in this country will be economic necessity rather than a sense of justice. If 
economic justice results from changes that emerge due to economi  ecessity, then we 
can also feel good about that achievement. But it is unlikely to be the cause of change. 
In the case of health care reform and a move towards a) universal coverage, and 
b) more government involvement, a study of the outside motivators that favored 
Medicare should give us a clue to what will drive these changes. In the case of Medicare, 
the business leaders wanted to absolve themselves of responsibility for retiree health care 
benefits15. Organized labor was agreeable to this as many of their members would 
otherwise be without health insurance. In other words, the economics motivated the 
support. 
Today, the automobile industry is perhaps the premiere example among many of 
an industry burdened by health care costs. Reinhardt (2009) goes so far as to say that 
“General Motors is not a car company; it is a social security system that happens to make 
cars.” If social workers want to promote universal health care, then we must begin as a 
                                                
15 Many companies are now facing similar problems in pe sion obligations as well. Defined benefit plans, 
in particular, have the potential to wreak havoc with large employer profitability. It will be revealing to see 
how companies deal with these impending obligations. One possible alternative is to bankrupt the company 
which would push the responsibility for retiree income benefits onto the Pension Benefit Guaranty Fund of 
the federal government. 
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group to understand the economic forces that can be marshaled to motivate change; and, 
we must understand the economic benefits that will accrue from such a plan. Raw 
economic forces and interests are likely to force a cultural shift in how Americans 
deliver, utilize, and pay for health care. Whether that shift will meet the standards of 
economic justice may depend on the leadership that progressives exert on the process. 
Step Two: Advocate for, seek government and/or private funding for, and 
actively lead in the development of a National Institute of Social Welfare Policy as 
part of the NIH.  No one knows better than social workers that social welfare and anti-
poverty policy are an integral part of a healthier society. Yet, th  federal government has 
no central resource or funding outlet to support scientific study of these vital policies. 
Social workers have the advantage of a broad knowledge base rooted in multiple 
disciplines to bring to bear in development of such an institute. Because our knowledge 
base rests on the foundations of sociology, psychology, anthropology, education, and 
other disciplines, and given our systemic approach, we are uniquely positioned o bring 
these disciplines and others such as economics, public policy, political science, business, 
and law together to solve social welfare policy problems. 
Step Three: Actively work to change the culture of health care. While this 
may seem like just a “tip of the cap” to the idea of culture, I believe it goes farther than 
this. Social workers deal every day with the public, but we do relativ ly little as a group 
to actually change the way people think. We must train ourselves and our students to 
frame the debate in ways that strengthen our position at the table. One minor example is 
the use of the words “the American taxpayer,” in public discourse. Th  implication is that 
some people pay no taxes, and these people can be rightfully ignored in the policy 
debates. But, that simply is not true. If you live and work in the United States, you pay 
taxes. You may not pay income tax or pay very little income tax, but you pay regressive 
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sales taxes, you pay property taxes (renters pay those taxes in the form of increased 
rents), you pay sin taxes, and you pay corporate taxes, too, in the form of increased prices 
for goods. You also pay Social Security and Medicare taxes from the first dollar of 
earnings. “The American taxpayer” is a term used to define (and limit) who has 
legitimacy to engage in the debate. We are all taxpayers. Falling easily into the media and 
political vernacular is no excuse for social workers. We are advocates. We must advocate 
in ways that call for immediate action. Terms like “illegal alien” are also ways of 
demonizing people and justifying ignoring of their basic humanity, needs, and rights.
I am not espousing simply a bigger focus on the symbolic here or even some 
“politically correct” form of speech. After all, conservatives have done an excellent job 
of taking the idea of “political correctness” to minimize the importance of how we speak 
about culture. Far from that, I think progressives have focused too much on the symbols. 
I am talking about changing the way we think as a society; and the way you change how 
people think is by changing how they talk. Reinhardt (2009), again on health insurance 
for children, feels that neglecting the health of our children is the equivalent of wasting 
America’s future. You are born in this country and you get a certificate of citizenship and 
nobody questions that. You are entitled to a free education K-12 and nobody questions 
that. Reinhardt goes on to say you should be entitled to free medical care until you are 22 
years old, and nobody should question that either. He says that Americans have come to 
treat their children like pets. If you want choice, then give parents an actuarially-sound, 
risk-adjusted voucher for each child and then require the parent to use it to insure the 
child or spend 30 days in jail. Social workers might find this last “punitive” idea to be a 
bit overboard, or even a form of social injustice. We might prefer to work to lower 
barriers to entry, i.e., make enrollment in Medicaid or SCHIP less onerous for parents. 
Either way, this would represent a real change in the culture. Social workers are uniquely 
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positioned to change the public discourse. We should do it now. At the very least, we 
should strive to expand the voice of the uninsured and underinsured. We can, and must, 
insist on their legitimate right to be heard. There are seven m mbers of the House of 
Representatives who are social workers, and two United States Senators who are social 
workers in the 111th Congress. All nine are members of the Democratic Party. The 
represent states from Michigan to Texas and New Hampshire to California (National 
Association of Social Workers, 2009). Nine may not seem like a lot, but 9 members is 
almost 2 percent of the total number of Representatives and Senators. Social workers 
represent less than one-tenth of one percent of the American population. We have a good 
start on representation of our ideals in the American legislative branch. We should be 
capitalizing on that representation. Finally, we should be helping office seekers whose 
positions align with our values to get more votes. 
Social workers must be careful in how we approach the health care culture. We 
cannot afford to portray ourselves as pursuing a policy course solely out of self-interest. 
This, in fact, is what happened in 1998 in the case of Stephens et al. v. CMG Health et al 
("96 Civ. 7798 (KMW)," 1998). In this case, members of the helping professins, 
including clinical social workers, filed suit against a managed care organization 
challenging their rates of reimbursement for mental health services under restraint of 
trade laws. Judge Kimba Wood, a Clinton nominee for Attorney General whose 
nomination was derailed for having hired an undocumented immigrant, found for the 
defendants in the case. Judge Wood based her decision on the facts that the pl intiffs 
were merely protesting the buying power of managed care organizatio s in light of their 
economic self-interest in a higher rate of reimbursement. Mental health professionals are 
more likely to find success, if they find any at all, in the legislative branch rather than the 
judicial branch (Ross, 1999).  
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION  
Finally, what has occurred to me repeatedly as I read and catalogued nearly 
12,000 documents is the binding nature of culture on policy development. Americans’ 
social construction of health care is far different from that of m st of the developed 
world. We construct it not as a right, but as an economic commodity; some would go so 
far as to suggest that we also construct it as a privilege. Culturally, we concern ourselves 
more with the moral hazards of insurance than with the economically just and 
economically intelligent allocation of health resources. We have blunted our national 
conscience to the 27,000 (Lubbes, 2008) who die each year for lack of health insurance, 
fearful of our inability to afford their care. We have decisions to make about our society. 
The country’s current economic situation may well force those decisions in short order. 
This is a good time to begin setting the tone for those decisions. 
These changes will not come easily. They will require time and money and effort. 
Most of all, they will require leadership. Raising the bar is not an effortless task, 
thankless though it may be. As Americans begin to think about health care as a right, 
more of them will come to recognize that we are currently rationing care already. As 
Americans challenge the “provider and consumer choice” frame, they will have to say out 
loud that virtually no such choice exists in the current state of he society. (Indeed, most 
employers give their covered employee no choice of health plan or o ly a very limited 
choice – and all have incentives that make it virtually imperative that employees use their 
contract providers.) 
Many Americans think of “socialized medicine” as evil. Yet, we drive on 
socialized roads, we are educated in socialized schools, and we are protected by 
socialized police and socialized fire departments. These are public goods and services, 
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and considering access to health care to be a public good should not be tha much of a 
leap. Americans must be willing to stand up and say so. 
The mechanisms are largely in place. Galbraith (2008) makes the point that most 
of the necessary infrastructure already exists to solve our ecnomic problems thanks to 
the Roosevelt response to the Great Depression. Reinhardt (2009) holds that not all 
Americans consider government to be intrinsically evil. He points out that we have a 
pretty good civil service system and the lowest taxes of any developed nation. 
Government can be a place where people work together to solve common problems and 
provide public goods and services. That is the idea behind democracy.  




Adverse Selection refers to a situation in which, usually due to information 
asymmetry, a purchaser’s demand for insurance rises as his or her risk for loss increases, 
while the insurer is unable to price for this increase in demand. As an example, if insurers 
do not price coverage higher for smokers than for non-smokers, the insurance would be a 
better buy for the smoker as they are more likely to incur a claim. Smokers would thus be 
more likely to select the coverage than non-smokers, which would result in an adverse 
phenomenon (higher claims) for the insurer. Social norms and regulations may also 
prohibit insurers from considering certain factors (such as gender or ethnicity) in making 
pricing decisions. This becomes particularly problematic when underwriting, the process 
of selecting which risks to insure and at what price, is dismissed in favor of a guaranteed 
right to purchase the coverage (Cardon & Hendel, 2001; Polborn, Hoy, & Sadanand, 
2004). 
Association plans are group insurance plans underwritten by health insurance 
companies and offered to groups of people based upon their membership in some sort of 
organization or association. Credit unions, automobile associations, fraternal orders, and 
business and professional organizations are all examples of associations that typically 
offer such plans to their members. Many self-employed persons avail themselves of 
association plans if they are eligible for them in lieu of typically more expensive 
individual plans. 
Chargemaster Lists are the master lists of hospital charges for each procedure or 
supply offered in a given hospital. The chargemaster list is generally closely-held and not 
available to the general public (G. F. Anderson, 2007). 
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Co-insurance is generally expressed as a percentage of approved charges after 
the deductible has been paid by the insured. This is usually in the rang  of 20 percent of 
charges, though it may be higher if the insured chooses a provider who does not have a 
negotiated pricing agreement with the insurer. Co-insurance, like deductibles and co-
payments, acts to reduce ex post moral hazard (see below) by discouraging patients from 
utilizing more expensive procedures when less expensive procedures will suffice. Co-
insurance is usually capped by an out-of-pocket maximum amount above which the 
insurance company pays 100 percent of approved charges. 
Comprehensive Coverage is sometimes referred to in the health insurance 
market as “major medical.” Comprehensive coverage pays based upon some negotiated 
price or percentage of actual charges. Indemnity plans (see below) pay a set fee for each 
service, e.g., $25 per day of hospitalization. 
Co-payment is a flat fee per service rendered which must be paid by the 
consumer at the time of service. Typically in the $10 to $50 range for a doctor’s visit, 
depending on whether a generalist or a specialist, the premise behind co-payments is to 
reduce the incentive of the insured to overutilize medical services (see “moral hazard” 
below). Co-payments may also be applied to hospital stays, emergency room visits 
(usually for non-emergencies), and prescription drugs as well as other charges. 
Deductibles are an amount which must be paid out of the insured’s pocket before 
insurance pays anything for services. Unlike co-payments, deductibles are cumulative 
and generally start over at the beginning of each insurance plan year. Co-payments do not 
count toward deductible requirements, nor do co-payments usually cease to pply once 
deductibles are met. Higher deductibles generally result in lower pr miums, as the 
insurance company has less exposure to ex post moral hazard (see below). 
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Experience-rated group health insurance is the type of insurance provided by 
most employers, especially those not large enough to self-insure (see “self-insured plans” 
below). These policies are purchased by the employer from a group health insurance 
company. The premiums are based upon the previous claims experience of the employer. 
If an employer has a large number of expensive claims, that employer can expect its 
premiums to increase the following renewal period (usually a year) much more rapidly 
than employers who have healthier (or at least smaller-claims producing) employees and 
dependents. 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the total value of goods and services 
produced in a given country’s economy in a year. In the United States, GDP is expressed 
in U.S. Dollars (Sullivan & Sheffrin, 2003). 
Indemnity Coverage or indemnity plans refers to insurance plans that pay a set 
fee per procedure or day of hospitalization. Indemnity coverage is less expensive than 
comprehensive coverage (see above) in general, but it provides significantly fewer 
benefits as well. 
Legislative Tempo, as I use it in this dissertation, refers to the amount and type 
of legislation being submitted to Congress by the executive branch. 
Managed Care refers to programs or organizations whose goal is to reduce the 
cost of providing health care while improving the quality of the car  delivered. The term 
encompasses a variety of techniques and methods including economic incentives to 
physicians and patients to select less costly care, increased cost-sharing with 
beneficiaries, and controls on hospital admissions and lengths of hospital stays (MeSH, 
n.d.)  
Moral Hazard refers to the tendency of a party who is insulated from a risk to 
behave differently than if the party were fully exposed to the risk. In health insurance 
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markets, this means that insured persons may either engage in more risky behavior (e.g., 
start smoking once covered), which is called ex ante moral hazard, or may ask the insurer 
to pay for more covered services once insured (e.g., more doctor visis), which is called 
ex post moral hazard (Arrow, 1971). The usually methods of countering the ex post moral 
hazard are deductibles, co-payments, and coinsurance. Without these direct costs to the 
insured person, there would be no economic incentive to avoid going to the doctor 
whenever possible. The net result, however, is that poorer people, those who may have 
trouble paying the deductibles or co-payments, may postpone treatment until such time as 
they can no longer do so resulting in an increased cost overall to the insurer. 
Risk pool is the group of risks being covered by an insurer (government or 
private). Generally, it refers to the people who will be covered by an insurer and the 
insured losses which they may incur over a given period of time. Pooling risk is a basic 
principle of insurance. Everyone in the pool pays a premium to be insured against a risk. 
Usually a limited number of people will actually incur an insured loss. The premiums 
collected are then used to pay for the cost of the insured loss. In the case of private for-
profit companies, an additional amount must be included in the premium for pro it for the 
company as well as overhead expenses. 
Self-insured plans are private employer-provided plans where the employing 
corporation provides the funds for claims itself rather than relying o  an insurance 
company. In many cases, self-insured plans hire a third-party administrator (often an 
insurance company) to actually process and pay the claims while they collect any 
premiums and supply the funds for the claims out of the corporation’s profits. Such plans 
are almost exclusively the domain of very large corporations and, in some cases, 
government or quasi-governmental agencies such as universities. In some cases, self-
insured companies may elect to purchase so-called “stop loss” insurance. This is 
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relatively low-cost insurance that picks up when a given employee’s claims reach a pre-
determined limit, e.g., $500,000, with any risk above that amount borne by an insurance 
carrier instead of by the employer itself. 
Socialized Medicine refers to systems in which the government provides medical 
care directly to the public through government-employed providers. Often raised as a 
rallying cry against universal health care in the United States, many Western countries do 
not, in fact, have true socialized medicine. Rather, they have single-payer insurance 
where the government covers the costs of privately provided care. 
Worker’s Compensation Insurance covers medical expenses and lost wages 
due to job-related injury or illness. Most states require employers who employ more than 
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Figure 12:   Percent of Each Race That Was Uninsured During 2007 [DeNavas-
Walt, et al. (2008)] 
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Figure 13:   Percent of Each Age Grouping That Was Uninsured During 2007 
[DeNavas-Walt, et al. (2008)] 
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Figure 14:   Percent of Each Household Income Category That Was Uninsured 
During 2007 [DeNavas-Walt, et al. (2008)] 
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Figure 15:   Percent of Each Working Status That Was Uninsured During 2007 
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